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THE LAW REFORM COMMISSION
OF CANADA'S EVIDENCE CODE
By NEIL BROOKS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In its Report on Evidence, the Law Reform Commission of Canada included a draft Evidence Code that they recommended be enacted by Parliament.1 The Code would apply, in the main, to criminal proceedings and to
proceedings before the Federal Court of Canada. 2 It took four years to prepare: preliminary work began in the summer of 1971; the Code was published
in the late fall of 1975. During the preparation of the Code, when the Evidence Project of the Law Reform Commission was releasing study papers on
various aspects of evidence laws and after the Code's publication, the Commission's work on evidence law was the subject of extensive comment and
criticism from the bench and bar.4
The purpose of this article is to respond to some of the general questions
and concerns about the Code frequently raised by these commentators and
critics. I will not deal with criticisms made of specific sections in the Code;
the Report on Evidence itself contains most of the answers to these criticisms.
Much of the background to the Code, however, has not been adequately explained and it may be that a greater understanding of these matters will lead
to a better appreciation of the overall objectives of the Code. This article will
© Copyright, 1978, Neil Brooks.
* Neil Brooks is an Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. He was the Special Consultant to the Law Reform Commission of Canada on
the Evidence Project.
I am deeply indebted to my colleague, John McCamus, for generously providing
helpful comments and suggestions. I would also like to acknowledge the invaluable
assistance of Sara Joyce in preparing this article for publication.
' Report on Evidence (Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1975). The
Report consists of an introductory note, an Evidence Code and comments on the structure and specific provisions of the Code. The Report was republished in separate French
and English editions in 1977.
2 Evidence Code, s. 86.
a Study Papers Nos. 1 to 4 were published together in 1972: Competence and
Compellability; Manner of Questioning Witnesses; Credibility; Character. Study Paper
No. 5, Compellability of the Accused and the Admissibility of his Statements, appeared
in 1973. Study Papers Nos. 6 to 8 were published together in 1973: Judicial Notice;
Opinion and Expert Evidence; Burdens of Proof and Presumptions. The remaining
studies were published individually: Hearsay (No. 9, 1974); The Exclusion of Illegally
Obtained Evidence (No. 10, 1974); Corroboration (No. 11, 1975); Professional Privileges Before the Courts (No. 12, 1975).
4
The written comments are on file at the Commission and have been collected in
a volume that collates them to the sections in the Code. J. L. Baudouin and N. Brooks,
Written Comments Received from the Public Relating to the Laws of Evidence (Ottawa:
Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1976). Many more comments were, however,
made orally to the Commissioners and staff members during countless meetings with the
bench and bar across the country.
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survey the reasons why the Law Reform Commission of Canada undertook a
study of evidence law, the reform attempts that predated the Code, the procedure followed by the Commission in studying the rules, and the philosophy
underlying the substance and the drafting of the Code. It will also attempt
to explain some of the criticisms made of the Code.
The aspects of the Code that I have chosen to discuss have been determined by the general tenor of the comments made about the Code. More
particularly, they reflect, to some extent, the fact that the comments from the
bench and bar on the Code and the Evidence Project's study papers can be
fairly described as overwhelmingly hostile. Representative comments include
cryptic and blunt remarks such as "unacceptable"; 5 "[it will] introduce chaos
and lead to disaster"; 6 and, "It is difficult to take any of it seriously .. .";7 to
more extended but no less pointed criticism: "If this proposed legislation,
which wipes out the common law of evidence, is enacted every citizen of this
country has a right to fear that in one stroke the Government will have swept
away fundamental protections which have been developed over centuries to
protect the accused from the State"; 8 and, "... I find little merit, considerable
harm and inconceivable stupidity in the reports. It seems clear that their
authors have no experience of what actually happens in court and that their
scales of values and priorities are foreign to the fundamental traditions and indeed life-blood of our jurisprudence." 9
These comments by the bench and bar might be contrasted to assessments of the Code made by Sir Rupert Cross: "The Code is the simplest and
boldest that I have encountered and I commend it as preferable to any of the
three comparable American productions ...
";10 and, "I am ...inclined to
say that, were it adopted just as it is, the distinction of having the best code
of evidence in the common law world would go to Canada.""1
5 R. Anderson, A Criticism of the Evidence Code: Some Practical Considerations
(1977), 11 U.B.C.L. Rev. 163 at 186.
0
Supra, note 4 at 40.
7
A. Mewett, Law Reform Commission of Canada Report on Evidence (1975-76),
18 Crim. L.Q. 155 at 155. Professor Mewett, one of the few academics to comment
on the Report, was, at the time he made these remarks, the director of a research team
on the law of evidence under the Ontario Law Reform Commission. The research
papers prepared by this team formed the basis of Ontario's Report on the Law of
Evidence (Toronto: Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1976). Somewhat surprisingly,
Professor Mewett had, six years earlier, argued that, "[a]nything relevant should be
admissible, subject always to the discretion of the trial judge to exclude or discount
anything the probative value of which is outweighed by its unfairness." A. Mewett,
Evidence in Criminal Cases (1968-69), 11 Crim. L.Q. 241 at 242. This is certainly
the ideal toward which the drafters of the Code strove.
8
Letter to the Attorney General, Mr. Basford, from the Criminal Lawyers Association, in 2 Criminal Lawyers Association Newsletter 5 (April, 1977).
9Bowman, a lawyer, in Comments to the Law Reform Commission of Canada on
the Law of Evidence Project's Study Papers (Winnipeg: Manitoba Law Reform Commission, 1972) at 27.
' R. Cross, An English Lawyer's First Impressions of the Proposed Canadian
Evidence Code (unpublished). (A copy is on file at the offices of the Osgoode Hall
Law Journal.)
11
R. Cross, The Proposed Canadian Evidence Code and the Civil Evidence Act
1968, to be published in a forthcoming issue of the Canadian Bar Review.

1978]

Law Reform Commission of Canada

II.- WHY THE STUDY OF EVIDENCE WAS UNDERTAKEN
Critics of the Code often launched their assaults by questioning the need

for a study of evidence law at all. A typical comment described the project
as "... a make-work project for academics who are seemingly unaware of the

fact that the present laws of evidence are functioning satisfactorily at least in
British Columbia."'' A frequent variant on this theme consisted of posing the
question rhetorically as an argument against the Code. For instance, in a
recent article, a Judge from British Columbia asked, "Where is the demand
from the public (or anyone else) for an evidence Code?"' 13
The most important reason why the Commission undertook a study of
evidence law was that the rules appeared to be in desperate need of reform.
In the next section of this article the basis for this position will be considered.
However, this same comment might be made of many areas of law. Thus I
will here review some of the discussion leading up to the establishment of the

Commission and the setting of its first priorities in order to indicate why evidence was a logical subject for the Commission to study.
1. The Government's Expectations
Under the Law Reform Commission Act, the Commission is free to carry
out whatever studies it "deems fiecessary for the proper discharge of its functions."'14 The Minister of Justice may, however, specifically direct that the
Commission study a particular subject area.' 5 While the Minister did not formally direct the Commission to undertake a review of the laws of evidence,
the government clearly contemplated at the time of establishing the Commission that the laws of evidence would receive priority in the Commission's

work.

10

12 Supra, note 4 at 46.
13 Supra, note 5 at 167. The Evidence Project noted in the preface to its first four

study papers, supra, note 3, that "[public pressure for reform of the law of evidence
has not been as great as for improvement of some of the areas of substantive law. The
law of evidence is, in the main, lawyer's law; laymen are affected by it only when they
appear in court. Therefore, except with respect to those few rules of evidence which
affect the accused person because of his special status in court, the rules have never
become a public issue."
14
Law Reform Commission Act, R.S.C. 1970, (1st Supp.), c. 23, s. 12(1).
1r Id. s. 12(2).
10 Apart from the details of organization, the hiring of research staff, and related
matters, the Commission did give priority to preparing our program of studies.
Quite frankly, certain important questions had already been decided. It was clear,
from statements made by the then Minister of Justice, the Honourable John
Turner, in the House of Commons and elsewhere, that the expectation was that
our most important undertakings were to be in the areas of criminal law and
evidence. We were in no way dissatisfied with this understanding. The very selection of the members left no real alternative. Mr. Justice Hartt and Mr. Justice
Lamer were known for their work in criminal law and Professor Martin Friedland
was a distinguished criminal law teacher and scholar.
W. Ryan, The Law Reform Commission of Canada (1976), 25 U.N.B.L.. 3 at 8.
Even before the Commission was constituted it was reasonably clear that there
was a widespread expectation that the major items of investigation during its
initial years would fall within the broad sweep of the criminal law and the law
of evidence.
First Annual Report of the Law Reform Commission of Canada (Ottawa: Law Reform
Commission of Canada, 1972) at 4.
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On the second reading of the Law Reform Commission Bill, the then
Minister of Justice, the Honourable John N. Turner, suggested that one of the
immediate priorities of the Commission would be to thoroughly revise the
CanadaEvidence Act and to try to achieve some degree of uniformity between
the criminal and civil laws of evidence throughout Canada.17 When the Bill
was before the Commons Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, he repeated
his intention to refer the Canada Evidence Act and the Criminal Code to the
Commission and stated that "... the appointments I intend to make would
reflect that particular expertise during the first five years of the life of the
Commission." ' s
The Government's commitment to review the laws of evidence predates,
however, the formation of the Law Reform Commission. In introducing amendments to the Evidence Act in 1969, Justice Minister Turner stated:
... Mhe general law of evidence in this country has tended to remain as frozen
as an iceberg, while the substantive civil and criminal law has been developed
largely by statute to keep in pace with changing social conditions.
This year I am initiating a general overhaul of the Canada Evidence Act
which I hope will result in major reforms to that statute.19

Many members of the House spoke at that time of the need to examine the
entire law of evidence. Indeed, speakers from each party were adamant that
it be reviewed without further delay. Mr. Eldon M. Woolliams (Progressive
Conservative) suggested that the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal
Affairs should consider the entire Canada Evidence Act.20 Mr. John Gilbert
stated that "....

we in the New Democratic Party welcome [Mr. Turner's]

statement that it is his intention to have a general overhaul of the Canada
Evidence Act in the near future." 21 Mr. Andr6 Fortin (Cr6ditiste) was the
most forceful in arguing that the whole of the law of evidence should be
reviewed:
Mr. Speaker, the Evidence Act was enacted 75 years ago and it has never been
amended since.
. . . [wihy . . . must [we] be satisfied today with amending the Evidence
Act-and very limited amendment indeed instead of changing entirely such an
important legislation, on which rests in a way the efficient administration of
justice.

He suggested the priority would be:
. . revising on a total basis, the Canada Evidence Act and, in doing so [to]
arrange that the criminal laws on evidence correspond in so far as that is possible
with the civil law on evidence across Canada, both within the civil law system
of Quebec and the common law system obtaining in the other nine provinces.
Can: H. of C., Debates, February 23, 1970 at 3963.
18 Can: H. of C., Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, April 27, 1970,
17

*

vol. 22, at 20.
19 Can: H. of C., Debates, January 20, 1969 at 4494.
20
1d. at 4496.

21 Id. at 4500.
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[A] complete review of the Evidence Act would certainly help improve the
efficiency of our judicial system.
be
I therefore want him to give us the assurance that the law as a whole will
22
reviewed without further delay because we have already waited far too long.

Later in the debate, Mr. Turner, in speaking of the proposal to establish a

Law Reform Commission, added that "[t]he law of evidence would be a very
"23 Thus, although the law of evidence was never
useful reference to it ....specifically referred to the Commission, it was undoubtedly the government's
expectation that the Law Reform Commission would undertake a complete
review of this subject.
Furthermore, a study of evidence law was an appropriate if not necessary
companion to the other studies that the Commission undertook. From the
outset the Commission was committed to reviewing comprehensively the criminal law of Canada. 24 The study of the laws of criminal evidence seemed an
appropriate, if incidental, part of that larger study. However, once the Com25
mission decided to embark on a study of criminal procedure, a study of
20
criminal evidence appeared essential.
Before finalizing its initial research programme, the Commission sent a
questionnaire to lawyers, judges, and others asking them what, in their view,
should be areas of priority in law reform. The questionnaire listed the law of
evidence as a potential area of study. 27 Although the overall response to the
questionnaire was disappointing, many of the respondents noted that evidence
was an area that needed reform. 28 No one at that time suggested that it would
be a waste of time to study the law of evidence because the rules in their present form were working satisfactorily. Thus, it understandably came as a surprise to the Commission when later it was alleged that the laws of evidence
were not in need of reform, and that the Evidence Project was "a make-work
project."
The Government's judgment that the time was ripe for a complete study
of the rules of evidence seemed to be confirmed by the fact that practically
23

Id.at 4505.

16.
251d.
20 "There can be no thoroughly effective reform in law administration, however,
without an adequate treatment of the matter of evidence." C. Callaghan and E. Ferguson,
Evidence and the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1936), 45 Yale L.J. 622 at
622.
2
7 Questionnaire, at 4.
28
"As a result of this consultation it was apparent that our expectation that we
should undertake extensive research in criminal law and evidence was justified."
Annual Report, supra, note 16 at 4-5. At the time the Commission was established,
what public comments there were also urged the reform of the rules of evidence. See,
for example, Mewett, Evidence in Criminal Cases, supra, note 7 at 242.
22
Id. at 4502.
24 Annual Report,s,,;ra, note

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 16, NO. 2

every law reform body in the common law world was studying evidence. 20
The late 1960's and early 1970's have been called "a major reforming period
29 See the discussion, infra, Part C. See also the following reform efforts in other
jurisdictions:
England
a. Law Reform Committee, Hearsay Evidence in Civil Proceedings (Thirteenth
Report) (Cmnd. 2964) (1966); The Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn (Fifteenth Report) (Cmnd. 3391) (1967); Privilege in Civil Proceedings (Sixteenth Report) (Cmnd. 3472) (1967).
b. Memoranda by Committee on Evidence, Justice (British Section of the International Commission of Jurists): 1. Judgments and Convictions as Evidence;
2. Crown Privilege; 3. Court Witnesses; 4. Character in Criminal Cases; 5.Impeaching One's Own Witness; 6. Identification; 7. Redraft of Evidence Act,
1938; 8. Spouses' Privilege; 9. Availability of Prosecution Evidence to the
Defence; 10. Discovery in Aid of the Evidence Act; 11. Advance Notice of
Special Defences; 12. The Interrogation of Suspects; 13. Confessions of Persons other than Police Officers; 14. The Accused as a Witness; 15. Admission
of Accused's Record; 16. Hearsay in Criminal Cases.
Australia

a. Western Australia Law Reform Commission, Evidence of Criminal Convictions in Civil Proceedings,Working Paper, Project No. 20 (1971) and Report
(1972); Competence and Compellability of Spouses as Witnesses in Criminal
Proceedings,Working Paper, Project No. 31 (1974) and Report (1977); Privilege for Technical and Medical Reports in Legal Proceedings, Working Paper,
Project No. 40 (1974) and Report (1975); Privilege For Journalists,Working
Paper, Project No. 53 (1977).
b. Victoria Statute Law Revision Committee, Competence and Compellability
of Spouses To Give Evidence (1966); Right of An Accused Person to Make

an Unsworn Statement (1972). Victoria Law Reform Commissioners, Spouse-

Witnesses (Competence and Compellability), Report No. 6 (1976).
c. Tasmania Law Reform Commission, Law of Evidence: The Hearsay Rule
(1970); Evidence Bill 1975 (Microfilm and other reproductions) (1976).
d. South Australia Law Reform Committee, Evidence Act, 1929-1968 and the
Children's Protection Act, 1936-1961 (First Report) (1968); Evidence ActNew Part VIA Computer Evidence (Tenth Report) (1969). Criminal Law and
Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, Court Procedure and
Evidence (Third Report) (1975).
e. Queensland Law Reform Commission, Evidence (Q.L.R.C. 19) (1975).
f. New South Wales Law Reform Commission, The Rule Against Hearsay, Working Paper (1976); Evidence (Business Records), Report (L.R.C. 17) (1973).
New Zealand
Torts and General Law Reform Committee of New Zealand, Professional
Privilege In The Law of Evidence (1977); The Rule In Hollington v. Hewthorn
(1972); Hearsay Evidence (1967).
Ireland

The revision and codification of the law of evidence, both civil and

criminal, has been a subject much discussed for many years in common
law countries and there seems to be general agreement as to the desirability of a code or codes of evidence, if such should prove to be practicable.
The Commission appreciates that because of the immensity of the task
it would not be feasible to undertake the preparation of comprehensive
codes all at once. It is proposed that particular areas of the law be examined with a view to reform and that the reforms be designed to fit
into an ultimate whole without the necessity for any subsequent substantial change.
Law Reform Commission of Ireland, First Programme 8 (1976).
South Africa

South African Law Commission, Annual Report 3 (1976) (Their intention is
to revise the law of evidence as a whole and to codify it.)
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in the law of evidence." 30 In 1968 an English authority wrote that, a "hurricane" was upon us in the law of evidence. He predicted that a wind of change
"of a velocity and turbulence hitherto unknown is going to sweep away common law principles hitherto regarded as fundamental."31
2. The PresentRules of Evidence Are in Need of Reform
The most compelling reason for reviewing and recommending reform of
the laws of evidence was simply that they are in drastic need of reform. If the
laws of evidence were once rational and of assistance in furthering the objectives of the procedural system, they are no longer so. When vigorously applied, the rules result in trial delays, intimidation of witnesses, confusion of
jurors and the public, unseemly bickering over trivial issues, rulings that prevent cases from being decided on their merits, and technical appeals that are
both time-consuming and expensive. The rules have become rigid, complex
and technical. They are a disgrace to the common law. 32 They have been applied in case after case without reference to their original purpose or to the
objectives of the system they are designed to regulate. In no area of law has
the common law lawyer's sometimes simple-minded and fanatic urge to
pigeonhole, conceptualize
and classify so completely dominated the resolution
33
of serious problems.
Even though it is easy to demonstrate that evidence jurisprudence suffers
from the dead hand of conceptualism, it is nevertheless difficult to verify directly whether the rules are working well or not. However, given the conceptualism of the rules, along with the fact that there have been no substantial changes in the rules of evidence for over one hundred years, that most
of the distinctions and assumptions upon which the rules are based are disingenuous or incorrect, and that virtually every serious and thoughtful commentator on the rules of evidence has called for drastic reform, it would be
indeed surprising if the rules were working efficiently.
Every area of law has changed dramatically over the past one hundred
years. A lawyer practising in 1878 would probably recognize only one area
of present day law as being even remotely familiar; that area would be evidence law. Not only would he recognize the rules, but he could walk into a
present day courtroom, pick up a brief, and present a case without the judge
even noticing that he hailed from a previous generation. Yet, virtually every
aspect of the litigation process and of daily life, upon which the rules of evidence are premised, has changed. Modern business records and methods of
information retrieval bear little resemblance to the hand-written records upon
30 Panel discussion in Modification of the Hearsay Rule (1971), 45 Aust. L.J. 531
at 559 (per Harding).
31 R. Gooderson, Previous Consistent Statements, [1968] Camb. L.J. 64 at 64.
32 To be quite brutal about evidence law, as the profession has known (but not
understood) it, it is presently a disgrace to the common law system.
G. Murray, Evidence Reform: Some Random Thoughts (unpublished essay, Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1975).
33 In a survey of over one hundred recent cases, I have attempted to show the
extent to which evidence cases are decided without reference to principle. See N. Brooks,
Annual Survey of CanadianLaw: Evidence (1975), 7 Ottawa L. Rev. 600.
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which most of the rules of authentication and original evidence are premised.
Changes in pre-trial discovery and the more extensive use of written evidence
have rendered meaningless many rules designed to prevent surprise at trial.
The trend towards specialized knowledge and the consequent reliance upon
expert testimony has rendered obsolete rules relating to expert testimony.
Finally, given the progress made in the scientific study of human behavior,
and the increased sophistication of jurors, rules formulated by judges on the
basis of their intuitive understanding of human behavior and of the inferencedrawing abilities of illiterate jurors are out-dated.
The suspicion that rules of evidence which were formulated over one
hundred years ago cannot sensibly govern the presentation of proof in a
modern trial is confirmed by a review of the distinctions these rules compel
judges to make and the specific empirical assumptions upon which they are
premised. The rules of evidence require lawyers to debate (at enormous expense to the State and to those unfortunate souls who become entrapped in
the cycle of litigation) such questions as: Whether the assertion that "he
looked badly hurt" is a statement of fact or opinion? Whether the victim of a
homicide had a settled and hopeless expectation of death when he uttered a
statement purporting to identify his assailant? Whether a statement by the
accused was made voluntarily? Whether a child understands the nature of the
oath? Whether a document was made in the course of duty? Whether an
opinion embraces the ultimate issue in a case? Whether the testimony of a
sworn child can corroborate the testimony of an unsworn child? Whether a
scream can amount to corroboration? Whether a document relates to a collateral matter? Whether a statement is part of the res gestae? 34 Whether evidence is being offered to prove the accused's identity, in which case it is admissible, or whether it is being offered to prove his disposition to commit a
particular act, in which case it is inadmissible? At first glance many lawyers
would probably find nothing strange about the prospect of debating these
questions before a bench of nine learned judges. Upon reflection, however, it
seems evident that many of these questions assume a distinction that is epistemologically or metaphysically unsound. At the very least, not one of them
draws a distinction that relates in any way to the principles that should underlie a rational body of rules used to determine whether certain evidence ought
to be admissible in a judicial trial.
As well as injecting these nonsensical distinctions into the litigation pro34 All the leading evidence scholars have recognized the meaninglessness of these
questions, so I will not footnote references. However, a remark made by one of the
great common law jurists nicely states the objection which could be made to all these
questions. The following anecdote was found in E. R. Thayer's teaching notes:
When counsel was attempting to introduce certain hearsay, Holmes J. presiding
said "No, the hearsay rule has been a good deal nibbled round the edges, but
nobody has taken quite such a bite out of as that. And I think I won't set the
example." "Not as part of the res gestae?" asked counsel. Holmes J., replied:
"The man who uses that phrase has lost temporarily all power of analyzing ideas.
For my part, I prefer to give articulate reasons for my decisions."
Quoted in Hale, Report of the Committee on Administration of Justice on the Model
Code of Evidence-A Reply (1947), 22 J. State B. Calif. 188 at 193.
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cess, virtually every rule of evidence rests upon a questionable empirical assumption. These assumptions are of two kinds: some relate to the jury's inference-drawing ability; others relate to the manner in which people behave
under certain circumstances. The assumptions relating to the jury's inferencedrawing ability are often startling. The ultimate issue rule (a rule which holds

that a witness cannot give direct testimony about the ultimate issue in the
case) assumes that the jury is so unintelligent that, if a witness testifies as to
how the ultimate factual issue in the case ought to be resolved, the jury will
blindly accept the truth of such an assertion, forgetting that the resolution of
the factual issues is their function.s Even the assumption behind the hearsay
rule, that the jury is not intelligent enough to appreciate the frailties of statements made by persons out of court who are not subject to cross-examination,30 must appear ridiculous to anyone who is not trained by rote to believe
that the rule is an essential prerequisite to rational fact-finding.
Even if it is not accepted that many of the assumptions underlying the
rules are absurd on their face, it must at least be apparent that they are frequently inconsistent. Jurors are assumed for some purposes to be imbecilic,
while for other purposes they are assumed to have mental powers that operate
with computer-like precision. For example, it is assumed that, from evidence
of a witness's previous consistent or inconsistent statement, the jury can draw
an inference about the witness's credibility without, at the same time, drawing
an inference about the truth of the facts asserted in the previous statement.
(As in all these examples, the jury is assumed to be capable of drawing the

former inference, incapable of rationally drawing the latter, yet brilliant
35 Wigmore delivers a fatal blow to the ultimate issue rule in a contrived scenario
in which he has an American lawyer attempt to explain to a foreign lawyer why
testimony upon the ultimate issue is excluded:
So now comes the foreign lawyer, and asks his friend, "What was the reason for
prohibiting that testimony?" And the friend replies, "Because that is the very
question which the jury is to decide." Whereon the foreign lawyer replies, in
astonishment, "But that would seem to be the very reason for its admission.
Instruction from qualified persons is what the jury want, is it not? Why call
qualified persons, if not to help the jury on the very point in issue?"
"No," answers the American friend, "our law forbids that; the jury might
believe them, and thus might go wrong."
"But if these experts were wrong, then experts could be called on the other
side to say so?"
"Yes, of course; but then the jury would be confused."
"They might; but may they not also be confused when any other witnesses
on opposite sides contradict each other?"
"Yes, but that can't be helped."
"Then why call the experts at all?"
"No, we couldn't very well do that, but we can call them and then stop them
from being of any service; which is what our rule amounts to."
J. H. Wigmore, Looking Behind the Letter of the Law (1937), 4 U. of Chicago L. Rev.
259 at 263-64.
36 1 am aware that countless explanations have been given for the hearsay rule,
and for every other rule of evidence for that matter. The frailty of the jury, however.
is certainly the most commonly given explanation for the hearsay rule. For example:
".... [I]n England, where the jury are the sole judges of the fact, hearsay evidence is
properly excluded because no man can tell what effect it might have upon their minds."
per Mansfield C.J., In re Berkeley (1811), 4 Camp. 402 at 416; 171 E.R. 128 at 135.

250

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 16, NO. 2

enough to be able to distinguish between them and draw the former, but not
the latter, when so instructed by the judge, even though both inferences logically suggest themselves.) Another rule assumes that, from evidence of the
accused's silence in the face of police questioning, the jury can make a judgment about the weight to be given to the accused's defence, but not at the
same time draw a direct inference of guilt from that silence. A further assumption is that the jury can, from a statement made by one co-accused which implicates both accused, draw an inference of guilt with respect to the accused
who made the statement, but put the statement completely out of its mind
when considering the guilt of the other accused. Finally, we assume that the
jury can draw an inference about the accused's credibility from evidence of
the accused's past criminal record but not,8 7at the same time, draw a direct
inference about the accused's probable guilt.

Other rules of evidence based on assumptions about the jury's fact-finding
ability are not only wrong, but are likely to have an effect exactly opposite to
that intended. The authors of one empirical study on the jury found that when
the jury receives the standard instructions that it is dangerous to convict the
accused on the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, they are in fact
more likely to convict. 88 The authors of another study found that in a tort
case where the jury heard the inadmissible evidence that the defendant was
insured, they gave the plaintiff a higher award of damages, if as is customary,
they were instructed to ignore that fact, than if they were given no special
9
instructions with respect to it.3
Other rules of evidence, even if they have their intended effect on jury
deliberations, are applied in the wrong kinds of cases. The rule in Hodge's
Case is an example. This rule requires the jury to be instructed, in cases where
the evidence is substantially circumstantial, that "before it can find the accused
guilty, it must be satisfied that the circumstances proved in evidence are not
only consistent with the accused having committed the act, but also that they
are inconsistent with any other rational conclusion than that the accused is
the guilty person. '40 Assuming for a moment that the rule makes literal sense
(which it does not because in every case there will always be more than one
explanation which could rationally explain the evidence), and that such an
instruction to the jury will affect their evaluation of the evidence (it likely does
not, for irrespective of what the jury is instructed on the matter of burden of
proof, they are likely to do the sensible thing and decide whether the particular
accused in the particular case ought to be convicted) ,41 it is given in the wrong
kinds of cases. The available empirical evidence suggests that the danger that
the jury will not correctly evaluate circumstantial evidence is small. There is
8

See, generally, R. Cross, An Attempt to Update the Law of Evidence (Jerusalem:
Magnes Press, Hebrew University, 1974).
38 L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, [1973] Crim. L. Rev. 208
at 220.
8
9D. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project (1959), 38 Nebraska
L. Rev.744 at 753, 754.
40
In re Hodge (1838), 2 Lew.C.C. 227 at 228, 168 E.R. 1136 at 1137.
41
See generally, A. Doob, "Rules of Evidence and Laws of Behavior" in Psychology
and The Litigation Process (Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada, 1977) at 75-76.
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strong evidence, however, that the jury tends to give too much weight to direct
eyewitness testimony. Studies of actual cases in which a person was wrongfully convicted reveal that a wrongful conviction is much more likely to result
in a case involving eyewitness testimony than in one involving any other kind
of evidence. Only a very small number of recorded cases of wrongful conviction involve substantially circumstantial evidence. 42 The familiar retort that
this fact only proves that the rule in Hodge's Case works carries no weight
here because all of these studies were conducted in jurisdictions that did not
have the rule.
A controlled experiment performed by an experimental psychologist has
confirmed that juries are likely to give too much credence to eyewitness testimony.43 In the experiment, subject-jurors heard the facts of a case involving
only circumstantial evidence and were asked to determine the accused's guilt;
only eighteen percent judged the defendant to be guilty. In another condition
of the experiment the same facts were given to other subject-jurors, but the
additional evidence of an eyewitness was introduced into the scenario; seventytwo percent of the subject-jurors who heard this scenario judged the defendant
to be guilty. In the final condition of the experiment, the facts of the second
condition were repeated, but the eyewitness's testimony was completely discredited. Among other things, the fact that he had only 20/400 vision was
introduced. Nevertheless, sixty-eight percent of the jurors who heard the testimony of the discredited eyewitness voted for conviction. Thus, if a special
cautionary instruction to the jury can be justified, it is clear that it should be
given in cases involving substantially direct evidence, not substantially circumstantial evidence.
When the rules of evidence were first formulated, it might have been
true that special rules were needed to protect the jury from drawing fallacious
inferences and improperly estimating the probability of the existence of the
facts in issue. Certainly most jurists of the day had a very low opinion of the
jury's abilities. Herbert Spencer referred to them as "twelve people of average
ignorance."' The Common Law Commissioners of 1853 noted that the jury
is "unaccustomed to severe intellectual exercise or protracted thought. '45 Lord
Coleridge stated before the House of Lords that the argument that certain evidence should be admissible was based upon "the fallacy, that, whatever is
morally convincing, and whatever reasonable beings would form their judgements and act upon, may be submitted to the jury." 46 However, by the middle
42 See R. Brandon and C. Davies, Wrongful Imprisonment: Mistaken Convictions
and Their Consequences (London: Archon Books, 1973); E. M. Borchard and E. R.
Lutz, Convicting the Innocent: Errors of Criminal Justice (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1932); 1. Frank, B. Frank, and H. M. Hoffman, Not Guilty (New York: Da
Capo Press, 1957); Departmental Committee on Evidence of Identification in Criminal
Cases, Report to the Secretary of State for the Home Department (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1976). This committee was chaired by Lord Devlin.
43
Loftus, "Eyewitness Reports: Psychological Factors and Expert Testimony" in
Psychology and the Litigation Process,supra, note 41 at 94-95.
44 Quoted in Glanville Williams, The Proof of Guilt (3d ed. London: Stevens,
1963) at 271.
45 Quoted in Patrick Devlin, Trial By Jury (London: Stevens, 1966) at 4.
46 Wright v. Tatham (1838), 5 Cl. & Fin. 670 at 690; 7 E.R. 559 at 566.
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of the nineteenth century this view of the ability of jurors showed signs of
changing. In 1861, Chief Justice Cockburn noted: "People were formerly
frightened out of their wits about admitting evidence, lest juries should
go
'' 47
wrong. In modern times we admit the evidence, and discuss its weight.
Certainly there can be little question that modem jurors are better educated and have a broader experience than jurors of the middle nineteenth
century. Jurors at that time were largely illiterate and ignorant of any matters
beyond their day to day existence. Nowadays, not only can virtually all jurors
read, but most have a high school education and all of them will have been
exposed through the mass media to an incredible range of information about
the world in which they live. It would be both presumptuous and negligent for
a law reform commission today to tolerate rules of evidence that were formulated to protect "rude and illiterate" jurors. 48
As well as resting upon questionable assumptions about the jury's inference-drawing abilities, many rules of evidence rest upon dubious assumptions
about human behaviour generally. The rule admitting past sexual conduct in
rape cases assumes that there is a relationship between promiscuity and veracity; the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule assumes that a startling event
stills the reflective thought process and heightens perception; 49 the conditions
47 Queen v. The Churchwardens of Birmingham (1861), 1 B & S 763 at 767; 121
E.R. 897 at 899. In the United States, a judge expressed the same sentiments in even
stronger language in 1853:
And formerly in England, whole juries were composed of rude and illiterate
men-a system of excluding testimony grew up, more technical and artificial than
any to be found in the world.
But as jurors have become more capable of exercising their function intelligently, the Judges both in England and in this country are struggling constantly
to open the door wide as possible: aye, to take it off the hinges, to let in all facts
calculated to affect the minds of the jury in arriving at a correct conclusion ....
Truth, common sense, and enlightened reason, alike demand the abolition
of all those artificial rules which shut out any fact from the jury, however, remotely relevant, or from whatever source derived, which would assist them in coming
to a satisfactory verdict.
Johnson v. State, 14 Ga 55 at 61-62 (1853). per Lumpkin, J.
48 We doubt that modern juries, properly instructed, find special difficulty in evaluating the worth of hearsay evidence. In private and business life most important
decisions are based, at least partly, on hearsay information. Juries are as well
equipped by experience to assess hearsay evidence as they are to assess direct
evidence given by oral testimony.
Report on Evidence (Business Records) (L.R.C. 17), New South Wales Law Reform
Commission, supra, note 29.
We disagree strongly with the argument that juries and lay magistrates will be
over-impressed by hearsay evidence and too ready to convict or acquit on the
strength of it. Anybody with common-sense will understand that evidence which
cannot be tested by cross-examination may well be less reliable than evidence
which can.
Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report: Evidence (General) (Cmnd. 4991,
1972) at 247.
49 The authors of a study of this hearsay exception suggested that these assumptions
are so clearly wrong that, "On psychological grounds, the rule might very well read:
Hearsay is inadmissible, especially (not except) if it be a spontaneous exclamation."
R. M. Hutchins and D. Slesinger, Some Observations On The Law of Evidence (1928),
28 Colum. L. Rev. 432 at 439.
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attaching to the admissibility of a hearsay statement against interest assumes
a person is less likely to make a false statement which is against his proprietary interest than he is to make a false statement that ruins his reputation, or
that might result in him being sentenced to death; the dying declaration exception to the hearsayi rule assumes that a dying person is unlikely to lie (this
assumption is only made in criminal trials in which the accused is charged
with homicide; it is not made in a civil action in which, for example, a few
hundred dollars might be at stake); finally, the rule requiring corroboration
of the testimony of children who cannot be sworn assumes that children who
understand the nature of the oath have a higher moral standard than those
who do not. This last rule also assumes that the testimony of children is unreliable because children are likely to be insincere. In fact, their testimony is
likely to be unreliable because of their underdeveloped perceptual ability, their
inability to conceptualize and their susceptibility to suggestion.
Professor Cleary has observed, with respect to the empirical assumptions
upon which the common law judges based the rules of evidence: "... the

rules of evidence largely have been constructed out of anecdote and unsystematic observation, plus what hopefully passes for reason but could more honestly be labelled conjecture about human behavior." 0 Another commentator
noted ironically, "it is a curious paradox that these very rules are themselves
based on no evidence which would be admissible in any court applying those
rules." 51 In the face of these unsubstantiated and inconsistent empirical assumptions about the jury's inference-drawing process, and about human behavior, one might be forgiven for questioning whether the rules of evidence
are working well. It would indeed be surprising if rules premised upon such
fantastical notions worked well in the real world.
It seems peculiar to have to appeal to authority to support the assertion
that the rules of evidence are a disgrace to the common law. But, judging
from the responses to the Commission's Report on Evidence, it would come
as a surprise to many Canadian lawyers and judges to learn that in this century serious scholars of evidence law have been unanimous in condemning
the rules and calling for their reformY2 This attitude towards the rules is
admittedly in contrast to that held in the early part of the nineteenth century,
50 W. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating (1952), 5 Vand. L. Rev.

277 at 279. (footnote omitted)
51 D. S. Greer, Anything But the Truth? The Reliability of Testimony in Criminal

Trials (1971), 11 British Journal of Criminology 131. Lee Loevinger perhaps made the
point with respect to the naive assumptions about the jury's inference-drawing process
best:
In terms of the rules of evidence themselves, the objection that the exclusionary
rules are required because of the incapacity of juries to act reasonably in their
absence is an assumption based on an opinion derived from a surmise, and altogether lacking in evidence, competent or incompetent, to support it.
Lee Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof (1958), 9 Western Reserve L. Rev.
154 at 172.
52
Although it is not hard to find many expressions by lawyers and judges in panegyric praise of the legal system and its operation, scholars who have studied the
rules of evidence are nearly unanimous in finding them unsatisfactory and illsuited to their function.
Loevinger, id. at 162.
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when many jurists looked upon the rules of evidence "with almost religious
sanctity."' s In 1790, for example, Lord Kenyon C.J, is reported to have
said, ".... [The rules of evidence] have been matured by the wisdom of ages,
and are now revered for their antiquity and the good sense in which they are
founded." 54 A few years later, in 1808, Lord Ellenborough cautioned that he
"should be extremely sorry if anything fell from the court ... which would
in any degree break in upon those sound rules of evidence which have been
established for the security of life, liberty and property...."5r
At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the authors of the emerging
treatises on evidence law were equally unrestrained and eloquent in their praise
of the rules of evidence. In 1810, Swift, an American author, observed: "[The
rules of evidence have been] reduced to a precision, and certainty, susceptible
of little further improvement, and may now be considered as placed on a
basis, that will endure as long as truth and justice shall be revered."'' 0 The
authors of the two finest nineteenth century treatises on evidence, both written
around the middle of the century, also had a high regard for the state of evidence law. Best wrote: "The common law system of evidence ... must ever
claim the highest respect and admiration as a whole, however particular portions of it may be justly or unjustly condemned." 5 Simon Greenleaf, whose
5 During the nineteenth century ... [rules of evidence] were looked upon with
almost religious sanctity without consideration being given to whether their source
was historical accident, a social policy of the time of their origin, an outgrowth
of a formalism then found in pleading and procedure generally, or was based
upon a sound principle of logic and psychology. Discrimination was not made
between principles fundamentally sound and those fantastic in their origin. Generally speaking, it was enough that the rule had been stated and being a rule of
evidence its sins were white-washed and its virtue exhorted. In a large measure
evidence rules were learned rather than thought through, and efforts were directed
toward their classification rather than their criticism.
Mason Ladd, A Modern Code of Evidence (1942), 27 Iowa L. Rev. 213.
54
The full quote is:
All questions upon the rules of evidence- are of vast importance to all orders and
degrees of men; our lives, our liberty, and our property, are all concerned in the
support of these rules, which have been matured by the wisdom of ages, and are
now revered for their antiquity and the good sense upon which they are founded;
they are not rules depending on technical refinements but upon good sense; and
the preservation of them is the first duty of Judges.
R. v. The Inhabitants of Eriswell (1790), 3 Term Reports 707 at 721; 100 E.R. 815 at
823 (K.B.).
55
Higham v. Ridgway (1808), 10 East 109 at 116; 103 E.R. 717 at 720. (K.B.).

56 Z. Swift, A Digest of the Law of Evidence (Hartford: Oliver Cooke, 1810) at x.
An editor of the first treatise on evidence, written by Lord Chief Baron Gilbert,
observed in his preface:
The more extensive our acquaintance with those fundamental maxims, which
regulate the reception of testimony, in our courts of Judicature, the stronger will
be our conviction of their utility, and the more zealous our veneration of that
humane, discreet, and politic wisdom, by which they were established. They do
not grow out of the petty exceptions of cavil and chicane, they are the conclusions
of penetrative and enlightened minds, discerning with quickness, but deciding with
caution.
Gilbert, The Law of Evidence, ed. J. Sedgwick (6th ed. London: W. Clarke and Sons,
1801).
5
7 W. M. Best, Original Preface to The Principles of the Law of Evidence (8th ed.
Boston: The Boston Book Co., 1893) at ix.
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1842 treatise was one of the first to thoroughly probe the principles upon
which the rules rested, was unqualified in his praise of them. At the end of
the first volume of his treatise he reflected: "The student will not fail to observe the symmetry and beauty of this branch of the law ... ; and will rise
from the study of its principles, convinced, with Lord Erskine, that 'they are
founded on the charities of religion-in the philosophy of nature-in the
truths of history-and in the experience of common life.' "58
The eighteenth and nineteenth century commentators, however, were not
unanimous in their praise. Lord Mansfield protested as early as 1762 that
"We don't sit here to take our rules of evidence from Siderfin or Keble." 59
In 1791, Edmund Burke, during the course of Warren Hasting's trial, ridiculed the rules of evidence by noting "that a parrot he had known might get
them by rote in half, an hour and repeat them in five minutes. ' 60 And, of
course, the great reformer, Jeremy Bentham, in his Rationaleof Judicial Evidence was vociferous in his criticism of the rules of evidence. The following
passage is typical of the many critical comments interspersed throughout his
treatise: "So far as evidence is concerned... the existing system of procedure
has been framed, not in pursuit of the ends of justice, but in pursuit of private
sinister ends-in direct hostility to their public ends."' 1
Since the end of the last century, however, it is difficult to find even one
prominent commentator praising the rules. 62 Fifty years after Greenleaf had
Us S. Greenleaf, Treatise on the Law of Evidence, ed. J. H. Wigmore (16th ed.

Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1899) at 730. Jurists in Canada were not to be outdone
in praising the rules of evidence. In 1865, Justice Johnston proclaimed:
The rules of evidence, however, which have been sanctioned by the wisest and
best Judges, and ratified by the experience of ages, as the safest guides in the
investigation of criminal accusations in British courts of justice, are not subtle
refinements, barren technicalities, or arbitrary enactments; they are deductions
drawn from a deep insight into human nature, and being founded on a close
observation of the ordinary current of human action under the influence of the
motives, passions, interests and affections which sway men in the diversified incidents of life, their object is, and they are calculated, to protect the innocent from
unjust condemnation, and to prevent the escape of the guilty from merited
punishment.
The Queen v. Downsey (1865-66), 6 N.S.R. 93 at 113.
5
9 Lowe v. Joliffe (1762), 1 Black W. 365 at 366; 96 E.R. 204 at 204.
COQuoted in J. H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law, Vol. 1 (3d ed.
Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1940) at 237, para. 8, note 5.
61
J. Bentham, "Rationale of Judicial Evidence," ed. J. S. Mill, in The Works of
Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 7, ed. J. Bowring (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962) at 598.
62 There are, of course, exceptions. For example, Hamilton L.. said:
I yield to authority on the laws of evidence without reluctance, because I am
satisfied that in the main the English rules of evidence are just and I am satisfied
also that there is no portion of English law which ought to be more rigidly upheld.
My experience is that the public have in the result derived great benefit from
their strict application.
Attorney-General v. Homer (No. 2), [1913] 2 Ch. 140 at 156.
While not necessarily referring to their rationality, John Chipman Gray is reputed
to have referred to the "close and sustained reasoning" and the "quiet and prolonged
study" necessary to master this branch of the law, of which none "lends itself more
easily to philosophical inquiries or subtlety of distinctions." Quoted in J. Maguire,
Wigmore-Two Centuries (1963-64), 58 Nw. U.L. Rev. 456.
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marvelled at their symmetry, Thayer, one of the first scholars to thoroughly
explore the history of the rules, was much less confident about their symmetry,
and more importantly, their utility. After quoting Greenleaf, he wrote: "I think
that it would be juster and more exact to say that our law of evidence is a
piece of illogical, but by no means irrational, patchwork; not at all to be
admired, nor easily to be found intelligible, except as a product of the jury
system .... ,,63 In spite of this, however, when Thayer wrote his treatise in
1898, he felt that the rules were sufficiently flexible to provide a base for
future juridical development. He thought that they only required treatment
by jurists "... which, beginning with full historical examination of the sub-

ject, and continuing with a criticism of the cases, shall end with a restatement
of the existing law and with suggestions for the course of its future development."6

Thayer's most distinguished student, John Henry Wigmore, admirably
carried out such an examination of the rules,35 but judges appeared incapable
of, or unwilling to assume responsibility for fashioning the rules of evidence
into a rational body of law for regulating judicial fact-finding. Gradually, as
trials became more complex and knowledge about the principles and the assumptions of the rules of evidence increased, the rules began to look increasingly archaic. As a consequence, they came under bitter attack by those concerned about the quality of justice dispensed in the courtroom and the acceptability of its procedures. In 1904, in the preface to the first edition of his
great treatise, Wignore noted, " ...

the rules of Evidence, over and above

others, have come lo bear, even within the profession itself, the stigma of
technical arbitrariness and obstructive unreason."6 Throughout his treatise,
Wigmore was highly critical of the rules,7 and in particular of the manner in
3
which judges and lawyers applied them.
63 J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on the Law of Evidence (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Co., 1898) at 509. Thayer also noted at 527-28:
The chief defects [of the laws of evidence] . . . are that motley and undiscriminated character of its contents ... ; the ambiguity of its terminology; the multiplicity and rigor of its rules and exceptions to rules; the difficulty of grasping
these and perceiving their true place and relation in the system, and of determining, in the decision of new questions whether to give scope and extension to the
rational principles that lie at the bottom of all modem theories of evidence, or
to those checks and qualifications of these principles which have grown out of the
machinery through which our system is applied, namely, the jury. These defects
discourage and make difficult any thorough and scientific knowledge of this part
of the law and its peculiarities .

. .

. In part our rules are a body of confused

doctrines, expressed in ambiguous phrases, Latin or English, half understood, but
glibly used, without perceiving that ideas, pertinent and just in their proper places,
are being misconstrued and misapplied.
64
1d. at 511.
66J. Wigmore, Treatise on the System of Evidence inTrials at Common Law (lst
ed. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1904).
436Id. at vii-viii.
67 A series of comments on cases indexed under the heading "New Trial for Erroneous Rulings," taken from his 1915 supplement, illustrate Wigmore's attitude towards
the bulk of evidence cases decided at that time:
Here is indeed the Trilogy of Technicalism . . .; typical case to show modern
quibbling spirit of lawyers trying the case; this kind of ruling is itself a putrefac-
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As the twentieth century wore on, the commentators became more stri-

dent in their criticism. In 1921, in an article entitled "The Progress of the
Law," Professor Chafee wrote: "The word 'progress' is somewhat ironical
when applied to the enormous outpouring of American decisions on Evidence.
The best proof of progress in this branch of the law would be its virtual disappearance from our appellate courts."'68 Leon Green noted in 1930 that:
"The rules of evidence which have come to govern the hearing of a witness's
story appear as if they were designed to enable his opponent to minimize its
effect." 69 Edmund Morgan, an incisive and analytical evidence scholar, and
chief reporter of the Model Code of Evidence, was unrelenting in his criticism
of evidence law. He described the rules as "obstructions to intelligent investigation,170 and in 1942 observed that "the law of evidence is now where the
law of forms of action and common law pleading was in the early part of the
nineteenth century ...[and that] it is time ... for radical reformation of the
law of evidence."''r Morgan indeed assumed that the sad condition of the rules
of evidence was self-evident. He asserted, "Any thoughtful lawyer who will
merely thumb the pages of Wigmore will be convinced that the existing law
of evidence is in hopeless confusion."7 2 In 1973, Professors Morgan and
Maguire observed, "... there is scarcely a segment of the subject [evidence]
which does not call for re-examination or revision."7 Maguire, in a well-

tion of justice; here the court relapses to the mechanical theory; A rich piece
of judicial artificiality; . . .; justice was bungled here, and . . . it was bungled
because the judges are slaves of a machine-like method and are not bold enough
as justiciars to put two such cases together and solve them rationally and sensibly;
the plain-minded observer can say that such language is that of a helpless slave
of a legal treadmill, not that of an administrator of justice; A system of proof
pretending to call itself rational should not be found employing such a parody of
reasoning; this is an extreme example of the sporting theory of justice; that piece
of weird logomachy.
Wigmore, Supplement to Evidence in Trials at Common Law (2d ed. Boston: Little,
Brown, and Co., 1915) at 19-21.
68 Z. Chafee, Jr., The Progress of the Law, 1919-1921: Evidence (1921-22), 35
Harv. L. Rev. 320.
6
9L. Green, Judge and Jury (Kansas: Vernon Law Book Co., 1930) at 400.
70 Significant Developments in the Law during the War Years-Evidence (New
York: Practising Law Institute, 1946) at 1.
71 E. Morgan, Foreword to the Model Code of Evidence (Philadelphia: American
Law Institute, 1942) at 4. Morgan predicted the outcome should reform not be carried
out, . . . the hampering of investigation by the common law rules of procedure and
evidence has become so irksome to litigants and legislators that greater and greater
resort is being made to tribunals authorized to disregard them. . . ." at 50-51. Judge
Wyzanki echoed similar concerns: "The original demand for administrative adjudication
was traceable, in part at least, to the unwillingness of Courts to admit evidence which
they allowed administrative agencies to receive and act upon": U.S. v. United Shoe
Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349 at 356 (D.Mass. 1950). J. Maguire noted as well:
"Men who sound like good prophets warn us that if the judiciary continues to carry
only an outmoded stock of procedural goods, it may find itself without customers."
Evidence: Common Sense and Common Law (Chicago: Foundation Press, 1947) at
164-65.
72 E. Morgan, Spotlight on Evidence (1943), 27 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 113 at 115.
73 E. Morgan and J. Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence (193637), 50 Harv. L. Rev. 909 at 922.
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known passage, referred to the rules as "a study of calculated and supposedly
helpful obstructionism."7 4
Perhaps the most significant and telling criticism of the rules of evidence
was implied by the action of the American Law Institute in the 1930's. When
that prestigious but conservative body came to the subject of evidence in its
restatement of the law project, it decided that a mere restatement of the
subject, such as the Institute had undertaken in the fields of contracts, agency
and trusts, would be useless. While the Institute felt that it was possible and
worthwhile to restate most other areas of the common law, such was not the
case with evidence. The Council reasoned:
mhe principal reason for . . . abandoning all idea of the Restatement of the
present Law of Evidence was the belief that however much the law needs clarification in order to produce reasonable certainty in its application, the Rules themselves in numerous and important instances are so defective that instead of being

the means of developing truth, they operate to suppress it. The Council of the
Institute therefore felt that a Restatement of the Law of Evidence would be a
waste of time or worse; that what was needed was a thorough revision of existing
law. A bad rule of law is not cured by clarification. 75

By the late 1940's, the whole of the law of evidence was in such an unsatisfactory state that some courts were reluctant to attempt to rationalize
even part of it by judicial law reform. Justice Jackson of the United States
Supreme Court stated:
We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters and the profession that
much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned
counterprivilege to the other. But somehow it has proved a workable even if
clumsy system when moderated by discretionary controls in the hands of a wise
and strong trial court. To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure
is more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than
to establish a rational edifice.76

Professor Cleary in 1952, described the atmosphere created by the rules:
"[h]ellish dark, and smells of cheese."7 7 McCormick lamented that the law of
evidence "has not responded in recent decades to the need for simplification
and rationalization as rapidly as other parts of procedural law."78 Later in the
fifties one of the greatest American judges, Justice Traynor, felt compelled to
write:
... just as no one will tell the emperor that he has no clothes there are too few
who will whisper that the law of evidence has too many. It is wound round in
mummy casings from tip to buskined toe, but its venerable ancient history still

74

Maguire, supra, note 71 at 11.
75W. D. Lewis, Introduction to the Model Code, supra, note 71 at vii-viii. See also
(1939), 16 A.L.I. Proceedings 46.
76
Michelson v. U.S., 335 U.S. 469 (1948) at 486.
7
7 E. Cleary, Evidence as a Problem in Communicating, supra, note 50. Professor
Cleary went on to bemoan "the multiplicity of the rules and their unreality" and note
that "possibly the unreality is what causes the multiplicity."
78 C. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Evidence (St. Paul: West Pub. Co.,
1954) at 137-38.
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moves men to respect, and they are loath to say that the years have made it a
museum piece. Medicine and business could not afford to be so naive. 79
English and Canadian evidence law is virtually identical to the common
law of evidence in the United States, and all of these comments and concerns
are equally applicable to Canadian law. Thoughtful English and Canadian
commentators, however, have not been silent. In 1958, C.P. Harvey characterized the law of evidence as:
Founded apparently upon the proposition that all witnesses are presumptively
liars and that all documents are presumptively forgeries, it has been added to,
subtracted from and tinkered with for two centuries, until it has become less of a
structure than a pile of builders' debris.8 0

Rupert Cross went so far as to say that, even if the present rules of evidence
produced no wrongful convictions, he favoured adoption of the Criminal Law
Revision Committee's recommendations on evidence because:
their adoption would spare the judge from talking gibberish to the jury, the
conscientious magistrate from directing himself in imbecile terms, and the writer
on the law of evidence from drawing distinctions absurd enough to bring a blush
to the most hardened academic face. 81

Even the editor of the practitioner's bible, Phipson on Evidence, was moved
to write, "it is a matter for serious consideration whether ... the subject of
evidence ought not to be reconsidered with a view to ensuring that it shall
better conduce to the only object that justifies its existence, viz. the due as82
certainment of truth in the administration of justice.
An ominous warning from Edmund Morgan summarizes the views of
most commentators:
The way of the would-be reformer in evidence is hard indeed; but not so hard as
will be that of the lawyer who believes in the Anglo-American system of trial by
judge or by judge and jury if drastic reform of the law of evidence is much longer
83
delayed.

In view of these considered opinions, it was quite remarkable that when
the Commission suggested that the laws of evidence needed a major overhaul,
so many Canadian lawyers and judges responded by apotheosising the rules.
Indeed, many of their remarks made the authors and jurists of 150 years ago
seem restrained in their praise.

79 R. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, [1956] U. Ill. L.
Forum 230 at 234.
800 . P. Harvey, The Advocate's Devil (London: Stevens, 1958) at 79.
81
R. Cross, The Evidence Report: Sense or Nonsense, [1973] Crim. L. Rev. 329
at 333.
82
R. Burrows, Preface to L. Phipson, The Law of Evidence (8th ed. London:
Sweet and Maxwell, 1942) at iv. For critical comments on the rules by Canadian
commentators see, C. Wright, Case Comment on Palter Cap Co. v. Great West Life
Assurance Co. (1936), 14 Can. B. Rev. 688 at 699; G. Murray, Evidence: A Fresh
Approach. The American Rules of Evidence (1959), 37 Can. Bar Rev. 576; Editorial,
Evidence in Criminal Cases, supra, note 7.
83E. Morgan, "Codification of Evidence," in Alison Reppy, ed., David Dudley Field:
Centenary Essays Celebrating100 Years of Legal Reform (New York: New York Univ.
School of Law, 1949) at 176.
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The PresentRules Only "Work" Because They Are Ignored

Critics of the Code often support their praise of the present rules of evidence by pointing to the fact that hundreds of cases are being tried in Canada
daily. They conclude from this that the rules must be working well. Could it
be that in spite of the nonsensical distinctions upon which the rules are based,
the unrealistic empirical assumptions upon which they rest, and the utterly
senseless word games in which they result in the courts of appeal, the application of the rules in trial courts assists the fair, expeditious and rational
resolution of disputes? Obviously not. The fallacy of the argument is that
irrationality and obstructiveness are only characteristics of the rules when they
are applied. The system of criminal justice functions as well as it does only
because the rules of evidence are largely ignored in trial courts. It is not uncommon to sit in Provincial Courts day after day and never hear an objection
to the admissibility of evidence. When an eager counsel presses an objection,
trial judges, perhaps embarrassed by the charade, perhaps ignorant of the
complications of the rule, but more likely sensitive to their duty to resolve the
case on its merits, usually admit the evidence.
I am not aware of a systematic study of the operation of the rules of
evidence in trial courts, but the impressionistic evidence that they are not
applied with rigour is overwhelming. Able and experienced judges will often
candidly confide that they neither know the rules, nor make a pretence of
applying them. If an objection is made, the common practice is to admit the
evidence subject to objection. An American commentator, in 1954, spoke of
"the wisdom of the practice adopted by many experienced trial judges in nonjury cases of provisionally admitting all evidence which is objected to if he
thinks its admissibility is debatable, with the announcement that all questions
of admissibility will be reserved until the evidence is all in ... and at the end
[he] will seek to find clearly admissible testimony on which to base his
findings."8 4
Some well-known judges have confessed in print that they do not apply
the rules. Perhaps the most candid statement is that made by Judge Learned
Hand at the 1942 American Law Institute annual meeting when discussing
the Proposed Final Draft of the Model Code of Evidence. In concurring with
an assertion by Professor Morgan, the Reporter, that the trial judge must be
given a discretion or the rules would have to be extremely detailed, Judge
Learned Hand said:
I think the Reporter has been speaking absolute God's truth this time. Do you
suppose anybody in the last twenty-five years, except where the appellate court
wanted to have a reversal because of something else in the case which made them
doubt the general fairness of the verdict or judgment, observed all these complicated rules of evidence that we have had? I don't believe anybody has known
them. I tried cases for thirteen years and got along without all these technicalities. 85
84

Supra, note 82 at 137-38.

85 (1942), 19 A.L.I. Proceedings 225. Charles Clark, former Chief Justice of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, made the same point in explaining why there is not more agitation in the United States for reforming the laws of
evidence:
. in
m. my experience, the actual practice in the courts has tended to outstrip
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Experienced counsel also often confess to not knowing or applying the
rules. As early as the turn of the century Mr. Choate, the famous American
trial counsel, is reported to have said to Professor Ezra Thayer: "Tell your
father (Professor James Bradley Thayer] it is a good book [Professor Thayer's
Treatise on Evidence], but it is a pity he did not publish while there was still
86
such a thing in existence as the law of evidence." Knowledgeable commenta87
tors have recorded the lack of application of the rules in trial courts. McCormick, in 1938, noted: "There is even a growing reluctance to invoke in
court the rules of exclusion, except where the testimony would be crucial, a
88
reluctance prompted by motives both tactical and ethical." In 1950, Edward
Cleary stated:
The law of evidence is sagging to the point of collapse under its own weight. It
has cracked visibly in the administrative sphere, and what saves it in the courts
is probably a rather general ignorance of what is actually between the covers of
Wigmore, plus the fact that lawyers and judges often seem to be downright

the theoretical argumentation. While scholars and appellate courts have struggled
with the weight of restrictive precedents from the past, trial courts in the main
seem to have gone ahead with rather sensible reactions. I remember my dear and
distinguished former colleague Augustus N. Hand saying with pride that in his
years as a trial judge he always took pains to admit all evidence presented if at
all useful or admissible and, in so doing, was never reversed by the appellate
court.
C. Clark, Foreword to a Symposium on The Uniform Rules of Evidence (1956), 10
Rutgers L. Rev. 479 at 480.
80 Ezra Thayer, Observations on the Lav of Evidence (1914-15), 13 Mich. L. Rev.
355 at 364. Professor James Bradley Thayer himself was aware that the rules were
never applied with their full strictness. He observed:
The defects [in the laws of evidence] discourage and make difficult any thorough
and scientific knowledge of our system and its peculiarities. Strange to say such
a knowledge is very unusual, even among judges.
The actual administration of this system is, indeed, often marked by extraordinary sagacity and good sense, particularly in England. In that country it is
uncommon to carry questions of evidence to the upper courts.
J. Thayer, The Present and Future of Evidence (1898-99), 12 Harv. L. Rev. 71 at 87.
In a similar vein, Charles A. Wright commented: ".... rules which were spawned,
in whole or in part by the jury system, such as the hearsay rule, the "best evidence"
rule, the rule against opinions, and the like have no logical place in a court trial. Thus
while the rules retain a theoretical validity, in practice they are of little effect." A Primer
of PracticalEvidence (1956), 40 Minn. L. Rev. 635 at 667.
87
Legal scholars have long recognized that conceptual ossification in the field of
evidence has created something of a monstrosity: a tissue of doctrine that seems
to function best when it is most transparent-that is, when it is essentially
ignored.
L. Tribe, TriangulatingHearsay (1974), 87 Harv. L. Rev. 956.
88 C. McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence (1938), 24 A.B.A.J. 507 at 581.
Professor McCormick explained at 508:
. . . if one has occasion, as I have had, to compare the law of evidence in the
books, with the rules of evidence as they seem actually to be applied in trial
court rooms in several states, there is a strange disparity. The lush exuberance
of doctrines which bloom in the digests and the six-volume treatises on evidence,
and the sharp quiddities of the class room, though they were fairly well known
to the advocate of a generation ago, are not familiar ground to the average
successful trial lawyer of today .... For even the trial judges today, with notable
exceptions, have only a discreet bowing acquaintance with the evidence rules.
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ashamed to push the rules to their logical extremes. Evidence in action is, happily
perhaps, somewhat different from evidence in books.8 9

After a description of the rules of evidence summarized by the words "dreadful condition," a discerning writer has observed: "Despite all this, federal evidence law has worked with remarkable smoothness. The reason is not that
the complexity is mastered but that it has been ignored." 90
These views were reiterated by many who communicated with the Commission. In fact, it would be surprising if the rules were applied with any
regularity in practice. Time and time again at meetings organized by the Commission, none of the lawyers and judges present were sure what the present
law was on a particular point. Or rather, while each was certain of his or her
own statement of the law, each held differing views. Indeed, some of the most
amusing comments on the evidence study papers were those in which the
authors contended that a particular proposal would never work in practice,
when in fact all the recommendation did was restate the present law.
Finally, it has been my experience, in reviewing countless transcripts of
cases on appeal, that frequently no objection had been made at trial to the
alleged evidentiary errors raised on appeal, although such errors often involved basic issues of evidence law. This experience would tend to confirm
Wigmore's assertion that the rules are only "game rules" for setting aside the
verdict later on. 91
An unfortunate aspect of the present rules, however, is that they are not
always ignored at trial. Indeed it might be fairly asserted that in many respects
all the Proposed Evidence Code does is bring the law in theory into conformity
with the law in practice in lower courts.92
1I1. ANTECEDENTS OF THE CODE
In reforming evidence law, the Commission was able to draw and build
upon an enormous body of critical literature, studies by various law reform
bodies and prior codifications. It was the ability to draw upon this work
which permitted the Commission to proceed with the Evidence Code relatively
expeditiously and without a great commitment of resources. The research began by obtaining copies of evidence rules from virtually every common law
89
9

Supra,note 77.
0 R. Degnan, The Law of Federal Evidence Reform (1962-63), 76 Harv. L. Rev.
275 at 276.
91 Supra, note 60 at 260, para. 8c.
92
The English Law Reform Committee noted in their Report on hearsay evidence:
Judges, believing themselves capable of weighing the probative value of different
kinds of material which tend to show what in fact happened in the past... disparage technical objections to the admissibility of evidence in civil cases, and tactful advocates hesitate to persist. But it is unsatisfactory that the application of
rules of evidence should depend upon the willingness of the individual judge to
discourage the observance of what are still rules of evidence and the forcefulness
with which he does so.
Hearsay Evidence in Civil Proceedings, Thirteenth Report of the Law Reform Committee (Cmnd. 2964, 1966) at 6-7.
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jurisdiction in the world. English translations of evidence rules existing in
European countries were also collected. An exhaustive search of the literature
was then undertaken. The indebtedness to the great evidence scholars of this
century must be apparent to anyone who reads the Code. The critical and
analytical writings of Thayer,9 Wigmore,94 Morgan, 95 Ladd, 6 Maguire 7 and
McCormick 98 were invaluable and relied upon extensively. With the exception
of those of Cross 9 and Williams, 10 treatises of the great English evidence

scholars, such as Best, Taylor, Power, Roscoe, and Phipson, were of less
value.

10

These latter authors generally treated the rules uncritically. However,

the early editions of their works, before they were reworked by the casecompilers who often completely destroyed their value, were useful in obtaining
a sense of the historical development of many rules. The only Canadian work
that was consulted regularly was the unpublished collection of materials on
evidence prepared by Professor Stanley Schiff of the University of Toronto
Law School. 02 The notes in his materials contain a superb doctrinal analysis
of Canadian jurisprudence on evidence and the materials are developed so as

to highlight the purposes of the judicial trial, its institutional characteristics
and the procedural values that must be protected in an adjudicative process.
03 J. B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence At The Common Law (New
York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1898).
94 J. H. Wigmore, A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials
at Common Law Including the Statutes and Judicial Decisions of all Jurisdictions of the
United States and Canada (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1940). All of Wigmore's
thoughts on evidence are undoubtedly collected in his treatise. An unpublished bibliography of his works, however, contains over 900 entries. W. Roalfe, John Henry Wigmore
-Scholar and Reformer (1962), 53 J. of Crim. L., Criminology & Police Sci. 277 at
291, n. 107.
Or A bibliography of Morgan's writings on evidence can be found in (1961), 14
Vand. L. Rev. 701. His books include Basic Problems of Evidence (4th ed. New York:
Practising Law Institute, 1963); Some Problems of Proof Under the Anglo-American
System of Litigation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).
90
6See Bibliography of Dean Ladd's Publications (1956-57), 51 Iowa L. Rev. 803;
Cases and Materials on Evidence (Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1972) (with R. L.
Carlson).
97See J. M. Maguire, Evidence-Common Sense and Common Law (Chicago:
The Foundation Press, 1947); Evidence: Cases and Materials (6th ed. Brooklyn: The
Foundation Press, 1973) (with J. B. Weinstein, J. H. Chadbourn, J. H. Mansfield).
98See R. R. Ray, McCormick's Contributionsto the Law of Evidence (1961-62),
40 Texas L. Rev. 185; McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Evidence (St. Paul: West
Pub. Co., 1954).
99 R. Cross, Evidence (4th ed. London: Butterworths, 1974); Outline of the Law
of Evidence (3rd ed. London: Butterworths, 1971) (with N. Wilkins).
'OoSupra, note 44.
'D For a bibliography of early English treatises on evidence, see W. S. Holdsworth,
History of English Law, Vol. 13 (London: Methuen & Co., 1966) at 466-68; E. A.
Jelf, Where to Find Your Law (London: H. Cox, 1907) at 415-26; G. D. Nokes,
Introduction to Evidence (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1962) at 21-26; J. Wigmore,
supra,note 60, para. 8; J. L. Montrose, Basic Concepts of the Law of Evidence (1954),
70 L.Q. Rev. 527 at 527-33.
102 S. A. Sehiff, Evidence in the Litigation Process: A Coursebook In Law (Draft
ed. Toronto: University of Toronto Faculty of Law, 1972).
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Of more direct value were the many prior codifications of the rules of
evidence, particularly the recent American codifications. These were used as
a starting point in the examination of each area of evidence law. While the
Commission's indebtedness to these Codes was acknowledged in both the
Project working papers and in the Commission's Proposed Code, the antecedents of the Code were not reviewed in these publications in any detail.
Therefore, to make clear the extent of this indebtedness, and the scholarship
upon which the Proposed Code builds, I will review here the geneology of the
Code.
1.

Bentham

Bentham is regarded as the modem precursor of the codification of the
common law. He also remains the severest critic of the English rules of evidence. Yet he never proposed an evidence code. The explanation for this
paradox is simple; he recommended the abolition of all exclusionary rules of
evidence.' 03 He began his treatise on evidence as follows:
The Theorem [to be proved] is this: that, merely with a view to rectitude of
decision, to the avoidance of the mischiefs attached to undue decision,
no species
of evidence whatsoever, willing or unwilling, ought to be excluded. 10 4
Bentham had such a significant impact on the development of evidence law,
however, that any review of evidence reform and codification efforts must

begin with his work.
Bentham wrote a monograph and a treatise on evidence law. His monograph is entitled An Introductory View of the Rationale of Evidence; for the
Use of Non-Lawyers as Well as Lawyers. The manuscript was prepared for
publication by James Mill in 1812. However, it was so critical of the rules
of evidence that no bookseller would publish it for fear that it constituted a
libel on the administration of justice. It was never published separately, but
eventually appeared in Bowring's edition of The Works of Jeremy Bentham.1° 5

Bentham worked on a treatise on evidence at various times between
1802 and 1812. When he took up the subject, he often did so without reference to his previous manuscripts. 10 6 On three different occasions he attempted

to complete his treatise on the subject.107
' Finally, his unfinished manuscripts

03

1

See Bentham, supra, note 61, vols. 6 and 7. The statement in the text is not

quite accurate. Bentham did admit that evidence which might cause needless vexation,
expense or delay should be excluded. (Id., vol. 6 at 213.) Also, he argued that communication made to a priest should be privileged. (id., vol. 7 at 366-68.)
10 4 Id., vol. 6 at 203-4.
10 5 1d., vol. 6 at 1-187. See, generally, A. Bain, James Mill: A Biography (London:

Longmans, Green, 1882); T. H. Bowyer, "Bentham's Publications on Evidence," in
A. Muirhead, A Jeremy Bentham Collection and Publications on Evidence (London:

The Bibliographical Society, 1946) at 205-06; C. M. Atkinson, Jeremy Bentham: His
Life and Work (London: Methuen, 1905) at 223; Dillon, "Bentham's Influence in the

Reforms of the Nineteenth Century," in Association of American Law Schools, Select
Essays in Anglo-American Legal History, Vol. 1 (Frankfurt: Sauer and Auvermann,
1968) 492 at 500.
106 See Preface to Rationale,supra, note 61, vol. 6 at 201.
10 7 See J. S. Mill's Autobiography (New York: P. F. Collier, 1909) at 77.
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were given to Etienne Dumont who, over a period of years, extracted sections
from them which he published in French in 1823.108 In 1825, Bentham recovered his papers from Dumont and gave them to John Stuart Mill, who
edited and published them in 1827 under the title Rationale of Judicial Evidence, specially applied to English Practice from the manuscripts of Jeremy
Bentham.10 9 The Rationale of Judicial Evidence was an exhaustive, but sarcastic and vituperative, review of English evidence law. Bentham set out to
establish six propositions regarding the English jurisprudence on evidence, of
which the first two were:
1. That the system, taken in the aggregate, is repugnant to the ends of justice:
and that this is true of almost every rule that has ever been laid down.
2. That it is inconsistent even within itself; and in particular, that there is not
a rule in it which is not violated by a multitude of exceptions or counterrules ....11o

The treatise was immediately attacked."' Virtually all of the criticisms
were of an ad hominem nature. Bentham, it was alleged, was too academic,
too far removed from practical life to appreciate the fallacies of what he proposed. Chief Justice Best referred to him in a judgment as "a learned writer,
who has devoted too much of his time to the theory of jurisprudence, to know
much of practical consequence of the doctrines he has published to the
world. 111 2 Stephen was critical of Bentham's work because "he had not the
13
mastery of the law itself which is unattainable by mere theoretical study."
Bentham's inclination to approve of the French method of interrogating
prisoners was explained by "his lack of experience at the Bar.""u 4
Nevertheless, through the work of Lord Denman and Brougham, 115
Bentham's writings had an enormous influence on evidence law. Virtually all
of the legislative changes in English evidence law made in the mid-nineteenth
century can be traced to Bentham's scathing indictment of the common law
108 Etienne Dumont, Traitg des Preuves Judiciaires.For a brief account of Dumont's
contribution in translating various of Bentham's manuscripts see Dillon, supra, note 105
at 500, n. 1.
109 Supra, note 61, vol. 6 at 190 ff.
11Old. at 204.
111 See review in (1828), 48 Edinburgh Review 457. The reviewer was also extremely critical of Mill's editorship, at 462-66. An earlier review of the French edition,
edited by Dumont, was generally favourable: (1824), 40 Edinburgh Review 169. This
latter reviewer did, however, take issue with a number of Bentham's recommendations
for reform, in particular, the abolition of the lawyer-client privilege. For a reply by Mill,
see supra, note 103, vol. 7 at 476.
112 Hovill v. Stephenson (1829), 5 Bing 493; 130 E.R. 1152. Interestingly, this
quote was removed from the edition of Greenleaf edited by Wigmore (16th ed. Boston:
Little, Brown, and Co., 1899). In his treatise on evidence, Best accused Bentham of not

understanding the characteristic feature of judicial evidence because he considered "every

issue raised in a court of justice as a philosophical question, the actual truth of which
is to be ascertained by the tribunal at any cost." Supra, note 57 at 37-38, para. 53.
113 J. Stephen, Digest of the Law of Evidence (5th ed. London: Macmillan and
Co., 1899) at xxii.
114 Atkinson, supra,note 105 at 228.
115 See Wigmore, supra, note 94, vol. 1 at 239, para. 8.
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rules.110 As well, at least a few of the treatises on evidence written about this
time drew heavily on Bentham's analysis.'1

7

His Rationale of Judicial Evi-

dence has been called "of all Bentham's works ... the most voluminous and
also without doubt the most important.""18 John Stuart Mill observed, "if Mr.
Bentham had made no contributions to the science of jurisprudence beyond
the volumes which are now before us [The Rationale of JudicialEvidence] ...
his name would deservedly be ranked among those of the most eminent promoters of law reform."'1 9
Most of Bentham's criticisms of the rules of evidence have either resulted
in legislative change or have been assimilated in the arguments of modern
critics of the rules. Therefore, present day law reformers rarely rely upon or
make reference to Bentham's Rationale of Judicial Evidence. 20 However, a
by commentators by referfew modem reform efforts have been evaluated
12
ence to Bentham's proposals for reform. 1
Livingston's Code of Evidence
The first American codifier, Edward Livingston, clearly drew his inspira23
tion from Bentham.122 Indeed, he has been called "the American Bentham.'
124
In the early 1820's he drafted the first modem code of evidence. Although
2.

36 G. W. Keeton and 0. R. Marshall, "Bentham's Influence On The Law of Evidence," in G. W. Keeton and G. Schwarzenberger, Jeremy Bentham and The Law: a
Symposium (London: Stevens, 1948) at 79; Dillon, supra, note 105 at 509-11.
117 See Best, supra, note 57. Holdsworth summarized Bentham's contributions to
the development of evidence law: "His influence is writ large on the nineteenth-century
statutes relating to evidence, and on the books of a new type which then began to
appear." Holdsworth, supra, note 101 at 121.
118 E. Halvy, The Growth of PhilosophicRadicalism (London: Faber and Faber,
1928) at 383.
119 J. S. Mill, The Exclusion of Evidence, [1832] The Jurist 1. Mill also wrote of
the treatise, "It is the first and perhaps the greatest achievement of Bentham; the entire
discrediting of all technical systems; and the example which he set of treating law as no
peculiar mystery, but a simple piece of practical business, wherein means were to be
adopted to ends, as in any of the other arts of life." As quoted in L. Radzinowicz, A
History of English CriminalLaw, vol. 1 (London: Stevens, 1948) at 348, n. 20.
120 However, it was quoted twice in the Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law
Revision Committee, supra, note 48. See W. Twining, The Way of the Baffled Medic:
PrescribeFirst;DiagnoseLater-If at All, (1972-73), J. Soc. Pub. Teach. L. 348.
11 See Twining, id; H. L. A. Hart, Bentham and the Demystification of the Law,
[1973] Mod. L. Rev. 2; J. H. Chadbourn, Bentham And The Hearsay Rule-A
Benthamic View of Rule 63(4)(c) of the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1961-62), 75
Harv. L. Rev. 932.
1In a letter to Bentham, Livingston acknowledged, "The perusal of your works
first gave method to my ideas, and taught me to consider legislation as a science governed by certain principles, applicable to all its different branches, instead of an occasional exercise of its power, called forth only on particular occasion without relation
to or connection with each other." He concluded: "Hereafter no one can in Criminal
jurisprudence make any wise improvement that your superior sagacity has not suggested." Hunt, Life of Edward Livingston at 96, quoted in Dillon, supra, note 105 at
508, n. 1.
123
Wigmore, supra, note 94, vol. 1, at 240, para. 8.
124 Code of Evidence, in 1 Complete Works of Edward Livingston on Criminal
Jurisprudence, vol. 2 (Montclair, NJ.: Patterson Smith, 1968) at 452-533. The rules
of evidence were stated in the form of a code in England in 1825 by S. B. Harrison
in a booklet entitled "Evidence Forming a Title of the Code of Legal Proceedings
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the Code was drafted for adoption in the state of Louisiana, a civil law jurisdiction, it was modelled on the common law. In his Evidence Code, as in his
Penal Code, 1' Livingston dealt with virtually every problem in the subject
area, most of which are still with us today. Many of his arguments for abolishing certain evidentiary rules remain unequalled in terms of their painstakingly
logical development.12 The Code was not adopted, however, in Louisiana,
nor in any other jurisdiction, 27 and appears to have had little impact on the
development of subsequent evidence legislation or jurisprudence.
3.

Stephen's Evidence Act of India

By 1860, the English common law of evidence was being applied generally in the Indian courts.12s In 1868, the Indian Law Commissioners prepared a draft evidence bill. However, the local authorities contended that it
was too complicated and not suited to the needs of the country, and therefore
it was never enacted. 29 Two years later, James Fitzjames Stephen was asked
to prepare an Evidence Code for India. The Code prepared by him was enacted in 1872.130 In large part, Stephen simply codified the English law of
evidence. He claimed that the one hundred and sixty-seven sections of his
Code covered all the English law of evidence contained within Taylor's two
volume treatise on evidence. 131 Stephen did, however, logically arrange the
according to the plan proposed by Crofton Uniacke, Esq." However, it was incomplete
in many respects and had little impact. See Holdsworth, supra, note 101 at 467; see
also, G. D. Nokes, Codification of the Law of Evidence in Common Law Jurisdictions
(1956), 5 I.C.L.Q. 347 at 349-50.
12 GSee G. 0. W. Meuller, Crime, Law and the Scholars (Seattle: U. of Washington
Press, 1969) at 25-26.
126 See, for example, his argument for abolishing spousal incompetence. Introductory Report to the Code of Evidence, supra, note 124 at 452-459.
12 7 See G. W. Pugh, Louisiana Evidence Law (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1974)
at 3. Livingston was commissioned by the Louisiana assembly to prepare a Code of
Criminal Law, Evidence, and Procedure. He finished his work, but before it was enacted
he was elected to Congress and practically ceased to reside in Louisiana. Dillon, supra,
note 106 at 508-09, n. 1.
128 H. S. Maine, "The Theory of Evidence," in Village-Communities in the East
and West (New York: Henry Holt, 1880) 295 at 301.
129 Report of the Pakistan Law Reform Commission 1967-70 (Karachi: Manager
of Publications, 1970) at 394. The draft bill was introduced in the legislative body by
Sir Henry Maine.
130 See J Stephen, A Digest of Evidence Law, ed. W. May (3d ed. Boston: Little,
Brown, & Co., 1877) at 1.
131 See supra, note 128 at 305. But see:
It has been asserted that the hundred and sixty-seven sections of the Evidence Act
contain all that is applicable to India, in the two bulky volumes of Taylor. This
appears to me to be a mere figure of speech. A great mass of principles and rules,
which Taylor's work contains will have to be written back between the lines of
the Code; the chief merit of which, unless I am wrong, consists in the perspicuity
with which the line has been drawn and maintained between what is relevant and
irrelevant; and in defining how that which is relevant is to be proved. The laborious assiduity with which Taylor has been boiled down into substantive propositions of law must be admitted. The defect of the Code, I think, is, that this process
has been very arbitrarily applied, with too niggard a selection.
Norton's Evidence, quoted in S. C. Sarkar, Law of Evidence (11th ed. Calcutta: S. C.
Sarkar, 1965) at 11.
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subject matter, develop a consistent terminology, 8 2 remove some anomalies,
and in other ways rationalize the rules of evidence. With only a few amendments, Stephen's Code remains the Evidence Act of India. 138 It has been
adopted in whole or in part in numerous countries, including Pakistan and
Ceylon 1and,
more recently, in such African countries as Kenya, Nigeria and
34
Uganda.
In 1872, at the request of Lord Coleridge, the Attorney General of England, Stephen prepared a similar Code for adoption in England. However,
Lord Coleridge was soon thereafter appointed Chief Justice, and his successor
did not proceed with the enactment of the Code.135 While Stephen's Code was
thus never adopted in England, it did form the basis of his text, Digest of the
Law of Evidence, which was published in 1876.136 In this form it had an enormous impact on the common law of evidence. In the preface to his treatise,
Wigmore noted that "....

the domination of ...[Stephen's] thought in our

law of Evidence during
the past generation has been rivalled only by that of
1 37
Professor Thayer.'
4.

Wigmore's Pocket Code

In 1910, John Wigmore wrote A Pocket Code of the Rules of Evidence
in Trials at Law.188 This Code remains the most detailed ever published. The
' 32 Some of his terminology has not met with general acceptance. For example, his
insistence on referring to certain inadmissible evidence such as hearsay, as "irrelevant"
evidence or evidence "deemed to be unrelevant," has been criticized. See R. Cross, supra,
note 99 at 25; Montrose, supra, note 101 at 531.
3
13 See S. C. Sarkar, supra, note 131 at 5; M. P. Bhatnagai, Woodrofle and Ameer
Ali's Criminal Evidence (Allahabad: Law Book Co., 1965). The Code appears to be
working satisfactorily. Following a review of the Act as it applies in Pakistan, the Law
Reform Commission of that country concluded:
No doubt the principles followed in the Act of 1872 are derived from the English
law of evidence but these have been suitably amended to suit the peculiar circumstances prevailing in our country. The Evidence Act has worked satisfactorily
in this country for about a century. The members of the legal profession, the
Judges and the general public have sufficiently assimilated the principles of law
laid down in the Act. It is no longer foreign to us. Thus, in our view, the rules
contained in the Evidence Act neither cause delay in disposal of cases nor are
unsuited to the genius of our people.
Supra, note 129 at 395.
134 See Nokes, supra, note 124; H. B. Miller, Beyond The Law of Evidence (196667), 40 So. Calif. L. Rev. 1,3.
185 See supra, note 130. See also L. Radzinowicz, Sir James Fitziames Stephen,
1829-1894, And His ContributionTo The Development of Criminal Law, Seldon Society
Lecture, July 30, 1957 (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1957).
186 The most recent edition is J. F. Stephen, A Digest of The Law of Evidence, ed.
H. L. Stephen and L. F. Sturge (12th ed. London: Macmillan, 1948). The Code, as
published in Stephen's Digest, was the subject of an extended critique in the Solicitor's
Journal. (An English Evidence Code (1876), 20 Sol. J.856, 869, 880, 894, 905, 937,
949.)
137 Wigmore, supra, note 94, vol. 1 at xiv.
138 J. H. Wigmore, A Pocket Code of The Rules of Evidence in Trials at Law
(Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1910). Wigmore published new editions of the Pocket
Code in 1935 and 1942 (in the 1935 edition the word Pocket was dropped from the
title). Thus its revision followed new editions of his treatise. The first edition of his
treatise was published in 1904, the second in 1923 and the third in 1940.
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third edition published in 1942 is over 550 pages long, is divided into 3150
numbered paragraphs, and contains 242 rules, each of which in turn is subdivided into three to thirty articles (which in turn are further subdivided into
paragraphs and sub-paragraphs.) 13 9 The Code is cross-referenced to Wigmore's treatise and thus no specific problem of evidence is overlooked.
In the preface, Wigmore stated that the purpose of the Code was twofold: "to provide the practitioner with a handy summary of the existing rules
of evidence; and at the same time to state them in a scientific form capable of
serving as a Code." He expressly said, however, that the Pocket Code "is not
offered as a proposal for legislation." Indeed, he stated that he was not sure
that a legislative Code was desirable at that time: "To Codification as a general enterprise, many objections may be raised-and a most deterrent one is
that it tends to fossilize the law." 140 However, while Wigmore disavowed the
intention of preparing a Code for legislative adoption, the Code did serve as
at least an inspiration for subsequent Codes. Indeed, in reviewing the first and
second editions of the Code, respectively, both Roscoe Pound 41 and Charles
McCormick' 42 noted its usefulness to a legislator.
Commonwealth Fund Committee Proposals

5.

In the United States, the organized movement to reform the laws of evidence began with the work of the Committee on Improvements in the Law of
Evidence, which was appointed by the Commonwealth Fund in 1923.143 The
Committee was composed of leading evidence scholars, including John Wigmore and Edmund Morgan. It deliberated for five years. The members considered recommending that all rules of evidence be abolished, but rejected
this approach.'" Noting that Wigmore and other reformers had pointed out
the "illogicalities and inconsistencies" in many of the rules of evidence, and
concluding that little would be gained by repeating these arguments, they decided to send an elaborate questionnaire to practicing lawyers and judges in
order to ascertain their views about priorities in evidence reform. On the
139 Article 4 of Rule 91 gives some sense of the meticulous detail which characterizes the code:
Art. 4. Radio-Broadcast Message.
Where an utterance heard on a radio-receiving instrument purports to have been
made by a particular person at a particular broadcasting station, it is sufficiently
authenticated by testimony that the receiving instrument was adjusted to the wavelength of that particular station.

Par. (a) The sender's indentity may be evidenced
(1) By the speaker's naming of the station, and his name of his principals,
and
(b) By testimony of its wave-length as stated in any publication commonly
used.
Id. (3d ed., 1942).
140 Id. at ix.
41

L. Rev. 190 at 191.
R. Pound, Book Review (1910-11), 5 11.
C. T. McCormick, Book Review (1935-36), 30 Ill. L. Rev. 687 at 688.
3
14 E. Morgan, Z. Chafee, R. Gifford, E. Hinton, C. Hough, W. Johnston, E.
Sunderland and J. H. Wigmore, The Law of Evidence: Some Proposalsfor Its Reform
(New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1927).
144 Id. at xi.
1
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basis of the response they received, they recommended that five uniform
statutes be drafed to implement the following recommendations: the rules of
evidence should not be enforced if there is no bona fide dispute about the fact
in question; the trial judge should be permitted to comment on the weight and
credibility of the evidence; pecuniary or proprietary interest should never be
a ground for excluding the testimony of a witness even where the other party
to the transaction has died; declarations of deceased persons should generally
be admissible; and business records should generally be admissible.14;
Although few of the recommendations were enacted immediately, probably because of the inertia of the state legislatures,1 46 most of them eventually
found their way into subsequent codifications. The Proposed Evidence Code
is, however, one of the few Codes to follow the recommendation that declarations of deceased persons should generally be admissible. In this regard, it is
interesting to note the response to the Committee's questionnaire. In Massachusetts, where such an exception had been recognized since 1898, the effect
of the rule was thought beneficent by seventy-one percent of the lawyers
and judges; only nineteen percent considered it harmful. 147
6.

Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence

In 1937, the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar
Association, as part of its programme for reform in judicial administration,
appointed a committee to study and make recommendations for the improvement of the law of evidence. Dean Wigmore headed the five man committee.
The Committee did not consider the improvement of details throughout the
law of evidence, but rather made fifteen specific recommendations for reform
45

ld. at xix-xx.
146 The one recommendation that was implemented in many states was the one recommending the drafting of the Uniform Business Records As Evidence Act. See J. H.
Tracy, What Progress in Reform of Evidence Rules? (1936), 20 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 80;
E. M. Morgan and J. M. Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence (1937),
50 Harv. L. Rev. 909 at 925, n. 26.
147 Supra, note 156 at 41-42.
148 Report of the Committee on Improvements in the Law of Evidence (1938),
63 A.B.A. Rep. 570. Many of the recommendations of the Commonwealth Fund Committee were incorporated into the report. The changes sought by the Committee were
summarized by Spencer Gard:
(1) disregarding of error in admission or rejection of evidence, if review discloses
no miscarriage of justice or deprivation of substantial rights; (2) denial of new
trial in nonjury case where inadmissible testimony given, if findings not based
thereon and rest on substantial evidence; (3) elimination of necessity for exception provided timely disclosure made of ground for objection; (4) admission of
survivor's testimony and declarations of decedent, if found to be made in good
faith and within personal knowledge; (5) admission of declarations of deceased
or insane persons prior to suit, subject to the same requirements as in (4); (6)
curtailment of physician-patient privilege whenever court believes disclosure
needed to secure justice, and refusal of privilege to accountants, social workers
and journalists; (7) adoption of Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act;
(8) abolition of opinion evidence rule for lay witnesses; (9) acceptance of principles of Model Expert Testimony Act; (10) authorization for certified copy of
official record, in manner permitted by Rule 44 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; (11) adoption of Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act; (12)
swearing of each witness separately, so as to make certain administration of oath
1
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they considered simple, feasible, and necessary. 48 In his foreword to the
report, the President of the American Bar Association said that the report
"presents to the American bench and bar the minimum requirements that are
needed in a practical way to make our law of evidence workable in the twentieth century."' 49 In addition to a number of specific recommendations relating to rules of evidence and the administration of justice, the committee recommended that consideration be given to codifying various aspects of evidence law. Many of the Committee's recommendations were eventually adopted by the State and Federal Courts. 5 0
7.

Model Code of Evidence

In 1939, the American Law Institute undertook to prepare a Code of
Evidence. It appointed a Committee on Evidence, made up of America's most
eminent legal scholars, to draft the code. Professor Morgan was appointed the
Reporter and Professor Maguire the Assistant Reporter. The members included, among others, Learned Hand, Augustus Hand, Mason Ladd, William Hale,
Charles McCormick and Charles Wyzanski, Jr. The Committee was aided by
sixty-four consultants, headed by Dean John Wigmore. In 1942, the Institute
approved a Model Code of Evidence.'51 In outline, and largely in substance,
it has formed the basis for all subsequent codifications of evidence, yet it remains the most radical and the most academically perfect Code of Evidence.
It would have resulted in the virtual abolition of the rigid rules of admissi15 2
bility.
The Code was immediately attacked by the bench and bar. Their attack
derived impetus from a dissent to the Code written by John Wigmore. He
concluded his dissent with this warning:
Reviewing this cumulation of shortcomings on the whole, might not a cold hearted
critic describe this Draft Code somewhat as follows: "This is an academic composition, meritorious as a record of aspirations and highly significant as a symptom
that Bench and Bar are ready for considerable progress; but not meriting legislative favor, first because its advanced proposals are far too radical at the present

will be dignified and understandable; (13) abolition of scintilla rule; (14) liberality in determining admissibility of evidence, by provisions similar to alternatives
set forth in Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (15) denial of
error for improper admission or rejection of evidence if facts so proven cannot
be disputed in good faith.
S. A. Gard, Kansas Law and The New Uniform Rules of Evidence (1954), 2 Kan. L.

Rev. 333, n. 2.
149 See the Foreword to the Report, id., at 63 A.B.A. Rep. 517.
150 See A. T. Vanderbilt, ed., Minimum Standards of Judicial Administration (New
York: National Conference of Judicial Councils, 1949) Chap. viii.
151 Model Code of Evidence, supra, note 71. For a description of the history and
process of drafting of the Code, see William D. Lewis' Introduction to the Code at
vii-xvi.
152 In terms of its drastic reform of the hearsay rule, the clear control it gives to
the trial judge in conducting the trial and the broad principles in which it is drafted,
the Law Reform Commission of Canada's proposed Code of Evidence is probably more
similar to the Model Code than to any other. Many of the rules of the Proposed Code
were inspired by provisions of the Model Code.
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time, and secondly because its imperfections in the formulation of the rules render
it quite unfit for practical use."' 5 3

A number of states rejected the Code out of hand. 15 4 However, at least
three states (Missouri, 5 5 Pennsylvania 5 6 and California 57), while they eventually rejected the Code, undertook extensive studies of it. The objections
raised by a committee of the California bar are representative of the comments made about the Code, and to anyone involved in the debate on the
Proposed Evidence Code, have a familiar ring:
A study of the Code must convince anyone that it was designed, not to offer any
improvement to existing statutes or existing codes of evidence, but to entirely
revolutionize our present rules of evidence and to substitute for them the rules of
evidence that are generally in force in continental Europe.' 5 s

The members of the Committee concluded: "[We] earnestly recommend that
the Bar should be on the alert to resist to its utmost at the coming or any succeeding session of the Legislature the enactment into law of the Code or any
of the parts thereof."' 59 However, let it not be said that the Bar is against progress. The members of the Committee also noted, as did practically all the
respondents to the Proposed Evidence Code, that, "....

we would not want

our report to be construed as indicating we believe that our present rules of
evidence are perfect, but on the whole we believe ... that in this state they
153 J. H. Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence Rules, A Dissent
(1942), 28 A.B.AJ. 23. One cannot help but feel that Wigmore was still smarting from
the failure of the reporter of the Model Code, Edmund Morgan, to even consider drafting a Code of the detail of Wigmore's own Pocket Code of Evidence, supra, note 151.
Wigmore prepared a statement at the request of the American Law Institute setting out
the differences in approach between himself and the Reporter of the Model Code. These
differences were expressed in the form of six postulates that should control the drafting
of a practical code of evidence. Appendix of the First Tentative Draft of the Model
Code, at 111-115. The next year these postulates found their way into the Preface
to the Third Edition of Wigmore's Code of Evidence as postulates by which his Code
was drafted. See supra, note 151 (3d ed., 1942).
154 See, "Note on Code as Means of Promoting Nation-Wide Reform," in W. T.
Fryer, ed., Selected Writings on the Law of Evidence and Trial (St. Paul: West Pub.
Co., 1957) at 1160.
155
1n Missouri, after the Model Code was found unacceptable, a Code for the
state was drafted. However, it was never enacted. See C. L. Carr, The ProposedMissouri
Evidence Code (1951), 29 Texas L. Rev. 627; R. J. Watson, Should Missouri Adopt
Proposed Evidence Code? (1949), 14 Mo. L. Rev. 251; C. T. McCormick, Impressions
of the Proposed Missouri Evidence Code (1948), 17 U. Kan. City L. Rev. 4; E. M.
Morgan, Comments on the Proposed Missouri Code of Evidence, (1948), 17 U. Kan,
City L. Rev. 13.
166See F. L. Windolph, A Code of Evidence for Pennsylvania-Pro (1949), 20
Pa. B.A. Q. 214; E. C. Wingerd, C. B. Rhoads and I. P. MacElree, A Code of Evidence
for Pennsylvania-Contra,id. at 220. See also A. L. Levin, Pennsylvania and the Unlform Rules of Evidence: Presumptions and Dead Man Statutes (1954), 103 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1 at 4-7.
157 See Report of Committee on Administration of Justice on Model Code of Evidence (1944), 19 Cal. S.B.J. 262. See reply by W. G. Hale, Report of Committee on
Administration of Justice on the Model Code of Evidence-A Reply (1947), 22 Cal.
S.B.J. 188.
158 Committee, id. at 262.
15
9Id. at 383.
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are well understood by Bench and Bar and are working reasonably well where
intelligently construed and applied by Bench and Bar."'110
Although the Model Code was not adopted in legislative form in any jurisdiction, it was the subject of extended discussion in the legal periodical literature, 116 and in this way had, and continues to have, an enormous impact. As
the Director of the American Law Institute noted in 1954, referring to the
Model Code, "courts have cited it and learned articles have cited it. Students
have cited it. It has been a handbook for some administrative bodies. In other
words, this Code, even without legislative adoption, has had a very considerable influence upon the law."1 62
In spite of the adverse reaction to the Model Code, the idea of using it
as a basis for legislative change was never completely abandoned. In 1949,
the Section of Judicial Administration of the American Bar Association took
the position that the "natural starting point for consideration of reform of the
law of evidence in any given state" was the Model Code, and that it was "preferable to work towards a complete revision, along the lines of the Model
03
Code, rather than a piecemeal correction of the more outstanding faults.'
8.

Uniform Rules of Evidence

When it became apparent that the Model Code was unacceptable to the
profession and was not going to be adopted by courts or legislatures, the American Law Institute suggested to the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws that they draft a Uniform Code or Uniform Rules of
Evidence, using the Model Code as a basis.'x In 1949, the project was approved and a committee was appointed. A trial judge, Spencer A. Gard of
Kansas, was named Chairman. The committee included three practising attorneys and three professors, including Professors Mason Ladd and Charles
McCormick. The American Law Institute appointed an advisory committee,
chaired by Edmund Morgan, to assist in the work. The drafting took four
years. In 1953, the Uniform Rules of Evidence were adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Lawsles approved by

160 Id. at 282.

161 From 1945 to 1947, the Wisconsin Law Review, under the sub-heading "A Code
of Evidence for Wisconsin," published a series of articles commenting on each individual
provision of the Model Code; see also, C. T. McCormick, The New Code of Evidence
of the American Law Institute (1942), 20 Texas L. Rev. 661; M. Ladd, Modern Thinking Upon Evidence-A Model Code (1941), 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 10; Fryer, supra, note
167; J. Broderick Jr. and T. F. Broden, Future of the Model Code of Evidence (1948),

23 Notre Dame Law 226.
1 2
6 Director H. F. Goodrich, [1957] A.L.I. Annual Report at 9-10, as quoted in
Fryer, id., at 1161.
163 The Improvement of the Administration of Justice: A Handbook (Washington:
A.B.A. Section of Judicial Administration, 1949) at 57; see also Vanderbilt, supra,
note 150 at 325.
164 Prefatory Note, Uniform Rules of Evidence (U.L.A.) 1953.
165 [1953] Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws 78.
166 (1953), 78 A.B.A. Annual Report 134; (1954), 79 A.B.A. Annual Report 535.
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and, in 1954, endorsed by the American

Although the drafters of the Uniform Rules used the Model Code as a
basis for their work, there are several important differences between the two
Codes, largely because the drafters of the Uniform Rules wanted to make
them acceptable to the profession and to have them form the basis for uniform
rules in individual states.108 The Uniform Rules deal primarily with the admissibility of evidence. Therefore, many "procedural" rules, which are included in the Model Code, such as those dealing with the judge's control over
the conduct of the trial, including his right to comment on the evidence, are
omitted from the Uniform Rules. The drafters of the Uniform Rules used the
language of the courts insofar as practicable. 69 They also simplified the
drafting by eliminating many of the cross-references used in the Model Code;
in some instances, by combining several Model Code Rules into one Uniform
Rule, and in others, by splitting a complex Model Code Rule into several
Uniform Rules. The Uniform Code is comprised of only seventy-two rules.
They were printed, with comments in a pamphlet of fifty-seven pages. The
most significant substantive difference between the Codes is that the broad
common law hearsay rule, which excludes the testimony of an unavailable
witness, is essentially preserved in the Uniform Rules. The Model Code proposed to admit generally all declarations made by an unavailable witness.
However, the Uniform Rules retain, with minor amendments, most of the
other rationalizing and liberalizing changes recommended in the Model Code.
It was hoped that the Uniform Rules of Evidence would furnish the
framework and momentum for the unification of evidence law throughout the
United States, yet, although it was the subject of extensive comment in the
legal periodicals, 70 the American Bar Association approved them in 1953,
167

(1954), 40 A.B.AJ. 607 at 608.

[Wiith the objects of acceptability and uniformity in mind, this effort is
devoted to the policy of retaining such parts of the Model Code as appear to meet the
3681. . .

requirements of such objectives, and to reject, revise or modify the rest." Supra, note
164.

169 Judge Spencer A. Gard, Reporter of the Uniform Rules, said: "I think if any
one broad criticism may be made of the Model Code it is that it is academically perfect." See, Panel on Uniform Rules of Evidence, (1953-54), 8 Ark. L. Rev. 44 at 44.
1 0 S. A. Gard, supra, note 148; C. T. McCormick, Some High Lights of the
Uniform Evidence Rules (1955), 33 Texas L. Rev. 559; J. H. Chadbourn, The Uniform
Rules and the CaliforniaLaw of Evidence (1954), 2 U.C.L.A. Rev. 1; S.A. Gard and

R. C. Barnhart, Panel on Uniform Rules of Evidence, supra, note 169; A. L. Levin,
Pennsylvania and the Uniform Rules of Evidence: Presumptionsand Dead Man Statutes,

supra, note 156; A Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence and Illinois Evidence
Law (1956), 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 481; Minnesota and the Uniform Rules of Evidence-A
Symposium (1956), 40 Minn. L. Rev. 297; Symposium on the Uniform Rules of Evidence, supra, note 85; G. D. Nokes, American Uniform Rules of Evidence (1955), 4

I.C.L.Q. 48; E. M. Morgan, The Uniform Rules and the Model Code (1956),
31 Tulane L. Rev. 145. (Professor Morgan, draftsman of the Model Code and advisor
to the Uniform Rules, concluded his review of the two Codes by saying ".... I believe
that a set of rules ... taking the best features of the Uniform Rules and of the Model
Code ... would be an improvement over both." at 152); J. F. Falknor, The Hearsay
Rule and Its Exceptions (1954), 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 43; J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof:
Presumptions (1954), 2 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 13; J.E. Stopher, The Uniform Rules of
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and the American Law Institute in 1954, by 1970 only two territories (Pana-

ma Canal Zone 71' and the Virgin Islands' 72 ) and three states (Kansas, 173 New
Jersey' 74 and California' 75 ), had adopted modified versions of the Rules.

76

In 1974, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in the interests of uniformity, approved the Federal Rules of Evidence as the Uniform Rules of
Evidence. 177 Before turning to the Federal Rules, however, brief mention will
be made of the reform efforts in those states that adopted the Uniform Rules.
Kansas was the first state to adopt the Uniform Rules, and did so with

only slight modifications. 7 8 This was undoubtedly because Spencer Gard, the
Chairman of the Committee which prepared the Uniform Rules, was a District
Judge in Iola, Kansas, and a member of the Judicial Council Advisory Committee that studied and recommended adoption of the Kansas Code of Civil
Procedure.
One interesting difference between the Uniform Rules and the Kansas
Rules of Evidence is that the Kansas legislature only adopted that part of
Rule 45 of the Uniform Rules which gives the judge the discretion to exclude
relevant evidence if it might unfairly surprise a party. Rule 45 of the Uniform
Rules provides:
Except as in these rules otherwise provided, the judge may in his discretion
exclude evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed
Evidence: Government by Man Instead Of By Law (1962), 29 Ins. Counsel J. 405;
S. A. Gard, Why Oregon Lawyers Should Be Interested in the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1958), 37 Ore. L. Rev. 287; Institute on Evidence: A Symposium (1960-61), 15
Ark. L. Rev. 7. A Canadian evidence scholar, Professor Graham Murray of Dalhousie
University, in an eloquent and powerful article, called upon Canadian lawyers to press
for adoption of the Code in Canada. Unfortunately, nothing came, at that time, of his
pleadings. Murray, supra, note 82. Professor Murray, in 1974, joined the Law Reform
Commission's Evidence Project and was able to continue his fight to have at least the
spirit of the Uniform Rules enacted in Canada. For a reply to his article see J. D.
Morton, Do We Need A Code of Evidence? (1960), 38 Can. Bar Rev. 35.
171 Panama Canal Zone: C.Z. Code, tit. 5, see. 273-2996 (1963).
172 Virgin Islands: V.I. Code Ann., tit. 5, sec. 771-956 (1957).
'73 Kansas: Kan. Civ. Pro. Stat. Ann., sees. 60-401 to 470 (Vernon 1964).
174New Jersey: NJ. Stat. Ann., see. 2A: 84A-1 et seq. (West). The Supreme
Court adopted the rules in 1967.
171 California: Cal. Evid. Code (West 1965). The Code, adopted in 1965, came
into effect January 1, 1967.
17 6 After 1970, even though most states were adopting or considering adopting the
Federal Rules of Evidence, Utah adopted the 1953 Uniform Rules. Utah: Utah Code
Ann., see. 78. In 1953 a committee had been appointed in Utah to consider the advisability of adopting the Uniform Rules of Evidence in that state. The Committee
reported to the Supreme Court of Utah in 1959. See J. F. Falknor, Vicarious Admissions and the Uniform Rules (1961), 14 Vand. L. Rev. 855 at 857, n. 12. In 1970,
another committee was appointed by the Utah Supreme Court, and its recommendations,
which were based on the previous report, were adopted in 1971.
177 [1974] Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws 145.
178The rules constituted Article 4 of the Kansas Code of Civil Procedure, supra,
note 173, which was adopted in 1963. See generally, W. F. Harvey, The Uniform Rules
of Evidence as Affected by the Federal Constitution, and as Adopted by One State
(1967), 29 Mont. L. Rev. 137; S. A. Gard, Highlights of the Kansas Code of Civil
Procedure (1963), 2 Wash. LU. 199; Gard, Evidence (1963), 12 U. Kan. L. Rev. 239.
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by the risk that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time, or
(b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of
misleading the jury, or (c) unfairly and harmfully surprise a party who has not
had reasonable opportunity to anticipate that such evidence would be offered. 179

This rule is the keystone of any rational system of judicial evidence and has
been included with only slight drafting changes in every other code of evidence. But the Kansas legislature, afraid that it gave trial judges too much
discretion, deleted it from their Code.180 Judge Spencer Gard, commenting
on the section, noted that the omission was not crucial because it was well
recognized at common law that a trial judge had the discretion provided by
Rule 45 of the Uniform Rules, and that his discretion should be continued
to be recognized in Kansas. 181
Another anomaly was created in the Kansas Code when the Supreme
Court of the United States, in 1965, held that it was unconstitutional to comment on the accused's failure to testify. 82 Kansas had adopted Rule 21 of the
Uniform Rules, which provides that evidence of the accused's previous conviction is not admissible "for the sole purpose of impairing his credibility unless he has first introduced evidence admissible solely for the purpose of supporting his credibility." 183 In the Uniform Rules, however, that provision went
hand in hand with a provision which permitted comment on a defendant's
failure to testify.18sSo, in Kansas, the accused cannot normally be impeached
with evidence of previous convictions, but his failure to take the stand cannot
be made the subject of comment. 185
Commissioner La Forest and the author visited Kansas in 1974, and
spoke at length with members of the Kansas bench and bar to determine how
a Code, similar to the one which the Law Reform Commission contemplated
recommending, has worked in practice. Everyone we met said that they were
completely satisfied with the Code. No one expressed a desire to return to the
pre-Code rules and practice of evidence.' 8 6
In New Jersey the Uniform Rules were adopted with only minor amendment after a twelve-year period of study. The reform effort began with the
appointment by the Supreme Court of New Jersey of a Committee to consider a revision of the rules of evidence. The Committee reported in 1955,

179 Rule 45, Uniform Rules of Evidence (U.L.A.) 1953.
180 Supra, note 173, see. 60-445. The only ground for exclusion which was retained
was that of surprise, a ground not generally recognized in modem Codes. See Rule 403
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 28 U.S.C.A.
181 Id.
182 Tehan, Sheriff v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S. Ct. 459, (1965).
183 Rule 21, Uniform Rules of Evidence (U.L.A.) 1953; adopted by sec. 60-421 of
the Kansas Rules, supra, note 173.
184 See commentary on Rule 21, id.
185 For a suggestion that the Kansas provision prohibiting impeachment of the
accused by the use of a previous conviction should be repealed, see additional commentary on see. 60-414 in Kan. Civ. Pro. Stat. Ann., 1974 Cum. Supp.
186
See Acknowledgements, Report on Evidence, supra, note 1 at ix.
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and recommended adoption of the Uniform Rules. 18 7 While the report received a generally favourable response among the members of the profession
in New Jersey, no action was taken.' 88 In 1955, the New Jersey Legislature
appointed a committee to studyithe Supreme Court Committee's report and
any other suggestions for improvement in the laws of evidence. This committee reported in 1956 and also recommended, with a few additional changes,
adoption of the Uniform Rules. 189 In 1960, the Legislature enacted the definition and privilege sections of the Uniform Rules; 19 0 the relevant legislation
also provided that the remaining rules of evidence could be adopted by the
Supreme Court of New Jersey. In 1967, the Supreme Court, following a further Committee report, adopted the remaining Uniform Rules.' 9 ' Only minor
amendments were made in the Uniform Rules.
The most extensive review of the Uniform Rules of Evidence was undertaken by the California Law Revision Commission, and the resulting California Evidence Code departs more drastically from the Uniform Rules than do
the codes of Kansas and New Jersey. Evidence reform began in California in
1956. The Legislature in that year directed the California Law Reform Commission to make a study "to determine whether the law of evidence should be
revised to conform to the Uniform Rules of Evidence ....,,192 At the request
of the Commission, Professor Chadbourn prepared studies of each Uniform
Rule and the corresponding California law, together with his own recommendation for reform. 193 Usually, he recommended that the relevant Uniform
Rule be adopted, with minor amendments to conform to California practice.
Based largely on these studies, the Commission drafted preliminary revisions
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Chadbourn's studies of each article of the
Uniform Rules, along with the Commission's tentative recommendations, were
published in pamphlets between August, 1962 and June, 1964.194 Three
months after the last pamphlet was published, the Commission published a
187 Report of the Committee on the Revision of the Law of Evidence To The
Supreme Court of New Jersey (May 25, 1955). For a summary of recommended

changes, see x-xii.
188N. L. Jacobs, The Uniform Rules of Evidence: General Provisions (1955), 10

Rutgers L. Rev. 485 at 487-89.
189 Report of the Commission to Study The Improvement of the Law of Evidence
Including Uniform Rules of Evidence (J.R. 15, 1955) ProposedBy It To The Senate and
General Assembly of the State of New Jersey (November, 1956).
0
I The Evidence Act, 1960 (L. 1960, c. 52).
191 For a brief description of Legislative history of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, see Preface By The Commission and Preliminary Comments To The Rules,
supra, note 174.
192 7 California Law Revision Committee, Recommendation Proposing an Evidence
Code 3 (Stanford: Stanford U. Sch. Law, 1965).
193 Id.
194 The titles of the pamphlets are: Article I. General Provisions; Article II. Judicial

Notice; Burden of Producing Evidence, Burden of Proof, and Presumptions (Replacing
Article i);

Article IV. Witnesses; Article V. Privileges; Article VI. Extrinsic Policies

Affecting Admissibility; Article VII. Expert and Other Opinion Testimony; Article VIII.
Hearsay Evidence; Article IX. Authentication and Content of Writings. The pamphlets
were all published in 6 California Law Revision Committee, Reports, Recommendations,
and Studies (1964).
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preliminary draft of a Proposed California Evidence Code.10 5 The Code was
very different from both the Uniform Rules and the Commission's tentative
recommendations with respect to the Uniform Rules. The Commission's
stated reasons for rejecting the Uniform Rules were:
First, in certain important respects, the Uniform Rules would change the law of
California to an extent the Commission considers undesirable....
Second, the existing California statutes contain many provisions that have
served the State well and that should be continued but are not found in the
Uniform Rules of Evidence....
Third, the draftmanship of the Uniform Rules is in some respects defective
by California standards. 196

The Commission's Final Recommendation on Evidence was published in
January, 1965, p9 and the Code was adopted a few months later.'9 8 The most
significant difference between the California Code and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence is that the California Code generally leaves less discretion to the
judge, is less liberal in admitting evidence, and is much more detailed. The
detailed manner in which it deals with each specific rule is without doubt its
most distinguishing characteristic. The California Code is over two and one
half times as long as the Uniform Rules of Evidence. 99
California's approach to codifying evidence law has not been copied
elsewhere.2 00 One suspects that the Law Revision Committee yielded at the
last moment to pressure from the bar in not adopting the Uniform Rules, but
rather adopting a Code containing a series of very detailed rules. 29' Such a
Code appears to provide more guidance to practitioners and to be a less drastic break from the past.
9. FederalRules of Evidence
The most recent major American Code of Evidence, The Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, has been called "the most
195 Supra, note 192 at 4.
196 Id.at 33.
197 Id.
198 Supra, note 175.
199 J.M. Maguire et al., Supplement of Evidence Rules to Accompany Cases and
Materials On Evidence (5th ed. Brooklyn: Foundation Press, 1973). An illustration
from the rules demonstrates this difference. The Uniform Rules include four rules dealing with the definition and effect of presumptions, and prescribing the manner of
resolving a clash between inconsistent presumptions (rules 13 to 16). The California
Evidence Code, on the other hand, has eight sections dealing with presumptions generally, five sections dealing with conclusive presumptions, seventeen sections which list
those presumptions which affect the burden of producing evidence, and ten sections
which list those presumptions that affect the burden of proof. (ss. 600-669) Another
illustration which demonstrates this difference deals with the disqualification of the
Judge as a witness: The California Code in three detailed subsections sets out the circumstances and conditions and procedure of disqualification of the judge when he becomes a witness and then concludes with a subsection which states, "In the absence of
objection by a party, the judge presiding at the trial of an action may testify in that
trial as a witness." (s.73) The Uniform Rules simply state, "Against the Objection of
a party, the judge presiding at the trial may not testify in that trial as a witness." (rule
42)
200 Except to a certain extent in Ghana, see infra.
201 See K. Graham, California's Restatement of Evidence (1971), 4 Loyola U. L.
Rev. 291.
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rational, practical, and expedient code of evidence in history." The fascinating
judicial and congressional history of these rules has been re-told countless

times.202 Briefly, however, suggestions that a set of rules for federal court

trials be promulgated had been made for many years. 20 3 In 1961, on the recommendation and authorization of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Chief Justice Warren appointed a Special Committee on Rules of Evidence to consider the advisability of developing uniform rules of evidence for
the federal courts. In a report published in 1962, the Special Committee concluded that the rules of evidence in the federal courts should be improved 2e 4
2 2
0 E. W. Cleary, The Plan for the Adoption of Rules of Evidence for United States
District Courts (1970), 25 Record 142; Foreword, Symposium on the Federal Rules of
Evidence (1976), 49 Temple L.Q. 860; Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before
the Special Subcommittee on Reform of Federal CriminalLavs of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. ser. 2, at 11 (1973); W. L. Hungate, An Introduction To The ProposedRules of Evidence (1973), 32 Fed. Bar J.225; Note, Congressional
Discretionin Dealing with the FederalRules of Evidence (1973), 6 J.of Law Reform 798;
D. E. Santarelli, The Supreme Court'sProposedFederalRules of Evidence: The Authority
and Necessity For Codification in Retrospect (1973), 32 Fed. Bar J. 257; V. E.
Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: An Introduction and Critilque
(1969), 38 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 449; C. Spangenberg, The Federal Rules of EvidenceAn Attempt at Uniformity in Federal Courts (1969), 15 Wayne L. Rev. 1061; J.B.
Weinstein and M. A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, Vol. 1 (New York: M. Bender,
1975) at vi-xi; C. A. Wright and A. R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure,Vol. 4
(St. Paul: West Pub. Co., 1969) s. 1007.
203 See, generally, R. E. Degnan, The Feasibility of Rules of Evidence in Federal
Courts, 24 F.R.D. 341 (1960); J.E. Estes, The Need for Uniform Rules of Evidence
in the FederalCourts, 24 F.R.D. 331 (1960).
204 Prior to the enactment of the Code, Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure governed the admissibility of evidence in civil actions. It provided:
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the
United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore applied in the courts of
the United States on the hearing of suits of equity, or under the rules of evidence
in the courts of general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court
is held. In any case, the statute, or rule which favors the reception of the evidence
governs and the evidence shall be presented according to the most convenient
method prescribed in any of the statutes or rules to which reference is herein
made.
(1 F.R.D. xiii (1941)).
Thus, in determining whether evidence was admissible in civil actions resort had
to be made to three different sources of law: (1) federal statutes, (2) rules of evidence
previously used by federal courts in suits in equity, and (3) rules of evidence applied
in the courts in the state in which the Federal Court was sitting. See generally, Note,
The Admissibility of Evidence in Federal Courts Under Rule 43(a) (1946), 46 Colum.
L. Rev. 267; Note, The Admissibility of Evidence Under Federal Rule 43a (1962), 48
Virg. L. Rev. 939; Note, Federal Rule 43a: The Scope of Admissibility of Evidence and
The Implications of The Erie Doctrine (1962), 62 Colum. L. Rev. 1049.
In criminal matters, Rule 26 of the FederalRules of Criminal Procedureprovided
generally that the admissibility of evidence, and the competency and privileges of witnesses, were governed by federal legislation, or, in the absence of legislation, "by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience." Rule 26 of the former Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 573 (1946), amended 1975. Thus, even in the criminal
cases, there was considerable confusion over which rules to apply, and the rules tended
to vary from one federal court circuit to the next. See, generally, L. B. Orfield, The
Reform of Federal Criminal Evidence, 32 F.R.D. 121 (1963); T. F. Green, Drafting
Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence (1967), 52 Cornell L.Q. 177 (1967); Wright and
Miller, supra, note 202, Vol. 2 at paras. 401-19.
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and that the enactment of uniform rules of evidence throughout the federal
court system was both advisable and feasible.2 5
The report was circulated to members of the bench and bar for comment. As a result of the favourable response, the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Committee in 1965 to formulate
uniform rules of evidence for federal courts. Professor Cleary acted as the
Reporter for the Committee. The Committee was comprised of fifteen eminent
•practioners, judges and law professors. It met every two or three months to
discuss working papers and draft sections prepared by Professor Cleary. Four
years later, in March, 1969, the Advisory Committee published a first draft
of the Rules,2 06 and invited submissions from the bench and bar. A revised
draft appeared two years later. 207 The Supreme Court approved a final version on November 20, 1972,208 and two months later sent it to Congress to
take effect on July 1, 1973, unless disapproved by Congress within ninety days.
Congress, however, vetoed this judicial promulgation of the rules and undertook a study of the rules. This veto largely resulted from the jealous protection
by Congress of its jurisdiction, and its concern over some of the privilege provisions, notably the abandonment of the physician-patient and spousal communication privileges, the liberalization of the executive privilege, and the
general lack of recognition of state law in the area of privilege. 2 9 After extensive congressional hearings and debates, the rules were signed into law by
President Ford on January 2, 1975 to be effective July 1, 1975.210
The rules were clearly drafted with the problems of the Model Code
of Evidence in mind. Unnecessary and academic verbiage has been avoided

and cross-references kept to a minimum. As much as possible each rule states

an independent and self-contained rule. The substance of the rules might be
summarized by noting that they display a bias in favour of admissibility, and
that they continue the trend of investing the trial judge with greater discretion,
205

Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Rules of Evidence: A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and
Feasibility of Developing Uniform Rules of Evidence for the United States Distric
Courts (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1962) at ix.
208 Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United
States District Courts and Magistrates, (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969).
207 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
20
8 56 F.R.D. 183 (1972).
209 D. W. Louisell, The California Evidence Code and the Federal Rules: PastAnd Present-Are Prologue (1976), 9 U.C.D.L. Rev. xxxvii at xxxxi.
210
For reference to the congressional record, see Weinstein, supra,note 202, Vol. 1.
President Ford, in requesting passage of the bill by Congress, urged:
Earlier this session, the House passed a bill to codify for the first time in our
history, the evidentiary rules governing the admissibility of proof in Federal
courts. This bill is the culmination of some 13 years of study by distinguished
judges, lawyers, Members of the Congress and others interested in and affected
by the administration of justice in the Federal system. The measure will lend
uniformity, accessibility, intelligibility and a basis for reform and growth in our
evidentiary rules which are sadly lacking in current law. I strongly urge final
action on this important bill prior to the conclusion of this Congress.
Quoted at xi.
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particularly over the conduct of the trial.211 Finally, after three major efforts,
will achieve
it appears that American codifiers have arrived at a Code that
2' 2 At least eight states have adopted the rules, 213 and they are
uniformity
214
being considered in many others.
The rules, however, have not passed without criticism. When they were
213
approved and promulgated by the Supreme Court, Justice Douglas dissented.

As well, when the Rules were being considered by Congress numerous representations were made urging that the Rules not be adopted. Perhaps the most
notable was made by Judge Henry Friendly. His concerns bear quoting because they are similar to the concerns expressed by many of the critics of the
Proposed Canadian Evidence Code:
My first objection to the proposed rules is that there is no need for them. Someone once said that, in legal matters, when it is not necessary to do anything, it is
necessary to do nothing. I find that a profoundly wise remark. We know we are
with respect to evidence; we cannot tell
now having almost no serious problems 216
how many the Proposed Rules will bring.

He went on to say that: "....

evidence is not the kind of subject that lends

itself to codification. It is peculiarly a subject of the common law system of
judicial development by examination of the actual facts in each case in an
adversary setting." 217 Finally, he was concerned that "... the Rules will sti-

2 11
See P. F. Rothstein, Some Themes in The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
(1974), 33 Fed. Bar J. 21. Between the 1969 draft and the March 1971 draft, several
changes were made that would tend to favour the prosecution. The general reasons for
these changes are explained in Weinstein, id. at vii.
212he rules have dominated the periodical literature on evidence over the past few
years. See, for example, the following symposia on the Federal Rules of Evidence:
[1969] L. & Soc. Order 509; (1970), 37 Ins. Counsel J. 565; (1976), 49 Temple L.Q.
860; (1976), 9 U.C.D.L. Rev. 1; (1973), 32 Fed. Bar J. 225; (1976), 57 Chi. Bar Rec.
208; (1975), 36 Louisiana L. Rev. 59; (1973), 23(3) Fed'n. Ins. Counsel Q. 3; (196869), 15 Wayne L. Rev. 1077; (1969-70), 16 Wayne L. Rev. 135.
213 Some states, in the rush to adopt the rules, adopted one of the preliminary
versions of the rules. Some set up committees to study the Federal Rules and recommended certain changes. Thus all statutes are not identical. Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat.,
para. 47,020 et seq. (1973); New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann., para. 20-4-101 et seq.
(Interim Supp. 1976); Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. Ann., sec. 901.01 et seq. (West 1973)
(The Wisconsin proposed Code of Evidence, with the Judicial Council's Committee
Notes, can be found in (1973), 56 Marquette L. Rev. 155); Nebraska: Neb. Rev.,
Stat. para. 27-101 et seq. (Supp. 1975); Maine: Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 16, para.
1 et seq. (Supp. 1975) (See R. H. Field, The Maine Rules of Evidence: What They
Are and How they Got That Way (1975), 27 Maine L. Rev. 203); Florida: F. Stat.
Ann., sec. 90.101 et seq. (Supp. 1977) (See C. M. Smith and C. W. Ehrhardt, Proposed Code of Evidence (1974), 48 Fla. B.J. 13; Ehrhardt, A Look at FloriddsProposed
Code of Evidence (1974), 2 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 681; Ehrhardt, The Federal Rules of
Evidence and FloridaEvidence Compared (1975), 3 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 384); Arkansas:
Ark. Stat. Ann., para. 28-103 et seq., Uniform Rules of Evidence (Noncum. Supp.
1976) (adopted 1974 Uniform Rules, which were in turn based on the Federal Rules).
214 See, for example, Symposium, Proposals For A New York Code of Evidence
(1974), 19 N.Y.L. Forum 739; J. B. Weinstein, The Ohio and Federal Rules of Evidence (1977), 6 Cap. U. L. Rev. 517.
215 409 U.S. 1132 (Reporter's Note); 56 F.R.D. 184 at 185 (1972). One of his
grounds for dissent was that the law of evidence is best left to case-by-case development
or legislative enactment.
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mulate appeals and increase reversals on evidentiary rulings."21

Judge

Friendly's concern impressed at least one member of the sub-committee. Representative Elizabeth Holtzman expressed her views separately from those
of the Committee: ".... the adoption of a rigid black letter evidentiary code

might constitute a step backward ... [because of] the difficulty of dealing
with evidentiary issues by black letter law and the disadvantage of cutting off
the development of the law in many areas where such development on a case
basis was presently desirable."2 19 Other commentators were more sweeping in
their criticisms. Professor Kenneth Graham wrote:
The general tenor of the proposed rules is so reactionary as to reject reforms that
as conservative a body as the American Bar Association had embraced twenty
years ago. They are totally inadequate as a basis for litigation in the Twenty-First
Century. Furthermore, the form of the rules is so complex that it is difficult even
for evidence scholars to decipher them. Finally, the overall approach of the rules
seems so designed to favor certain classes of litigants and the interests of lawyers
and judges rather than the public interest that they threaten to discredit the whole
rulemaking process. 22

10. Scottish Law Commission, Draft Evidence Code
Two other recent codes of evidence studied by the Commission were
drafted in Scotland and Ghana. The preparation of a Code of Evidence was
one of the first projects undertaken by the Scottish Law Commission. In justifying this priority, the Commission noted that "the law of evidence was the
branch not only most easily susceptible of codification, but was also that in
which a Code would be of the highest practical value."' 22 ' In 1968, the Commission published a Memorandum (No. 8) containing eight chapters of a
proposed Code of Evidence. 222 As well, the Memorandum included an introduction explaining the problems of codification, the form of the Code and the
interpretative principles to be applied in construing the Code. The Code is an
original contribution to the codification movement and contains a number of
216 Proposed Rules of Evidence: Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on Judiciary, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 261 (1973) (Statement of Henry J. Friendly, Chief Judge, U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit). A similar view was expressed by the Honourable
Arthur Goldberg, id., at 152.
217 Id. at 262.
218

Id.

Separate Views of Hon. Elizabeth Holtzman, Federal Rules of Evidence, H.R.
Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 27-8 (1973). This concern, that a Code might hinder
the judicial, case-by-case, evolution of the rules, was expressed by many critics of the
Code. See, for example, J. C. Smith, Codification of The Rules of Evidence: AIn Unreadiness (1974), 33 Fed. B.J. 44 at 46: "... . the natural development of the rules of
evidence should be allowed to continue unfettered by legislation. In any instance, codification, purporting to achieve certainty, should not be done at the expense of judicial
219

maturation."
22

o Supra, note 216 at 195. For an equally sweeping condemnation of the rules,
see Statement of Charles R. Halpem and George T. Frampton, Jr., on behalf of the
Washington Council of Lawyers, id. at 168.
221 Draft Evidence Code (FirstPart)Memorandum No. 8 (Edinburgh: Scottish Law
Commission, undated) at 1.
2
=Id. The date of publication is given in the Commission's Fifth Annual Report
1969-70 (Edinburgh: H.M.S.O., 1970) at 6.
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provisions pertaining to problems peculiar to Scottish law. However, the codifiers were clearly inspired by the American Model Code of Evidence, and
many of the provisions reflect the liberalizing influence of that Code. For
example, the hearsay rule is virtually abolished and the judge is given a broad
discretion to control the conduct of the case.
The Draft Evidence Code was circulated to the bench and bar for comment. Comment must have been adverse because further work on the Code
was delayed, 22 3 and eventually the concept of codification was abandoned 2 24
The Scottish Law Commission is now preparing a paper recommending reform in various areas of evidence and the consolidation of existing statutory
provisions.
11. Ghana's Draft Rules of Evidence
The codification of the rules of evidence was also one of the
first projects undertaken by the Ghana Law Reform Commission. In 1971, the
Commission published a report entitled, "Draft Rules of Evidence. '226 The
proposed Code drew upon American codifications, particularly the California
and Model Codes; the Indian Evidence Act, as modified in Nigeria and East
Africa; and recent statutory developments in England.227 For example, those
sections of the Code dealing with presumptions, authentication, writings and
privilege, are very detailed and similar in form to the California Code, while
in its virtual abolition of the hearsay rule, the Ghana Code follows the Model
the Commission subsequently
Code. The Code was enacted in 1975,2282 and
9
published an extensive commentary on it. 2
12. ..Eleventh Report of the CriminalLaw Revision Committee
In 1964, the Home Secretary asked the English Criminal Law Revision
Committee "to review the law of evidence in criminal cases . .230 Eight
years later, in 1972, the Committee published its final report.23 1 The Committee did not recommend the adoption of a Code of Evidence because they
felt that the far-reaching changes in the laws that they were recommending
should be considered first.2 3 2 However, their Draft Bill deals with all significant areas of criminal evidence. The major recommendations of the Report
include: the judge or jury should have the right to draw all reasonable infer-

223

Scottish Law Commission, Sixth Annual Report 1970-71 (Edinburgh: H.M.S.O.,

1971) at6.
224 Scottish Law Commission, Seventh Annual Report 1971-72 (Edinburgh: -.M.S.O.,
1973) at 4.
22
r Scottish Law Commission, Eleventh Annual Report 1975-76 (Edinburgh:
H.M.S.O., 1977) at 5.
226 Ghana Law Reform Commission, Draft Rules of Evidence (1971).
22 7
Ghana Law Reform Commission, FirstReport (1971) at 6.
22s Ghana, Evidence Decree, 1975 (N.R.L.D. 323).
229 Ghana Law Reform Commission, Commentary on the Evidence Decree, 1975.
20 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report: Evidence (General) (Cmnd.
4991; 1972) at 5.
231
232

Id.
Id. at 8.
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ences from the fact that the accused remained silent in the face of police
interrogation; the abolition of the caution by the police to the accused that he
has a right to remain silent; the prosecution should have the right to comment
on the accused's failure to give evidence at trial; confessions should be excluded only if made under circumstances likely to make them unreliable; the
accused's disposition should be admissible to show his state of mind if he
admits the actus reus of the crime; a burden of persuasion to disprove an element of the offence or to prove a defence should never be placed on the accused; the testimony of accomplices should not require corroboration; in
cases of identification, the judge should have to warn the jury of the special
need for caution; and, generally speaking, first-hand hearsay should be admissible, but second-hand hearsay (except for statements in other legal proceedings) should not.
The reaction to the Report was immediate, vicious and, in the end, overpowering. Newspaper and periodical headlines called it "Disappointing and
Dangerous," "Too High A Price for Conviction," "A Full-Scale Assault On
Traditional Standards of British Justice" and warned, "British Justice In
Jeopardy." The critics, however, did not stop at attacking the merits of the
Commission's recommendations: the secrecy of the Commission's proceedings was condemned; the anecdotal nature of the support for the empirical
assumptions of the Commission's recommendations was ridiculed; the narrow
frame of reference within which the Commission operated was questioned;
and the composition of the Commission itself (all males with an average age of
sixty-four and similar backgrounds, attitudes and experience) was criticized.2

233 The literature criticizing the report is voluminous. See, for representative com-

ments: General Council of the Bar of England and Wales, Evidence in Criminal Cases:
Memorandum on the Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee: Evidence (General) (London, 1973);
R. N. Gooderson, Evidence-CriminalLaw Revision Committee-Eleventh Report,

[19721 Camb. L.. 206;
E. Griew, ProposedReform of The Law of Evidence in Criminal Cases in England

and Wales (1972), 10 U. W. Aust. L. Rev. 243;
338 Parl. Deb. H.L. (5th ser.), col. 154 et seq.;
B. Hogan, Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eleventh Report: A Summary,
[1972] Crim. L. Rev. 468;
Sixteenth Annual Report (London: Justice (Society), 1973) at 18-24;
B. MacKenna, Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eleventh Report: Some Coinmnents, [1972] Crim. L. Rev. 605;
C. J. Miller, Silence and Confessions-What are they worth? [1973] Crim. L. Rev.
343;

A. Muir, The Rules of The Game, [1973] Crim. L. Rev. 341;
C. Tapper, Evidence (General): Eleventh Report of the Criminal Law Revision
Committee (1972), 35 Mod. L.R. 621; Tapper, Criminal Law Revision Committee Report: CharacterEvidence (1973), 36 Mod. L.R. 56 and 167;

Release Lawyers' Report, Guilty Until Proved Innocent (London: Sphere, 1973);
W. Twining, The Way Of The Baffled Medic: Prescribe First; Diagnose Later-If

At All (1973), 12 J. Soc. Pub. Teachers of Law 348.
A. A. S. Zuckerman, Criminal Law Revision Committee Eleventh Report, Right of
Silence (1973), 36 M.L.R. 509.
For an analysis of the reaction see M. Zander, The CLRC Report-A survey of
Reactions (1974), 71 L. Soc. Gazette 954; J. A. Coutts, Reform of the Law of Evidence
in Criminal Cases (1973), 1 Dalhousie LJ. 151 at 152-154.
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Members of the Commission, in particular Glanville Williams and Rupert Cross, replied to their critics. 234 Both authors contended that their critics
had attacked statements in the Report which were inconsequential to the conclusions; that they attacked the lack of research without pointing to research
the committee had ignored, or to facts that were needed and how they could
be obtained; and that they often did not fully understand the present rules
of evidence. Professor Cross noted that, irrespective of the correctness of the
empirical assumptions upon which the recommendations rested, the recommendations could be supported on the simple ground that they were necessary
in order to rationalize the rules of evidence by removing the illogicalities. 235
He also described much of the criticism of the Report as being characterized
by "ignorance, self-righteousness and unreason."' 06
The Criminal Law Revision Committee's Report on Evidence is one of
the most closely reasoned documents published on criminal evidence, and
many of its recommendations are long overdue. It is unfortunate that it is now
apparently a dead issue in England. When the Report was published, meetings
to review it were held at the Law Reform Commission of Canada. It was reassuring to find that much of the thinking underlying the Report paralleled
that underlying the Commission's Evidence Code.
14. Previous CanadianCodes of Evidence
A little-known Evidence Code has been in use in Canada for over seventeen years. In 1959, under authority of the National Defence Act,07 the Military Rules of Evidence, a code of evidence applicable in Canadian courts martial, was approved by the Governor-in-Council. 238 These rules follow, to some
extent, the Model and Uniform Rules. However, they are drafted in more de23 9
tail than those Codes, and adhere more closely to the common law rules.
The drafters attempted to draft a set of rules that would be acceptable to the
Military and that could be understood by, and provide guidance for, people
234 See R. Cross, An Attempt To Update, supra, note 37; The Evidence Report:
Sense or Nonsense, [19731 Crim. L. Rev. 329; Clause 3 of the Draft Criminal Evidence
Bill, Research and Codification, [1973] Crim. L. Rev. 400. G. Williams, The Proposals

for Hearsay Evidence, [1973] Crim. L. Rev. 76; The New Proposals in Relation to
Double Hearsay and Records, [1973] Crim. L. Rev. 139; The Work of Criminal Law

Reform, (1975), 13 J. Soc. Pub. Teachers of Law 183.
235 Cross, The Evidence Report, id.; see also Cross, An Attempt to Update, id.
230 Cross, The Evidence Report, id.
237 National Defence Act, R.S.C., 1970, c. N-4, s. 158(1).
238 Order-in-Council 1959-1027, Aug. 13, 1959, amended by P.C. 1967-2255, Nov.
30, 1967 and P.C. 1971-31, Jan. 12, 1971, with additional explanatory notes approved
by the Minister. The preparation of the Military Rules of Evidence began in 1952. The
project was under the direction of Professor W. R. Lederman, then of Dalhousie University, Faculty of Law. He prepared draft sections, with explanatory notes and illustrations, and submitted them to members of the legal branch of the Armed Forces. He
was assisted by Graham Murray and Dean Read, also of the Dalhousie University
Faculty of Law. Dean Read supervised the final drafting of the rules.
2
39 The details and form of some of the rules was apparently inspired by English
military law. The drafters of the rules acknowledged permission to use materials from
United Kingdom Service Manuals. Queen's Regulations and Orders, Volume II, Ap-

pendix xvii at (iv).
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who might not have a full legal training, or access to a legal library. In the
Queen's Regulations and Orders, the rules are preceded by an explanatory
note that describes the basic rules of evidence, their purposes and relationships. The Code has apparently "served the military well. 24 °
In drafting the Proposed Code of Evidence, reference was made from
time to time to the Military Rules of Evidence. 241 Indeed a Military Law Project was initiated at the Law Reform Commission under the supervision of
Colonel H.G. Oliver, who attended many of the meetings of the Evidence
Project. The Canadian Armed Forces expressed an interest in adopting the
Proposed Evidence Code when enacted so that there would be uniformity
between military courts martial and public criminal trials. Furthermore, it is
at present unclear whether the Court Martial Appeal Court is bound by the
2
Military Rules of Evidence. 4
The Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation drafted an Evidence
Act in 1936,243 which was revised in 1941,244 and has since been amended
from time to time. 245 The Act does not purport to be a code; however, it
contains sixty-six sections which consolidate earlier statutory provisions and
treat the various topics now covered in most provincial evidence acts. In
1959, the Commissioners undertook to study whether an Act containing Uniform Rules of Evidence should be recommended. 246 The question was referred
to the Newfoundland Commissioners.2 47 In 1963, these Commissioners expressed some doubt about the wisdom of attempting to codify the law of evidence but they suggested that the subject be referred to a more populous
province where problems with the laws of evidence would be more likely to
occur. The question was then referred to the Ontario Commissioners. 248 In
1965, the Ontario Commissioners concluded, after studying the Model Code
and Uniform Rules of Evidence, that they did not have the resources to con2

40 A. Swainson, The Rules of Evidence at Court Martial (1977), 25 Chitty's LJ.

272.
241

In a recent article, the Commission is criticized for failing "to acknowledge the

existence of the Military Rules of Evidence" and failing to make "comments of any
type about them." Id. at 280. In the preface to the proposed Code, reliance upon the
American Codes is acknowledged because many of the sections of the Code were drawn
from these sources. The Military Rules of Evidence were not followed in style or content
and thus no mention was made of them. However, certainly like much of the published
material the Commission consulted, the Military Rules of Evidence were useful in
formulating positions. Perhaps the Commission should have published a bibliography
of sources consulted.
242
See, R. v. Ziesman (1966-67), 9 Crim. L.Q. 225.
243 [1936] Proceedings of the Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada 28.
244 [1941] id. 65.
245 The Uniform Act was amended [1942] id. 19; [1944] id. 60; [1945] id. 73.
The Revised Uniform Act, [1945] id. 75, was amended [1951] id. 84; [1953] id. 82.
2
46This initiative was apparently the result of an article on codification written by
Professor Graham Murray, supra, note 82.
247 [1959] Proceedings of the Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in
Canada 21.
248 [1963] id. 25-26.
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duct the research and study that 2was
required in the field. The subject was
49
thus withdrawn from the Agenda.
This review of the antecedents of the Proposed Code of Evidence has
two purposes. First, one purpose is to demonstrate that codification of the
rules of evidence is not a new idea, or a notion foreign to common law
countries. Codification has been successfully accomplished in many such jurisdictions. Indeed, in view of this long history of attempts at codification, it is
curious that reform was such a long time coming and that codification was so
bitterly resisted. Second, this review sets out the many models and the enormous body of scholarship upon which the Commission was able to draw. Professor Graham Murray has suggested that the American evidence codes were
so good that "ridiculously little effort" would be needed to draft a code of
evidence rules for use in Canada.2" Undoubtedly, the American codifications
not only made the Commission's work on evidence much easier, they made it
possible. And because evidentiary problems admit of only a limited range of
solutions, particular problems were often resolved in the same manner as they
had been resolved in a previous codification. However, in preparing the Code,
no previous resolution of an evidence problem was blindly followed. The discussion of each problem always began and ended with a discussion of basic
principles.
IV. THE PROCEDURE OF REFORM
The decision on how to proceed with the study of evidence appeared to
involve a choice among three alternatives. The possibility of establishing an
advisory body of distinguished lawyers and judges from across the country
was debated at length. A full-time staff member at the Commission would
draft legislation and prepare comments on various aspects of evidence law.
These documents would be discussed by the advisory group, which would meet
four or five times a year. A complete Evidence Code would be prepared in
four or five years. This is basically the procedure adopted by the English
Criminal Law Revision Committee in reviewing the law of evidence in criminal cases.2i It is also the process followed in preparing
the Rules of Evidence
252
for the United District Courts and Magistrates.
An alternative method would be to engage a number of lawyers and academics to prepare definitive working papers on various areas of the laws of
evidence. At the end of two or three years, with these working papers in hand,
the Commission would prepare a draft Evidence Code. The Ontario Law Reform Commission decided to proceed with their study of evidence law in this
mannerma
id. 26.

249

[1965]

250

R. G. Murray, supra, note 82.

2 51

Criminal Law Revision Committee, Eleventh Report, supra, note 230. See
Coutts, supra, note 233; J. Barnes, The Law Reform Commission of Canada (1975-76),
2 Dalhousie L.J 62 at 64, n. 3.
2 52

Supra, note 206 at 1-9. See also statement of Albert Jenner, Hearings, supra,
note 216 at 77.
253 Ontario Law Reform Commission, Annual Report, 1967 (Toronto: Department
of the Attorney General, 1967) at 23.
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A final suggestion was that a small group of full-time staff be employed
at the Commission to prepare brief study papers on various aspects of evidence law. These papers would be circulated to the profession and the public
at large. The study papers and all responses to them would be considered by
the Commission in formulating its recommendations.
This third approach was adopted. The "advisory committee" approach
was rejected, mainly on the grounds that it would not provide interested members of the profession and the public an opportunity for meaningful input in
the early stages of the reform process. It was felt that the Commission should
proceed as openly as possible. Normally the advisory committee approach
presents the public with a fait accompli. Subsequent commentators are in some
sense limited to accepting or rejecting the report of the committee. 25 4 Furthermore, enormous difficulties in agreeing on the membership of the advisory
committee were foreseen, because it would have
to be representative of the
2
many interests at stake in the reform process. 5
It was the unanimous view of members of the Commission that it would
be pointless to prepare a series of academic tomes on the law of evidence.
Perhaps more than in any other area of the law, all the necessary doctrinal
analysis had been done in the law of evidence. It was hard to imagine that
any improvement could be made on the work of such American scholars as
Ladd, Morgan, Wigmore, Maguire, McCormick and Cleary, or of English
scholars such as Cross and Williams. While such doctrinal analysis had not
been done extensively in Canada, Professor Schiff's excellent materials provided a good basis for studying the Canadian jurisprudence.260 As well, the
Ontario Law Reform Commission made available the background studies on
evidence that were done for that Commission. While it was conceded that
there might be some value in undertaking such research if it were done by
people who could transform and enrich the data, there was a feeling that,
given the paucity of good writing on evidence in Canada, most of the papers
would simply collect, assemble and reorganize the information that was readily available. The need for additional compilations of cases was doubted.
Finally, because the Commission was interested in developing an approach to
evidence that reflected certain basic principles, it was essential that at least
a small group of people be thoroughly familiar with all aspects of the subject
and the proposed reforms.
At the outset, the law of evidence was broken down into a number of
subject areas. The rules of evidence relating to the competency, questioning
and impeachment of witnesses were the first chosen for study. It was felt that
a study of this area would provide a microcosm of all the problems likely to
254

The fate of the English Criminal Law Revision Committee's Eleventh Report,
supra, note 230, would appear to confirm the validity of this concern.
255
The Advisory Committee on the United States Federal Rules of Evidence was
criticized on these grounds. In alleging that the Advisory Committee was unrepresentative, representatives of the Washington Council of Lawyers noted, "There are no lawyers
concerned with problems of the poor; there are no environmental or consumer lawyers;
there are no lawyers actively involved in the vindication of the rights of minority
groups." Hearings, supra, note 216 at 178.
2 56
Supra, note 102.
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be encountered in studying the rules. Following an exhaustive research of the
relevant literature and legislation in other jurisdictions, study papers covering
each topic were prepared. These study papers stated the problems and issues
to be resolved in each area and the arguments relating to each. Rough draft
legislation was also frequently proposed in the study papers.
Once a week, members of the Evidence Project met to discuss these
study papers. In the first year the members included Martin Friedland, who
was the Commissioner initially most involved in the Project, Edward Tollefson, who was on the research staff of the Department of Justice, Judge Ren6
Marin and the author. Both Mr. Justice Patrick Hartt and Mr. Justice Antonio
Lamer, chairman and vice-chairman of the Commission, respectively, attended many of the meetings. In the second and third years, the Project was joined
by Jean-Louis Baudouin, a professor of law at the University of Montreal,
and Judge Ronald Delisle, who, then a professor on a leave of absence from
Queen's University Faculty of Law, joined the Commission on a full-time
basis for a year to work on the Project. While others were involved, two nonmembers of the Project, in particular, played important roles: a social psychologist, Professor Tony Doob, of the University of Toronto, and Professor
Stan Schiff, of the University of Toronto Faculty of Law. Professor Schiff
prepared detailed comments on each study paper, criticizing them from the
point of view of traditional evidentiary theory. Indeed, he often prepared
comments on the study papers that exceeded the study papers in length. The
final product was undoubtedly improved by his tough, analytical and often
unrelenting criticisms, although not as much as he would have liked. Professor
Doob's specific role was to criticize the study papers from the point of view
of the science of psychology. His ability to discern the empirical basis of the
various recommendations, design research techniques to test their validity,
and explain his conclusions in clear and understandable language, was of invaluable assistance.
After an area had been thoroughly explored at these weekly meetings,
a draft study paper would be prepared for publication. The study papers contained proposed draft legislation and a commentary explaining the drafted
sections. They were distributed to the public for comment. A number of
people from whom comments were invited complained that the study papers
were too brief and contained no footnote references.2 7 The papers were deliberately short in length, to encourage busy practitioners and judges to respond
to them. They were not intended to serve as reference guides to the present
law. Their sole purpose was to provoke comment on the merits of the suggested changes, based on the readers' experiences and on their views of the
relative importance of the competing interests. Indeed, it was hoped that practitioners and judges would use the papers or make reference to them on a
day-to-day basis as practical problems of evidence arose. In this way, problems that the recommendations would create or resolve could be discovered.
257 'Study papers' is a somewhat pendantic title for what the Commission has

released. 'Position papers with tentative recommendations' would be rather more
accurate, for they contain no authorities, footnotes or references, and evince
rather more provocative stances and rather less study than one would expect.
A. W. Mewett, Editorial, DemocraticLaw Reform (1972), 15 Crim. L.Q. 1.
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Over 5,000 copies of each study paper were distributed. 255 They were

distributed to, among others, Members of Parliament, Law Reform Commissions abroad and in Canada, Canadian libraries, the press, law teachers, law
societies and other law associations, police associations, judges and magistrates, and any other interested groups or persons. Papers that affected particular groups were sent to representative organizations. The response to the
papers was disappointing. An approximate total of only one hundred letters
and thirty briefs was received. 6 As well as receiving briefs and comments,
members of the Project attended numerous meetings of judges and lawyers
across the country to discuss the study papers. Many changes, mostly of a
technical nature, were made in the proposed evidence legislation as a result
of the comments received.
By the spring of 1974, all the study papers were completed and the
Commission began preparing an Evidence Code. A group referred to as the
Task Force on Evidence was formed. It included Mr. Justice Lamer and Dr.
G6rard LaForest, both Commissioners, Jean-Louis Baudouin, Graham Murray, a professor of law from Dalhousie who was working with the Commission
full-time in 1974, and the author. The Task Force met once a week throughout the fall of 1974 and early spring of 1975. It reviewed the Evidence Project's recommendations and the responses to them and sent its recommendations to the Commission in the summer of 1975.260
The Commissioners met throughout the summer and fall of 1975 to
agree on a Code. The author's role at these meetings was to answer specific
questions and to provide background on the issues where that was necessary.
While a number of drafts of the Evidence Code were prepared, Dr. G6rard
La Forest assumed final responsibility for the drafting. In considering the final
draft, the Commission occasionally met with outside groups. For example, in
the fall of 1975, three meetings were arranged with leading practitioners from
across the country, selected for this purpose by the Canadian Bar Association.
Finally, 261
in December of 1975, a Proposed Evidence Code was sent to Parliament.
258 Twelve study papers were eventually released, supra, note 3. All were of a
similar format except Study Paper #5, Compellability of the Accused and the Admissibility of His Statements. This study paper contained a radical proposal for the interrogation of accused persons. The proposal involved the exclusion of all out-of-court

statements made by the accused unless made before a judicial officer. Because of the
radical nature of the proposal it was documented and contained no proposed legislation.
2
59 The letters and briefs were collected and correlated to the sections of the
Proposed Evidence Code in a Commission document, Written Comments Received from
the Public Relating to the Laws of Evidence, supra, note 4.
2 60
These recommendations were contained in a document which included: every
particular evidentiary issue that had to be resolved; the Evidence Project's recommendations on each issue and the reasons for them; the comments that had been received from
the public relating to each particular issue and a summary of the relevant comments
that had been made at the various meetings that members of the Project had attended;
the manner in which the question had been dealt with in other jurisdictions in recent
codifications; the Task Force recommendations with reasons, to the extent that they
departed from the recommendations of the Evidence Project; and, for some issues,
general explanatory notes.
261 See supra,note 1. The Government referred the Code to the Justice Department
for study. However on January 28, 1976, the Honourable Mr. Fairweather introduced
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In retrospect, I have at least three reservations about the reform process
adopted by the Commission. First, I somewhat regret that there was not more
co-operation between the Law Reform Commission of Canada and the various provincial law reform commissions in reforming this area of law.262 The
needless duplication of effort, the need for uniformity, and the higher probability of the Code being adopted had it had the support of provincial law
reform commissions, are compelling reasons for co-operation. Also, it is possible that a pooling of resources might have resulted in a better product.
At the outset of the Project, the Commission communicated with the
provincial commissions and attorneys-general to explore the possibility of a
joint programme. This concept was not pursued with vigour, however, and
very little co-operation was ever achieved. The British Columbia Law Reform

Commission was the most anxious to co-operate in a joint endeavour. They
engaged John Spencer, a Vancouver lawyer, to prepare extensive comments
on all the Evidence Project's papers, and members of that Commission met
from time to time to discuss and vote upon the recommendations. 263 Their
comments were very useful in preparing the final version of the Code. However, the British Columbia Commission eventually decided to undertake their
own study of various aspects of evidence law.264 The Manitoba Law Reform
Commission also prepared comments on the first five Project study papers.2 65
The lack of co-operation amongst the Commissions may have in some
sense been a blessing, because it is apparent that each Commission had its
own views on both the process and substance of evidence law reform. 266 A
the Code as a private member's bill: An Act to Codify The Law of Evidence, Bill C423. The only section he changed was the section dealing with the character of the rape
victim. He would exclude such evidence in every case.
262
See Ryan, supra, note 16.
263 See Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Annual Report, 1972 (Vancouver: Department ot the Attorney General, 1972) at 11.
264 The B.C. Commission noted, "[We] have continued to take an active interest in
the work [of the federal] commission, but our participation was somewhat reduced this
year because of constraints of time, availability of personnel and differing priorities."
Annual Report, 1975 (Vancouver: Department of the Attorney General, 1975) at 6-7.
265 See supra, note 9.

266 See Law Reform Commission of British Columbia, Annual Report, 1976 (Vancouver: Department of the Attorney General, 1976) at 3-4. The B.C. Commission noted
the expected impact upon B.C. evidence law of the federal rules and of any reforms by
Ontario. Awaiting the reports of those commissions, they decided to pursue evidentiary
problems of specific interest to British Columbia.
The individual studies undertaken by the Provincial Commissions include: Law
Reform Commission of British Columbia, Legal Position of the Crown, Working
Paper No. 7 (1972) at 57-62; Report on Civil Rights, Part 1: Legal Position of the
Crown at 36-38 (1972); Extra-Judicial Use of Sworn Statements, Working Paper
#17 (1975) and Report (1976); Report on Interim Report on Law of Evidence
(1973); Report on Proof of Marriage In Civil Proceedings (1977); The Rule in
Hollington v. Hewthorn, Working Paper, (1975) and Report (1977); Alberta
Institute of Law Research and Reform, Rule in Hollington v. Hewthorn (1975);
the Institute is having a research paper prepared, based on the Ontario and
Federal Law Reform Commissions' Reports on Evidence, see Annual Report
(1976-77) at 12; Quebec Civil Code Revision Office, Report On Evidence (1975);
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on The Law of Evidence (1976); Newfoundland Family Law Study, Family Law In Newfoundland, Ch. X (1973).
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collaborative venture would have undoubtedly resulted in a compromise document. Perhaps at this stage in the reform of the Canadian law of evidence, a
number of different studies, expressing different points of view, will provide a
more useful basis for future reform.
A second reservation about the reform process stems from the fact that
the profession is apparently not prepared to take an active role in the law
reform process when they are simply invited to respond to study papers. The
Law Reform Commission went to great pains to ensure that every opportunity
was afforded the profession to become involved in the process. Thousands of
copies of the study papers were distributed, and each study paper appeared
in The National, the newspaper of the Canadian Bar Association. Interested
persons were invited, encouraged, indeed begged to respond. For whatever
reasons, the profession's response was disappointing. Perhaps practitioners
are too busy to commit their views to writing, do not think their written remarks will be taken seriously, or are simply not concerned at the preliminary
stage of law reform because they do not feel that ultimate change is a serious
possibility. 267 In other areas the Commission has since adopted alternative
means of bringing the expertise of practitioners to bear on the law reform
process. Most commonly, they have established advisory committees comprised of lawyers and judges.
Finally, my strongest reservation about the process of reform is that the
Evidence Project, and the Commission, did not organize their research in
such a way that all their work could be published, or at least made available
to the public in some form. I remain convinced that background papers in law
review format would have been a waste of time, and that the published study
papers performed a useful function. However, numerous other papers and
documents were prepared which could have been made available to the public
in some form. Such documents include: a number of background papers prepared by the Commission staff; the minutes of numerous meetings; a series of
empirical studies done by Professor Doob; Professor Schiff's excellent analysis
of the Project's study papers; a paper prepared by Bruce McDonald on
authentication, identification and proof of documents; empirical research undertaken by Professor Ronald Cohen on the testimony of children; a series of
delightful and perceptive papers written by Professor Murray on the general
question of codification; and a major research project, involving the examination of police records, conducted with the assistance of Herbert Thurston, an
advisor to the Ontario Police Commission. 2 8 There was little justification for
not making these and other studies readily available to interested persons, and
particularly to critics of the Code.
Evidence was the first project undertaken by the Commission, and was
Ryan, supra, note 16, at 11.
268 This study attempted to answer questions relating to the importance of police
questioning, the conditions under which confessions are usually given to the police, the
kinds of arrested persons who are most likely to give confessions to the police, the effect
of the presence of a lawyer on police questioning, the characteristics of police questioning, and the importance of statements given by the accused for use as evidence against
him at trial.
267
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well underway before the Commission was even fully organized. Therefore, it
did not directly benefit from the introspective and self-conscious approach to
the law reform process which began to be developed by the Commission during the second year of its operation. The Commission's approach to law reform is probably unique among law reform bodies. Beginning with the premise
that real law reform embodies changing social practices and that changing
laws and changing values are inseparable, the Commission has set about exploring methods of law reform other than rule reform. 269 Had the Evidence
Project been able to benefit from this extended dialogue taking place at the
Commission, its work might have taken a very different form.
V. PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING THE CODE
In this section, I will briefly indicate the critical focus adopted by the
Commission in its review of the evidence rules, and outline and illustrate the
major themes which emerged in the course of its work and which are reflected
in the Evidence Code. Procedural rules can be evaluated on at least three
different levels. First, they can be evaluated or criticized by reference to the
prevailing jurisprudence. A rule can be viewed as being wrong or incorrect on
the ground that it is inconsistent with, or cannot be derived from, the existing
case law. Evidence reform was thought by many of the critics of the Evidence
Code to involve simply the removal of anomalies or inconsistencies in the case
law. Indeed, so ingrained is this notion of law reform, at least as it relates to
evidence, that the Commission was often criticized solely because some of its
recommendations departed from leading Supreme Court of Canada cases.
From the beginning of its work on evidence, the Commission endeavoured to
resist the temptation to confine its research to simple doctrinal analysis or to
rely entirely upon appellate reports and commentaries on the existing case law.
At another level, the rules can be evaluated by reference to the empirical
assumptions upon which they rest. Nearly every rule of evidence rests upon
an assumption about human behaviour or about the jury's inference-drawing
process. 2 70 The assumptions underlying the common law rules of evidence
were made by judges on the basis of introspection and their own experience.
They were made prior to any scientific study of human behavior. Thus, if the
rules are to be understood and meaningful reform undertaken, their presuppositions must be either verified or refuted by the findings of the modern
science of human behavior. Accordingly, the Evidence Project undertook to
determine the most efficacious manner of applying the knowledge of psychology to the premises on which the rules are based. A number of constraints,
269 See Law Reform Commission of Canada, FirstAnnual Report 1971-72 (Ottawa:
Information Canada, 1972); Second Annual Report 1972-73 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1973); Third Annual Report 1973-74 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1974); Fourth
Annual Report 1974-75 (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1975). See also, P. Hartt, The
Limitations of Legislative Reform (1974), 6 Man. L.J. 1; W. Ryan, supra, note 16; J.
Barnes, supra, note 251; Lyon, Lev Reform Needs Reform (1974), 12 Osgoode Hall
L.J. 421; H. Mohr, Comment (1974), 12 Osgoode Hall L.J. 437; R. A. Samek, A Case

For Social Law Reform (1977), 55 Can. B. Rev. 409; E. Ryan and A. Lamer, The
Path of Law Reform (1977), 23 McGill L.J. 519.
27
0 Supra, Part II.
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experienced by all law reform bodies, 271 are imposed upon interdisciplinary
research of this kind: the task of finding a psychologist with an interest and
some experience in the field; the costs, in terms of both time and money, of
engaging in original research; the difficulty of determining the significance of
research findings to policy formulation; and the difficulty of discerning and
stating the empirical assumptions of the rules so that they could be verified or
refuted. The Commission considered employing a psychologist on a full-time
basis. Because of the difficulty in recruiting a suitable person, however, a sovcial psychologist was hired on a part-time basis. He attended many of the
Project's meetings, prepared a number of research memoranda and undertook
some original empirical research. The empirical assumption of each evidence
rule was explored and subjected to examination and discussion by the Project,
with the assistance of the psychologist. A search was made of the available
literature for assistance in verifying each assumption. In addition, a major
research project was undertaken on the testimony of children and the admissibility of confessions.
Thirdly, the rules can be evaluated in terms of the procedural and substantive goals they are intended to achieve. The premises of our procedural
system and the interests which must be balanced in fashioning rules of evidence and procedure were carefully articulated by the Project. The discussion
of each of the rules always began and ended with a clear reference to these
values. I will not here attempt a definitive cataloguing of these interests, their
inter-relationships and relative importance. It may be, however, that a brief
illustration of how particular interests were balanced, with reference 27
to particular rules of evidence, will reveal the general thrust of the Code. 2
1.

The Need to Admit All Relevant Evidence

Whatever one views as the ultimate purpose of the trial, it is clear that
an important objective of the fact-finding process is to determine "what happened." Thus, prima facie, all relevant evidence should be admissible. Professor Thayer is credited with having elevated this proposition to its rightful
place in evidence theory. Thayer noted, "The two leading principles [of the
rules of evidence] should be brought into conspicuous relief, (1) that nothing
is to be received which is not logically probative of some matter required to
be proved; and (2) that everything which is thus'273probative should come in,
unless a clear ground of policy of law excludes it.
Following Thayer's admonition, the first general rule in the Code provides: "All relevant evidence is admissible except as provided in this Code or
271 See The Law Commission (Great Britain), Seventh Annual Report [1971-72]
(London: H.M.S.O., 1972) para. 2.
272 Frequently, of course, many interests are at stake in formulating a particular
rule. For illustrative purposes, I will assume in the discussion that each rule entails the
balancing of only two 'interests.'
273 Thayer, The Present and Future of The Law of Evidence, supra, note 86 at 89.
See Morgan and Maguire, supra, note 73 at 922-23: "'Thayer was perhaps the first
to
describe these axioms and label them as the fundamental conceptions of the rules of
evidence." See also Wigmore, supra, note 60, Vol. 1, paras. 9, 10; J. L. Montrose, Basic
Concepts of the Law of Evidence (1954), 70 L.Q. Rev. 527.
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any other Act. '2 74 Thus, the slate is wiped clean of all prohibitions to admissibility. This bias in favour of admissibility is retained throughout the Code. Indeed, some members of the Project argued that this provision alone should
constitute the rules (or non-rules) of evidence. The Commission was of the
view, however, that in determining whether evidence should be admissible,
interests other than the unrelenting search for truth, must be considered.
More specifically, the Commission felt that interests such as finality, expedition, the need to protect the trial process from manufactured evidence and
the need to preserve the moral acceptability of the court's decision should be
reflected in the rules of evidence. Furthermore, the institutional characteristics
of the trial process, the adversary system and the jury, were perceived as imposing constraints on the methods used to further the goal of fact-finding.
Finally, it was thought that certain values extrinsic to the litigation process
itself might be jeopardized if there were no rules of evidence.
2.

The Need for Finality

In most disciplines the pursuit of truth is an on-going process. However,
if the judicial trial is to achieve its purpose of settling disputes, permitting repose among the parties to a civil dispute, and effectively sustaining the aims of
substantive criminal law, a high degree of finality must attach to its outcome.
While the importance of this interest is recognized in many rules of evidence,
an instance in which the Commission gave it considerable weight is in the
context of the question of whether the jury's verdict should ever be subject
to impeachment. My own view was that the desirable rule was that recognized
in the majority of American jurisdictions, whereby the jury's verdict can be
impeached if misconduct in the juryroom can be proved without inquiring into
the mental process by which the individual jurors reached their verdict.27
The Commission was convinced, however, that greater value should be placed
on the interest of finality in our criminal process than is currently the case
in the United States. Accordingly, section 52(2) of the Code preserves the
rigid common law rule that a member of the jury cannot give testimony impeaching the validity of the verdict of that jury.
In other contexts, however, the Commission was not persuaded that the
principle of finality should take precedence over other values. For example,
the Commission did not choose to require counsel at trial to make a timely
and specific objection to offered evidence in order to preserve the right to
appeal. Again, my own view differed from that of the Commission. I argued
that, in the absence of a timely and specific objection at trial, any error should
be waived for appeal and that this rule was necessary in order to ensure the
efficient and orderly presentation of evidence. In this instance, then, the Commission was not convinced that the accused's right to a fair trial should be
sacrificed for the sake of the finality that such a rule would ascribe to the verdict at trial. A section was, therefore, drafted which essentially preserves the
276
present law.

274 Code, s. 4(1).
27

5Fed. Rules Evid., Rule 606(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
270 Code, s. 11.
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The Need for Expedition

If the judicial trial is to be an effective forum for the resolution of disputes, its decision must not only be final, but must be reached relatively
quickly and inexpensively. Thus, this value, the need for expedition, must occasionally predominate over others. Regardless of the importance of the issues
at stake for the accused, an investigation on the scale of the Warren Commission cannot be mounted for every charge of murder. The Commission, however placed less emphasis on this value than did the common law judges who
fashioned the existing rules of evidence. For example, the purpose of the collateral fact rule and the rule excluding, in the usual case, prior consistent statements, is to expedite trials. The Commission abolished both of these rigid
rules.277 In their place, a discretion was conferred on the trial judge to exclude
evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger that its proof and
disproof would consume an inordinate amount of time.278 If the Code is
adopted, this change should result in the admission of at least slightly more
evidence than would be admitted under the present rules. To take a counter
example, judicial notice is a doctrine that is designed in part to expedite prooftaking. Here, the Commission liberalized the present rules so that a broader
range of matters will be subject to judicial notice.27 9 Presumably, this approach will result in the saving of time at trial. Critics of the Commission's
position would argue that this time-saving will be accomplished at the expense
of accurate fact-finding and, accordingly, that the rules relating to judicial
notice should not have been liberalized.
4.

The Need to Protect the Trial Process from Manufactured Evidence

In most fact-finding forums, and certainly in the pursuit of knowledge in
scientific laboratories or research libraries, the atmosphere is one of a sincere
'desire to seek the truth. Usually the persons involved have no motives for
falsifying the evidence. Even if such motives do exist, the opportunities to
fabricate evidence are slight. In a judicial trial, on the other hand, both motives and opportunities to manufacture evidence are present. Thus, the law of
evidence has always shown great distrust for evidence that could be easily
manufactured. In the nineteenth century, parties and witnesses with an interest
in the lawsuit were prohibited from giving testimony for fear of perjury. 280
Today, the hearsay rule, the best evidence rule and the rules relating to corroboration are, at least in part, premised on the need to protect the judicial trial
from manufactured evidence. The Commission took the view that the rules of
evidence were too blunt an instrument to be used for the purpose of attempting to protect the trial process from perjured evidence. Therefore, the hearsay
and best evidence rules were greatly liberalizd, and the rules requiring corroboration abolished. Thus, while ensuring the sincerity of testimony is at pre-

277
2

Id., s. 62.
s. 5.

78 Id.,

279
28

Id., ss. 82-85.
supra, note 60, Vol. 2, para. 572.

0 Wigmore,
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pursued by the rules of evidence, under the Code it is given little
sent a goal 281

recognition.
5. The Need to Preserve the Moral Acceptability of the Court's Decision

If the judicial trial is to discharge its functions, parties must be willing to
submit their disputes to the court for resolution and to accept the ultimate
decision of the court as authoritative. To retain its legitimacy as a disputeresolving forum, the court must apply substantive rules of law that are just.
Equally important, the process of determining the facts and arriving at a decision must be acceptable to both present and future litigants and participants.
This interest, which must be protected by the rules of evidence and procedure,
was considered by the Commission in relation to many of the rules, including:
the power the judge has to protect witnesses from harrassment; 28 2 the admissibility of evidence about the past conduct of the victims; 28s impeaching the
credibility of witnesses by introducing previous convictions; 2s4 the accused's
right to confront his accusers; and, the role of the judge in questioning and

calling witnesses.2 8sGenerally, in drafting the Code, the interest of legitimacy

was probably given more weight than the present rules of evidence ascribe to it.
6.

The Need to Protect the Jury from Confusing,
Misleadingand PrejudicialEvidence

Two characteristics of judicial trials have no counterpart in most other
fact-finding tribunals: the adversary system and the jury. In another article,
I have discussed the premises of the adversary system and alluded to the way

in which the rules of evidence must be fashioned to ensure its proper functioning. 286 As to the effect of the jury on the content of the rules of evidence,
jurors are not, of course, experts in evaluating litigious evidence. Therefore,
281

Bentham warned of the difficulty of convincing lawyers that this interest ought
not to be fostered by exclusionary rules of evidence:
Throughout the whole of this work, this practical conclusion is perpetually recurring. Do not exclude any evidence or testimony merely from the fear of being
deceived.
Indisputable, however, as this principle is in itself, it is so new, and so contrary to the prejudices and habits of lawyers, that all I may have to say on the
precautions to be employed will appear to them to be but a very weak remedy
in comparison with the evil.
J. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, supra, note 61, Vol. 5 at 180. In the Model
Code, the fear of perjury was expressly denied as a basis for rules of evidence:
Some of the deformities in that law [the law of evidence] are due to the obsession
of early judges and of earlier and later legislators that perjury can be prevented
by exclusionary rules . . . . If there ever was a time when exclusionary rules
No rational procedure
prevented perjury, that time has long since passed ....
will sanction an exclusionary rule supported only by its supposed efficacy to hinder
or prevent false testimony. This truth the Code recognizes.
Model Code of Evidence, supra, note 71 at 6.
282 Code, s. 58(2).
283 Id., s. 17(3).
284 Id., s. 64.

285 Id., s. 58.
2
86 N. Brooks, "The Judge and the Adversary System," in The Canadian Judiciary,
A. M. Linden, ed. (Toronto: Osgoode Hall Law School, 1976) at 89.
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the law has taken steps to further the rationality of the jury's estimations of the
probabilities of propositions about the ultimate facts in issue, by excluding
evidence from which they might draw fallacious inferences. Indeed, the majority of the rules of evidence were developed in order to protect the jury's inference-drawing process, and thus rest squarely on presumptions about the
jury's fact-finding abilities. The rules might be broadly classified as rules designed to protect the jury from being confused, (such as the collateral fact
rule), misled (the hearsay rule and the opinion evidence rule), or prejudiced
against the accused (the character evidence rule).
The Commission was generally unimpressed by the need to protect the
jury from certain kinds of evidence. Based largely upon their own extensive
experience (as trial lawyers and judges, in the case of the chairman and vicechairman), the general education and sophistication of modern jurors, and
impressionistic evidence drawn from a number of studies, 2 87 the Commissioners concluded that jurors are intelligent and diligent fact-finders. Thus
the collateral fact rule, the hearsay rule and the opinion evidence rule were
abolished or liberalized. One rule that was retained, and which is traditionally
justified on the ground that the jury is not a completely rational fact-finder, is
the character evidence rule. A character trait of the accused is sometimes
evidence of probative value. 288 It could be argued, therefore, that if the trier
of fact were completely rational, there would be no need to exclude such
evidence because of its prejudicial tendencies. However, at least one empirical
,study conducted by the Project suggested, not surprisingly, that people do
place an emphasis on character evidence which exceeds its probative value.289
The Commission was convinced, as well, that the character evidence rule
should be retained in order to ensure the legitimacy of the judicial trial. It is
obviously of great importance that the trial be seen as a forum where people
are tried on the basis of clearly defined acts, which they have been alleged to
have committed, rather than on an assessment of their character.
7. The Protection of Values Extrinsic to the Fact-FindingProcess
The rules of evidence discussed above are rules designed to further the
ultimate objectives of the trial and to support the unique characteristics of the
judicial trial, the adversary and jury systems. There are other rules of evidence, however, which are not designed to further the rationality of the judicial trial's search for truth, nor its function as a dispute-resolving forum.
These rules exclude evidence on the theory that the value of the evidence to
the court is outweighed by some other social value served by suppressing the
evidence. The values regarded as being of sufficient importance to justify impeding the court in its search for truth may be divided into those of protecting
certain relationships (solicitor and client, husband and wife); safeguarding
287 H.

Kalven and H. Zersel, The American Jury (Chicago: University of Chicago

Press, 1966); R. J. Simon, The Jury and the Defence of Insanity (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1967); W. R. Cornish, The Jury (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968).
288 Cf. A. Doob, "Rules of Evidence and Laws of Behavior" in Psychology and
The Litigation Process,supra, note 41 at 68.
289 W. N. Brooks, A. N. Doob and H. M. Kirshenbaum, Character of The Victim
in the Trial of a Case of Rape (unpublished manuscript, 1975).
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government operations (executive privilege); controlling government power
(privilege against self-incrimination); protecting the innocent (standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt); and furthering the aims of the penal system (the exclusion of unfairly obtained evidence). During the preparation of
the Code, there were hard fought battles over the efficacy of trying to protect
these interests by the rules of evidence, and over the manner in which such
objectives could best be achieved. The extent to which these values are protected by the rules in the Code will be obvious to anyone reading it. One
aspect of the last mentioned interest, namely, furthering the aims of the penal
system, deserves brief mention because it was the subject of perhaps the most
heated debate.
The Code provides that evidence shall be excluded, "if it was obtained
under such circumstances that its use in the proceedings would tend to bring
the administration of justice into disrepute." 290 The exclusion of unfairly
obtained evidence is often justified on the basis of the need to deter the police
from engaging in illegal or unfair methods of obtaining evidence. As is apparent from the wording of the section, the Commission did not conclude that this
reasoning justified the exclusion of such evidence. The reasoning which the
Commission found persuasive was premised on the need to further the aims of
the penal system. One of the aims of the penal system is to educate people
about proper conduct in exercising power. The trial process itself can be used to
further that objective. The procedure followed by the state in deciding whether
to exercise its awesome power against an individual does, to some extent, educate people in the proper procedure for the use of power. As Thurman Arnold
observed, "Throughout history the appearance of justice and government morality has been symbolized by the use of the criminal trial." 291 If the judicial trial is
to fulfill this objective, it must demonstrate the importance of order, discipline,
and fairness as a basis for exercising power. A dramatic way to emphasize
humanitarian values and protect the integrity of the criminal trial as a teaching
device is to exclude evidence that is unfairly obtained. Whether the admission
of the evidence would "bring the administration of justice into disrepute" is
a surrogate question asked in achieving this end. However, it is a term with
which the courts are familiar and it conveys the sense of the section.
8.

The Need to Simplify the Rules

Finally, in striking a balance among the various interests, the rules themselves must be certain of application and as understandable as possible. In
view of the Commission's commitment to simplification, this interest sometimes predominated over others. For example, the need for simplicity triumphed over theoretical niceties with respect to the effect of presumptions.
Although this point often goes unnoticed, under present law, presumptions in
civil cases sometimes operate to shift the burden of going forward with the
evidence, and at other times to shift the burden of persuasion. In a perfectly
rational evidentiary system, those presumptions created simply for the purpose
Code, s. 15(1).
91 T. Arnold, The Symbols of Government (New Haven: Yale University Press,

290

1935) at 174.
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of expediting proof-taking, (given certain basic facts, the presumed fact is
so probable that it will save time to provisonally assume it) or for the purpose of achieving procedural fairness, (given certain basic facts, the presumed fact will be provisionally assumed because the adverse party has superior access to proof relating to it) should operate to shift only the burden of
going forward with the evidence. Those presumptions created for important
reasons of social policy, such as presumptions relating to the legitimacy of
children, should operate to shift the burden of persuasion. Presumptions
could be distinguished on the basis of their rationales, albeit not without
difficulty. The dichotomy is not a crucial one, however, and in the Commission's view, there was another important procedural value at stake here-simplicity. The Commission recommended a simple workable rule: that in civil
cases all02presumptions should have the effect of shifting the burden of persuasion.
This brief survey of the interests to be balanced in formulating the rules
reveals the delicacy of the task and perhaps explains why so many of the
issues are ones on which reasonable people may differ. It also reveals, hopefully, the general value biases in the Code. Once the value choices were made,
the distinct, but equally difficult question of translating them into statutory
language had to be confronted.
VI. DRAFTING AND DISCRETION
The present rules of evidence suffer from rampant conceptualism 200
They are technical, detailed, rigid and often applied without reference either
to their purpose or to the overall objectives of the system. It is truly an area
where lawyers and judges have become bewitched and entrapped by their
own jargon. The Commission, therefore, above all, wished to avoid producing
a Code which would invite or even permit the development of conceptual
jurisprudence. They wanted to discourage a decision-making process that is
'based, not on the merits of a particular problem, but on the selection of a
solution from a number of pigeon-hole categories structured upon the ordinary usage of words and the facts and decisions of previous cases. Consequently, the rules are stated, so far as possible, in terms of the principles which
underlie them rather than in terms of minute and detailed rules. In most cases,
this will compel counsel to come to court prepared to argue why, in terms of
292 Code, s. 14(2).

293 For anyone familiar with evidentiary doctrine, this assertion does not need
documentation. However, a passage from Dean Wright's review of Phipson, aptly articulates the problem well:
• . . [Blooks like Phipson disclose that the past history of this part of the law
has been to treat evidence in the same manner as the law of real property-to
categorize and classify rigidly and to develop those categories sometimes, one
would be tempted to say, merely for the sake of mediaeval logic. If common
sense, used in this field to denote what a reasonable man would consider as something normally of probative value, rebelled against too rigid categories, there was
always the normal legal method of making a new category in which one could
classify anew what he could not force into another mold.
C. A. Wright, The Lm of Evidence: Present and Future (1942), 20 Can. B. Rev. 714
at 716.

1978]

Law Reform Commission of Canada

the purpose of the rule, certain evidence should be excluded. This should lead
to open, frank, and principled decision-making by judges.
A few of the reforms embodied in the Code can be used to illustrate the
change in the way evidence problems will have to be approached under the
Code. Common law concepts such as competency, voluntariness and hostility
are not used in the Code. Instead of determining whether a child can give
evidence by reference to some vague definition of the concept of "competency," under the Code the judge will be asked to determine whether the
child's evidence is of sufficient probative value to outweigh the dangers of
misleading the jury or the undue consumption of time.294 In making this
determination, the judge will have to consider the child's perceptual ability,
memory and sincerity.
Under the present law, in determining whether a confession is admissible,
the judge must make a finding as to whether the statement was made voluntarily. This concept has a different and ambiguous usage in virtually every
branch of human knowledge, and certainly, on the basis of existing jurisprudence, has no settled usage in evidence law. The Code requires the judge to
exclude confessions if made under circumstances likely to render them unreliable, or if their admission would bring the administration of justice into
disrepute.2 95 These, of course, are the underlying rationales for excluding
"involuntary" confessions.
Under the present law, before permitting a party who has called a witness to ask that witness leading questions, the judge must be satisfied that the
witness is hostile. But why should the witness's disposition be the deciding
factor in determining whether leading questions can be asked of that witness?
In deciding whether a witness can be asked a leading question, surely the
relevant question is whether the witness desires to give only those answers
which are favourable to the party questioning him. If so, it is dangerous to
permit counsel to suggest answers to the witness. The Code directs the judge's
mind to this question in ruling on the permissibilty of the form of a question. 296
The Code does not completely abandon common law evidentiary concepts and detailed rules. Both the hearsay rule and the character evidence
rule, for example, have been retained. Section 27(1) provides that, "Hearsay
evidence is inadmissible except as provided in this Code." "Hearsay" is then
defined in conventional terms2 97 While it might appear that this definition
could lead to arguments over whether a statement is a "hearsay statement"
rather than over the merits of admitting out-of-court declarations, the exceptions to the hearsay rule, particularly the exception for a person who is "unavailable as a witness," are drafted so broadly that the definition should not
result in the exclusion of reliable and necessary testimony. 298 It has been
argued, however, that by defining hearsay to exclude statements which, when
294 Code, s. 5.
295 Id., s. 15, 16.
290 Id., s. 59.
297 d., s. 27(2).
298 Id., s. 29.
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made, were not intended as assertions of the truth of the facts which they are
being admitted to prove, the Code will lead to the admission of evidence to
which the "hearsay dangers" clearly attach. That is to say, the perception,
memory, narration or sincerity of the maker of the statement may be in
doubt, even though the statement was non-assertive, and no opportunity will
be given to test these testimonial elements by cross-examination. The Commission considered drafting a definition of hearsay under which the judge, in
determining whether a statement was to be excluded as hearsay, had to weigh
the unreliability of the statement made by a declarant out of court against the
necessity for the evidence in the particular case. However, it was eventually
decided that the general discretionary section, which permits the judge to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of misleading
the jury, adequately covered this situation. 2 9 The Commission did not want
to destroy the vitality of this general clause by essentially repeating it in particular sections.
The Code also retains the common law rules which exclude evidence of
the accused's character, but which admit similar fact evidence. 0 0 The reason
for these rules is that the probative value of the accused's disposition to commit the kind of offence with which he is charged, or crimes in general, is assumed to be outweighed by the prejudicial effect of such evidence on the jury.
If, however, his disposition is relevant to a specific fact in issue, such as motive, opportunity or intent, the probative value of evidence of his disposition
is assumed to outweigh its possible prejudicial effect. Obviously, the character
evidence and similar fact rules implement only imperfectly the principles
underlying them. In some cases, even though the accused's disposition might
relate to a specific fact in issue, its probative value will be slight and its possible prejudicial effect great, and, therefore, it should be excluded. Under the
present law, it is generally recognized that the judge has a discretion to
exclude the evidence in such a case. Certainly under the Code this authority
is recognized by the general provision permitting the judge to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the dangers of undue prejudice. 80 1
However, it is also true that, in some cases, the probative value of evidence of the accused's general disposition to commit the crime with which he
is charged outweighs its prejudicial effect. This might be so in cases where the
relevant character trait is an unusual one, as in cases involving certain sexual
offences or child battery. The accused's disposition to commit the crime,
proved, for example, by previous convictions for the same offence, might also
be extremely probative in a case where there is independent evidence connect299 Id.,
300

s. 5.
Section 17(1) provides:
...evidence tendered by the prosecution of a trait of character of the accused
that is relevant to the disposition of the accused to act or fail to act in a particular
manner is inadmissible ....
Section 18 provides:
Nothing in section 17 prohibits the admission of evidence that a person committed
a crime, civil wrong or other act when relevant to prove some fact other than his
disposition to commit such act, such as evidence to prove absence or mistake or
accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or identity.
301 Id., s. 5.
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ing the accused with the crime. The rigid character evidence rule, however,
would result in the evidence of character being excluded in both of these
cases. 80 It would have been consistent with the Commission's general philosophy to have no rule dealing with character evidence. The judge would
simply have applied the principle in every case, weighing the probative value
of the evidence against its prejudicial effect. Ultimately, however, the Commission was concerned that it should not appear to open the door of admissibility too widely in this area. The Commission felt strongly that the utmost
care should be taken to ensure that accused people were not judged, or perceived to be judged, on their character rather than the act with which they
were charged.
The drafting of the character evidence rule is exceptional. For the most
part, the Code is drafted in terms of principles rather than detailed rules.
This point can be further illustrated by comparing the Code with the comparable sections proposed in the Evidence Project Study Papers. In Study
Paper #2, Manner of Questioning Witnesses, the Evidence Project proposed
a lengthy section dealing with those circumstances under which a party may ask
leading questions of a witness called by him. 0 3 In the Code this matter is
dealt with in a relatively straightforward section:
A party calling a witness shall not ask him leading questions unless they relate to
introductory or undisputed matters or are necessary to elicit the testimony of the
witness, or unless it becomes apparent that the witness desires to give only such
answers as he believes will be damaging to the party's case.8 04
302 Under the present law, judges sometimes avoid this result by reclassifying the
evidence, for example, by construing evidence of general disposition as evidence relevant
to identity, and thus admit it. See, for example, Thompson v. The King, [1918] A.C.
221; 13 Cr. App. R. 61.
803 Section 2.
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), the party calling a witness should not
ask him a question that is so framed as to suggest the desired answer.
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply where, in the opinion of the judge or other
person presiding at the proceeding,
(a) the question relates to an introductory or other undisputed matter;
(b) the examination of the witness would be unduly prolonged or protracted
by any other form of questioning, because of his mental or physical
condition, his difficulty is expressing himself in the language in which
the proceedings are being conducted, his age or other like reason;
(c) the witness is deliberately suppressing evidence on matters that are
known to him;
(d) the witness is reluctant to give evidence or is being evasive in his
answers; or
(e) the question will tend to elicit fairly in the circumstances the honest
belief of the witness.
Study Paper No. 2, supra, note 3, s. 2.
804 Code, s. 59(l). It may be noted that the Code provision contains no crossreferences or paragraphs. These common characteristics of Canadian legislation were
kept to a minimum in the interests of simplicity. Definitions were also avoided where
possible, both because they unnecessarily complicate the drafting and because they
encourage judges to resolve cases by reference to the meaning of a word derived from
its ordinary usage, instead of by reference to the purposes of the section. However, in
this instance, it was felt that the words "leading question" had acquired a well-known
and common usage that nearly paralleled the correct legal usage, and so the term was
used in the subsection 59(1) and defined in subsection 59(3) of the Code.
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The Project's draft of a rather lengthy open-ended listing of specific factual
instances in which leading questions might be asked, is encompassed within
a few simple statements of principle in the Code.830
Another illustration of this basic drafting difference between the Evidence Project recommendations and the Evidence Code are the sections dealing
with the use of previous convictions to impeach the credibility of a witness.
This evidence is often of little or no probative value, yet it often causes great
embarrassment to a witness and unfairly prejudices a party's case. To deal
with this problem, the Project proposed that evidence that a witness has been
previously convicted should be inadmissible unless the judge finds that the
previous conviction involved a false statement or an element of dishonesty
and is not too remote in time.306 The Commission again chose to deal with the
problem in a much broader and principle-oriented manner. They first provided
807
that a witness' credibility may be attacked or supported by relevant evidence.
They then provided that evidence of a trait of a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness is not admissible unless it is of substantial probative
value. This section was designed to balance the embarrassment and unfair305 Although it was not drafted in terms of principles, the Project draft was openended. Paragraph 2(2) (e), supra, note 303, provided the judge with a general discretion
to permit leading questions. The commentary on that paragraph stated, "Under subsection 2(e) the trial judge is free to exercise his discretion in all the situations where he
feels that leading questions will expedite the examination and will do no harm to the
adversary." Study Paper No. 2, supra, note 3 at 11. Having provided a number of
specific factual instances where leading questions might be appropriate, the drafters
wanted to provide a residual exception to virtually foreclose the possibility of appeal on
the issue of whether leading questions should have been asked. While the rules relating
to leading questions are sensible guidelines in conducting the trial, their application
should not be argued at an appellate level. When the Project drafted a rule broadly
to ensure that it was not under-inclusive, a list of specific exceptions was often followed
by a residual exception. This kind of over-riding or super-eminent provision is common
in civil codes. The purpose is to attempt to preserve some of the certainty of rules but,
at the same time, to provide for hard cases.
306 Section 4. (1) Subject to (2), evidence that a witness has been previously convicted of an offence is inadmissible for the purpose of attacking his credibility,
except that the judge or other person presiding at the trial or other proceeding
may, in his sole discretion, following an inquiry to be held in the absence of the
jury, if there is a jury, decide that it ought to be received on the grounds that
(a) the previous offence involved a false statement or an element of dishonesty,
(b) the previous conviction was not too remote in time from the proceedings over which he is presiding, and
(c) the party attacking the credibility of the witness can produce evidence of
the record of the previous convictions.
Study Paper #3 Credibility, supra, note 3 at 2.
307 Any party including the party calling him may examine a witness and introduce
other relevant evidence for the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility,
except as otherwise provided in this Code.
Code, s. 62. This section is, of course, technically unnecessary. It adds nothing to
the general section of the Code admitting relevant evidence. It was put in to make it
clear that the rule that a party cannot impeach a witness called by him, the collateral
fact rule, and the general rule prohibiting the admissibility of prior consistent and inconsistent statements made by a witness, were all abolished. It was also the Commission's hope that judges would begin applying a stricter test of relevancy in this area.
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ness, often caused a witness when a previous conviction is introduced to impeach his or her credibility, against the probative value of such evidence.
Somewhat incongruously, the Commission reverted to a strict rule in providing
that a conviction incurred more than a certain number of years previously
cannot be used to impeach the credibility of a witness.8 08 Vice-Chairman
Lamer dissented to the imposition of this arbitrary rule of relevancy. 09 The
rule was included to provide witnesses with an assurance that their previous
convictions would not be revealed if they testified as a witness, thus encouraging otherwise reluctant witnesses to come forward to testify. But in spite of the
limitation imposed by this section, a comparison of the Project's draft with the
Commission's illustrates a transition from relatively specific rules to more
general rules.
This issue, whether laws should be drafted broadly in terms of principles
or narrowly in terms of detailed rules, must be faced by all drafters. The
draftsmen of the American Law Institnte's Model Code of Evidence were
forced to confront the issue directly because the leading members of that Project had divergent and extreme views on the matter. It is worth briefly recounting their debate because the issues there were so clearly defined. At the
outset of their deliberations, three broad positions were identified.310 Wigmore
argued for a detailed and specific Code, modelled after his own Code of Evidence. He put forward the following postulate for adoption by the A.L.I.:
Postulate IV. Details. This Code, aiming as it does to become a practical guide
in trials, must not be content with abstractions, but must specifically deal with all
the concrete rules exemplifying the application of an abstraction, that have been
passed over in a majority of jurisdictions; the Code specifically either repudiating
or affirming these rules.-If the objection be made that the law of Evidence
should no longer remain a network of petty detailed rules, the answers are, first,
that both Bench and Bar need their guidance in order that a normal routine be
ordinarily followed for speedy dispatch at trials without discussion; secondly, that
the Bar needs them in order to prepare evidence for trial along normal expected
lines; and thirdly, that the really effective way to eliminate the present frequent
over-emphasis on detailed concrete rules, is to provide that they shall be only
guides, not chains,-directory, not mandatory,--and therefore to forbid the review
of the Trial Court's Rulings, except in extreme instances.311

The other extreme position was held by Charles E. Clark, Judge of the Second
Circuit, at one time Dean of Yale Law School, and chief drafter of the Rules
of Federal Procedure. He argued for a short, general, simple and flexible
312
Code; a statement of a few general principles to be applied by the trial judge.
Edmund Morgan, the reporter, took an intermediate position. He argued
that while the Code should be flexible and avoid unnecessary detail, it should
also be sufficiently complete.318 Morgan's approach was adopted.8 14 It has
308 Code, s. 64(1).
809 Id.at 96.
810 See (1939-40), 17 A.LI. Proceedings 64.
311 Id. at 70, where Morgan quotes the Appendix to Evidence Code, Tentative
Draft No. 1 at 111-12.
12
B
Id. at 80-84.
318
314

Foreword to Model Code, supra, note 71 at 12-13.
Supra, note 310 at 64-97.
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also been adopted by most subsequent American codifications. 1 5 While Morgan's position was characterized as the middle position, it was clear that he
was in favour of broadly drafted sections. At one point, asked to draft more
specific rules, he stated:
If you gentlemen are not willing to give trial judges wide room for the exercise

of discretion in the application of rules of evidence .... Eylou would have to get
another reporter if you wanted a Code drafted with all those detailed rules because I think that would be the worst thing that could possibly happen to the law
of evidence.8 18

Drafting broadly in terms of principles means that the trial judge is given
a wide discretion, as some people see it, in applying the law. In another
article I have evaluated the costs and benefits of drafting in terms of principles
and have explained why the drafters of the Code decided to draft in terms of
principles in most instances. 817 Without repeating the substance of those arguments, I would like to make a number of other points in answer to those who
charge that the Code confides too much discretion in trial judges.
If discretion means the unaccountable freedom to decide one way or
the other, one might argue that no body of principles could bestow on trial
judges more discretion than the existing jurisprudence on the law of evidence.
Over three hundred cases dealing with points of evidence law are reported in
Canadian law reports alone each year, many of them raising several issues of
evidence. A reading of any one year's production should persuade a disinterested observer that the chances of predicting the outcome of individual
cases are little better than random, regardless of the criteria followed. This
unpredictability cannot be accounted for, as in other areas of law, on the
basis that it is only the troublesome cases that reach the Court of Appeal.
Many evidence judgments are not appellate court decisions. But more importantly, cases, particularly criminal cases, are not usually appealed because
some evidentiary error was made at trial. The decision to appeal is most
often made on the basis of the amount of money at stake (for both lawyer
and client), the bargain made with the prosecutor, the seriousness of sentence,
and a whole range of other such factors. Once the decision to appeal is made,
the transcript is combed for evidentiary errors. Thus, in terms of the evidentiary issues, the cases that reach the appellate courts are probably almost randomly selected.
There are so many reported evidence cases (Wigmore cited over 85,000
in his treatise in 1940) and they are so often in conflict, that they tend to
cancel each other out. On almost any contentious offer of proof, a respectable
argument either for or against its admission can be made on the basis of the
authorities. It is a disingenuous judge who, on a particular point of evidence,
cannot decide a point either way and cite a body of authority in support of his

815 See E. W. Cleary, The Plan for the Adoption of Rules of Evidence, supra,
note 202 at 147.

(1943), 19 A.L.L Proceedings 222.
7 N. Brooks, The Common Law And The Evidence Code: Are They Compatible?,
in a forthcoming issue of the New Brunswick Law Journal.
816
81
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decision. That, I would argue, is discretion: the ability to draw on one line
of authority or another, and resolve the case either way, without having to
render a principled judgment on the merits of the issue.318
It is sometimes argued that rigid rules of evidence are necessary to prevent a corrupt judge from abusing his discretion or to prevent a foolish judge
from blundering. This argument was raised in the American Law Institute's
proceedings when discussing the adoption of the Model Code of Evidence,
and a review of the highlights of that debate is instructive. Judge Van Voorhis
maintained, "it would require a very unusual trial judge indeed to be able to
apply many of the provisions of this Code where an arbitrary discretion is
confided to the trial judge without any standards which he is to follow in the
rendering of a decision."3 19 Morgan replied that, "If our tribunals are incompetent, gentlemen, there is no use making rules of evidence for them. If trial
judges cannot be trusted to exercise fair judgment in cases of this kind, there
is just no use of making rules of thumb for them. '3 20 The specific rule being
discussed at the time of the debate provided that the judge could exclude evidence if its probative worth was outweighed by, for example, the risk that its
admission would necessitate an undue consumption of time.3 21 After an extended discussion, Judge Augustus Hand, growing impatient with the debate,
stated, "But has there ever been a time when a judge did not use his discretion in this very kind of a thing that is called for by this section? This kind
of talk about this particular section is nonsense and a waste of time.. .. "322
Judge McElroy spoke in similar terms, but met squarely the argument that
trial judges abuse their discretion:
...[We] had might as well candidly recognize that our having a fair trial depends
to the highest degree upon the sense of fairness, the good faith, and the will-

318 One reason for the "elasticity" of the common law of evidence is that most
evidentiary concepts are identified by words which have multiple reference. See J.Stone,
Legal Systems and Lmvyers' Reasonings (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press,

1964).
319

Supra, note 316 at 220. After elaborating on this point, the judge concluded
with a catch-22:
...saying these things I warn the Reporter not to be too severe with his criticism
of my position in this regard because any administrative weakness upon my part
will prove, as I think it should, that I am unfit to be trusted with arbitrary discretion upon so wide a scale.
Id. at 221.
320 Id. at 224.
321 Rule 303(1)
The judge may in his discretion exclude evidence if he finds that its probative

value is outweighed by the risk that its admission will
(e)necessitate undue consumption of time, or
(b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues,
or of misleading the jury, or
(c)unfairly surprise a party who has not reasonable ground to anticipate
that such evidence would be offered.
Model Code of Evidence, supra, note 71.
82 2
Supra, note 316 at 225.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 16, NO. 2

to-be-fair of the trial judge; and that if he intends to be unfair the whole thing
will be a farce no matter how many detailed rules we lay down for him.323

Thus, a consensus emerged among members of the Institute that, in the words
of Edmund Morgan, "No legislation can create a procedure which a fool or
a crook cannot pervert to his blundering or sinister purpose."3 24 The Model
Code was, therefore, drafted on the assumption that it would be administered
by a competent and honest judge.
Even if the formulation of detailed rules of evidence could minimize the
possibility that the trial judge might misuse his discretion, the exercise, if
undertaken for this reason, would be futile. The judge's decision-making process is replete with unreviewable discretion. In reaching his decision on the
facts, he must evaluate and weigh the evidence and the credibility of witnesses.

In undertaking this onerous task, he has complete discretion in the sense that
he is unguided by rules or even standards. 25 The judge also has an almost
unfettered discretion in deciding whether to grant a discharge and in determining sentence. It is utterly incongruous to place such complete trust in the
judge's ability to evaluate the proof and pass sentence, and yet to distrust his
ability to make a principled decision about the admissibility of evidence.3 20
2
3 3 Id. at 226; see also J.R. McElroy, "Some Observations Concerning The Discretions Reposed In Trial Judges by The American Law Institute's Code of Evidence," in
Model Code of Evidence, supra, note 71 at 356. Justice Charles Clark, arguing that a
Code of Evidence should consist of only a few general principles, also addressed the
issue of whether broad standards are dangerous in the hands of a weak judge:
It is often said that you must have detailed rules, not for the good judge who does
not need any rule, but the weak judge, but I think if you will follow the history
of procedural development in this country you will see that that is decidedly not
so.
There is no remedy that I know of for a weak or unintelligent judge. You
have just got to take him that is all. But the worst possible remedy is to suggest
detailed rules with the idea that you are going to compel him to be a better judge
than he is because all that means is that you have given him a refuge behind
which he can conceal somewhat or to some people his lack of intelligence.
Supra, note 316 at 82.
3 24
E. M. Morgan, Foreword to Model Code of Evidence, supra, note 71 at 8. See
also McElroy, supra,note 323.
325 This, of course, was one of the premises of Jerome Frank's fact-skepticisms:
When the oral testimony is in conflict as to a pivotal fact issue, the trial judge
is at liberty to choose to believe one witness rather than another. In other words,
in most cases the trial judges have an amazingly wide "discretion" in finding the
fact, a discretion with which upper courts, on appeal, seldom interfere, so that,
in most instances this "fact discretion" is almost boundless.
Frank, Courts On Trial (Princeton: University Press, 1949) at 57.
326 James Thayer made this same point over fifty years ago in arguing that rules
of evidence should be regarded simply as rules of thumb. In meeting the objection that
this would repose too large a discretion in judges, he said:
Those who make it this objection, forget, for the moment, how much discretion
is already reposed in our judges, and exercised by them at every hour of the day
and in every part of their functions. In imposing criminal sentences, in punishing
contempts, in passing upon motions, in making rules of court and regulating
practice and procedure, in adopting rules of presumption, in determining the
limits of judicial notice, in applying the rules of evidence, and in conducting trials
generally,-in discharging these and other duties, a vast discretionary power is
everywhere exercised. Men who can safely be entrusted with the discretion which
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It seems to be the last vestige of the myth that, in applying the law, judges
operate as slot-machines. Indeed, since rulings on the admissibility of evidence
can be reviewed on appeal, a judge would have to both corrupt and ignorant
to attempt to attain his sinister ends by misapplying the rules. Only a century
ago, most of the rules of evidence were fashioned by judges on the assumption
that witnesses were corrupt and jurors ignorant. We no longer feel that we
can justify excluding evidence for these reasons. It would be incongruous,
although poetic justice, to justify retaining the rules on the ground that it is
the judges who are both corrupt and ignorant.
Even assuming that detailed rules might, to some extent at least, assist
the foolish judge and dissuade the dishonest, this benefit must be weighed
against the costs imposed by such rules. One such cost is that detailed rules
will in many instances prevent good judges
from giving a correct ruling on the
32 7
merits of admitting certain evidence.
Finally, it is perhaps worth noting that the history of all procedural reform represents a move from rigid and inflexible rules to liberality and flexibility.328 There is scarcely a procedural scholar who has not advocated the
liberalizing of the rules of evidence. Thayer noted: "[Ihe rules of evidence
should be simplified; and should take on the general character of principles
to guide the sound judgment of the judge, rather than, minute rules to bind
them.1329 Wigmore made the same point: "A formulated rule tends unwholesomely to be the judge's tyrannous master, not his ministrant tool. What the
system of Evidence needs is, not so much another set of rules, or fewer rules,

the ordinary exercise of the judicial office imports, every day of the week, are
fit to undertake the function that I am now suggesting.
Thayer, supra, note 273 at 94.
32 7
Our judiciary has not always been everything it should be .... However, courts
like other social institutions, must depend for their ultimate success upon the
integrity of the human beings who compose them; because a few judges have
failed is no reason for tying the hands of all.
K. M. Johnson, Province of the Judge in Jury Trials (1929), 7 Tenn. L. Rev. 107 at
117.
328
The persistent habit of treating procedure as merely rules, and their enforcement, perhaps results from the failure to recognize the difference between rules of
procedure, which are, so the adage goes, the handmaiden of justice and not its mistress,
and substantive laws, which are intended to affect the vested interest of the parties:
An advance from the traditional treatment of the hearsay rule means, then, giving
a very free hand to the trial judge. We ought to face this fact and fearlessly
increase his powers .... We should keep clearly before our minds that this whole
matter of evidence is mainly procedure, and that a claim of rights by the parties
in such a field is to be accepted with caution. Many of the defects in our pro.
cedure can be traced to this error of treating supposed rights of parties concerning
the rules of evidence on the analogy of property rights, .. . simplicity and flexibility, important enough in any question of procedure become doubly important in a
matter so delicate and varied as the guidance of a trial before an untrained tribunal. In such a proceeding everything that hampers the administrative freedom
of the trial judge is to be regarded with suspicion.
E. R. Thayer, Observations On the Law of Evidence (1915), 13 Mich. L. Rev. 355 at
362.
329 J. B. Thayer, A PreliminaryTreatise on Evidence at the Common Law (South
Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman Reprints, 1969) at 530.
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as a judicial flexibility of rules. '33 0 Not only evidence scholars, but also experienced judges have also argued for more discretion in applying evidentiary concepts. A remark by Chief Justice Phillips of the United States Tenth Circuit,
is typical: ".... [Based on] my experience of 13 years at the bar and 29 years
on the bench ...[I think] ... a wide discretion should be accorded the trial
judge in determining the admissibility of proffered proof."33' Most Law Rea3 OSupra, note 138 at ix. Wigmore, in describing the shortcomings of the Supreme
Court's attitude toward evidence, noted:
Another marked shortcoming is the Supreme Court's habit of treating the rules
of Evidence as a rigid steelwork invariably applicable in precisely the same way.
But this is highly academic and unpractical-as impractical as the clambered
abstractions of any professorial dryasdust. Every man of experience knows that
the rules of evidence are based on generalities, on broad policies of experience,
and are meant for typical situations-but for those only.
We all know that in the application of them, from case to case, the abstract
situation for which they are supposed to be meant, does not necessarily exist; it
is varied, in the case at hand. And therefore the rule should bend.
Wigmore, Evidence, supra, note 65 at 249.
The same point was made by Sir John Salmond:
No unprejudiced observer can be blind to the excessive credit and importance
attached in judicial procedure to the minutiae of the law of evidence. This is one
of the last refuges of legal formalism. Nowhere is the contrast more striking
between the law's confidence in itself and its distrust of the judicial intelligence.
The fault is to be remedied not by the abolition of all rules for the measurement
of evidential value, but by their reduction from the position of rigid peremptory
to that of flexible and conditional rules. Most of them have their sources in good
sense and practical experience, and they are profitable for the guidance of individual discretion, though mischievous as substitutes for it.
Salmond, Jurisprudence (5th ed. London: Stevens and Haynes, 1916) at 452.
331 Phillips, Foreword to a Symposium on Evidence (1952), 5 Vand, L. Rev. 275.
A hundred and eighty years ago many judges deplored the quantity of discretion given
to them. In 1790, Gros, J.dreaded "that the rules of evidence should ever depend upon
the discretion of the judges .

. . ."

R. v. Inhabitants of Eriswell, supra, note 54 at 711

(T.R.); 818 (E.R.). Of course some contemporary judges still share this concern. An
exchange between two Australian judges is fairly typical of the exchanges that the author
overheard at meetings on the Evidence Code. In discussing a proposal to liberalize the
hearsay rule in Australia, Mr. Justice Wells objected:
.. .let me interpolate here a strong dissent from the practice that is becoming
more widespread amongst law-givers-that of identifying an issue and then leaving
its resolution to the discretion of judges. Sometimes the word "discretion" is not
actually used but its import is to be observed in legislation far too often. I deplore
the tendency of throwing a sticky problem to the judges and demanding that they,
under the cover of a discretion, sort the whole thing out. Unless it is unavoidable,
parties and their legal advisers should not be made to feel that a case stands or
falls according to the exercise of a wide judicial discretion with respect to admissibility.
Justice Reynolds replied:
I profoundly disagree, with respect, with Mr. Justice Wells' and others' distrust of
judicial discretion. I do not believe that judges and other people realize how many
discretions they exercise in the course of a few short hours in court. I believe
these rules were made largely by the exercises of discretion; as I said before, they
made the law of evidence for the needs of their time and nearly a hundred
years ago, they stopped for some reason developing it. I think if the judges are
given a firm, clear, legislative direction now that they can deal with this we can
give the law reform in this field of adjectival law the greatest fillip since Lord
Brougham's speech in 1828.
(1971) 45 Aust. L.J. 531 at 562 (Wells J.) and 568 (Reynolds J.).
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form Commissions have been persuaded of the need for discretion2 in the law
of evidence, and their recent reform efforts reflect this approach.ns
Common law lawyers are not accustomed to dealing with general principles and arguments by deduction. In order to make the Code more palatable
to common law lawyers, the use of illustrations following each section was
suggested. The illustrations would have shown how the principles in the section
were formulated, as well as demonstrating their intended application, by clearly
identifying the section for the common law lawyer, who is probably more
familiar with the factual situations in which rules of evidence are invoked than
the general principles behind them. It is interesting to speculate whether such
a technique would have reduced the hostility of the bar to the Code. Edmund
Morgan made liberal use of illustrations in explaining the operation of the
Model Code. 3 8 However, the only attempt to have illustrations form part of the
legislative enactment was the Evidence Act Stephen proposed for adoption in
England. Stephen explained in the preface to his Digest on Evidence, "The
Bill [to be introduced into the English Parliament] contained a certain number
of illustrations, and Lord Coleridge's personal opinion was in their favour,
though he had doubts as to the possibility of making them acceptable to Parliament ....I think that illustrations might be used with advantage in Acts of
Parliament... [as] they bring into clear light the meaning of abstract generalities. .. . Stephen was severely criticized by a commentator for suggesting
that illustrations might be useful in legislation 85 However, I remain convinced of their efficacy and regret that the idea was not pursued more vigorously by the Commission.
832The Scottish Law Commission in the preface to the Code states the argument
for discretion with eloquence:
It is not desirable to put the Courts in a straight-jacket from which they will
inevitably seek to escape ....
A Code, therefore, should be drafted with the primary aim of enunciating
clearly and simply the basic principles of the relevant branch of the law in a
form in which they can be readily understood by legal practitioners and others
who may wish to consult it. The application of these principles to particular problems, which is often a matter of concern in existing statutes, should be left as a
rule to be determined. It is for the Courts to give effect to those principles against
the background of a pattern of life which constantly alters. It is recognized that
with the passage of time the interpretation of particular articles may change; this
is a result to be sought rather than to be deplored.
Supra, note 221 at 4.
333 See, for example, the illustrations accompanying Rule 101, Model Code of
Evidence, supra, note 71 at 97-99.
334 Stephen, A Digest of The Law of Evidence, supra, note 113.
3 35
Lastly, so far as the question of legislation by illustrations is to be decided by
the present work, it appears to be itself an illustration against the plan. The
attempt thus to monopolize at once the functions of the legislator and the judgeto draw up a general rule, and then to hamper it with instances-is so wrong in
principle that we cannot suppose it will ever be adopted.
... It is a cover and excuse for vagueness and inaccuracy in the legislator,
and is a device by which the law can be made a nose of wax in the hands of the
interpreter. On the one hand, assuming the illustration to be accurate, the rule
may be narrowed by it; or, on the other hand, which is much more dangerous,
if the illustration be inaccurate the rule may be extended to beyond its limits.
Editorial, An English Evidence Code (1876), 20 Solicitor's 1. 949 at 952.
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VII. OPPOSITION TO THE CODE
Lawyers and judges were, with a few outstanding (and, given the rather
heated atmosphere generated by the profession's response to the Code, one
must add courageous) exceptions, almost unanimously opposed to the Code.8 0
This fact itself eventually became one of the most frequently voiced objections
to the Code. That is to say, from the premise that lawyers oppose the Code, the
conclusion was drawn that the Code must therefore be bad. As one judge put it,
"Are all these judges and lawyers so conservative, so blind and so arrogant that
they oppose the enactment of the Evidence Code without just cause?" 8 7 The
minor premise of this argument is that lawyers would only oppose the Code if
it were bad. Thus, the argument can be refuted by suggesting other more probable explanations for the opposition of lawyers to the Code.
A search for alternative explanations might usefully begin by noting that
as an historical phenomenon, lawyers as a group have always vehemently opposed procedural reform of any kind. 888 Perhaps the best known example is
the opposition of the organized bar to reform of the technical rules of pleading
in the early nineteenth century. In retrospect, their arguments have been exposed as lacking in merit. Professor Sunderland has noted that, "Many of the
arguments advanced to meet the broad grounds of public complaint were
striking instances of the unintelligent rationalizing by which instinctive or inherited prejudices are given a formal justification." 30 Contemporary commentators were even less kind in describing the bench and bar's defence of
the procedural status quo:
This mischievous mess, which exists in defiance and mockery of reason; English
lawyers inform us, is a strict, and pure, and beautiful exemplification of the rules
of logic. This is a common language of theirs. It is a language which clearly
demonstrates the state of their minds. All that they see in the system of pleading
is the mode
of performing it. What they know of logic is little more than the
0
name.34

It is interesting to note that many of the arguments made by lawyers in defence of the traditional rules of pleading are again being put forward in defence of the present rules of evidence. Duncan Kennedy's remark seems sin36 See supra, Part A. In the face of the criticism of the Code, some comfort was
taken by those working on it from an observation by Ezra Thayer:
Remembering, then, how often prophecies of disaster to follow upon a new thing
have failed, even when made by great men with reason behind them, patience
and optimism are well nigh exhausted by the dogged resistance to any change in
our system which reduced to its lowest terms means nothing but the ignorant
clinging of instinct to familiar forms, backed by the advocate's gift of making
any position more or less plausible.
E. R. Thayer, supra, note 86 at 356.
Roscoe Pound made a similar observation: "...
not the least warning of legal
history is one against confident prophecy of disaster when changes are made in the
law." The Problems of the Law (1926), 12 A.B.AJ. 81 at 83.
387 Anderson, supra, note 5 at 167.
8 See E. R. Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Reform (1925-26),
39 Harv. L. Rev. 725.
339 Id. at 735.
340 Mills, "Jurisprudence", in Encyclopedia Britannica,Supplement (1828), quoted
id. at 733.
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gularly apt: "....

[T]he arguments lawyers use are relatively few in number,

and highly stereotyped,
although they are applied in an infinite diversity of
341

factual situations."1

But why do lawyers oppose procedural reform? This question has been
called "worth sociological study." 342 I intend, here, however, to simply recount
a few impressions, based for the most part upon the profession's response to
the Evidence Code. The consistency of the profession's stance on questions of
procedural reform over the years suggests that the reasons underlying it are
deep-seated and, perhaps, structural in nature, deriving from the institutional
role performed by the legal profession. Further, the highly emotional and unreasoned nature of many of the responses to the Commission's work suggests
that many members of the profession feel instinctively that change in this area
of law is anathema. Lawyers frequently conduct reasoned debate on the major
issues of the day. What accounts for this profound distrust of procedural reform? One possible explanation would emphasize the fact that lawyers are so
familiar with the present rules that they have become part of their habits of
thought 3 43 They simply cannot conceive of an alternative system or alterna34

1 D. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication (1975-76), 89
Harv. L. Rev. 1685 at 1687.
342
K. W. Graham, supra, note 201 at 288.
That the dead hand of evidentiary tradition should grip us with a hold so stubborn is a rather intriguing mystery. The mystery is intensified if we seek to find,
in this hodgepodge of constitution, statute, court rule and decision that goes by
the name of "law of evidence", some unique characteristic which makes its
shackles difficult to loosen.
From J. H. Chadbourn, Review of C. J. McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence (1955), 43 Cal. L. Rev. at 365.
Nowhere else in English law has there been such an obstinate resistance to change
and reform as in the law relating to Evidence ....
R. W. Baker, The Hearsay Rule (London: Pitman, 1950) at vii.
343 This explanation has been alluded to by a number of commentators:
This assumption (that the jury-trial system of Evidence is the only safe system)
permeates the judicial opinions. It is attributable to the narrow experience of
the trial lawyers who have become judges. The inveterate habit of mind cannot
easily be altered when the judicial function comes to be exercised. It eulogizes
reverently the mint, anise, and cummin of every detail of the system. It enshrines
with sanctity each exception to an exception of a rule. It scans the findings to
detect a slip in the practice, and when found it fervently dwells on the particular
virtues of the violated rule. In short, it acts upon the assumption that no truth
ever has been or ever can be discovered, in human controversy, except by the
rigid employment of the jury-trial rules.
Wigmore, supra, note 60, Vol. 1, para. 4(b).
Breadth of vision in rule enforcement is inhibited by this effort to obey or compel
obedience to rules. The repetition of the act of obedience or of the act of compelling obedience thoroughly moulds the ideation of bench and bar, until procedure for them becomes only rules and enforcement of rules; the reason for the
rules and the ultimate objective of the system disappear. Repeated situations for
interpretation serve to focus a renewed emphasis upon the rule with each interpretation foreshortening the perspective. Judges lay down interpretations. By stare
decisis they become part of the rules. Later judges and lawyers respond to comparable stimuli in comparable fact situations to interpret the interpretations. The
incentive to obey causes these interpretations to be repeated, and repetition makes
them automatic; automaticity encourages a blind response to stimuli; the blind
response gives harsh rigidity.
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tive rules. 34 The need for consistency between our behaviour and attitudes is
well recognized in psychological theory. A trial lawyer who makes daily use
of the rules of evidence would experience unpleasant cognitive dissonance if
he or she did not firmly believe in the efficacy of the rules. Even if a lawyer
were initially sceptical of the utility of the rules, he or she would eventually
resolve this dissonance by persuading himself or herself that the rules were
efficacious. Indeed, the longer the lawyer is in practice, and the more experienced in conducting trials, the greater the need to rationalize the existence of
the rules. Not many people, with even a modicum of self-esteem, would be
prepared to admit that they have been engaged throughout their lives in
quackery. Jerome Frank, in the polemical style which often obscured or made
unpalatable his great insights, made the same point in illustrating the phenomenon he described as the lawyer's frequent resort to "verbal legal magic"
(in this context, the verbal magic surrounding the invocation of the rules of
evidence) in order to transform the desire to have judicial trials conducted
rationally and fairly into the belief that they actually are.8
A less kind, but perhaps more probable, explanation for the profession's
opposition to procedural reform, however, might be premised on some perceived self-interest which lawyers consider to be threatened by procedural reform. Lawyers are notorious for strongly resisting change which threatens
their narrow self-interest. Indeed, the strength of their opposition is a reliable
indicium of the imminence of the threat and of the importance of the interest
being protected. 46 On what basis could one argue that narrow self-interest has
clouded the profession's response to reform of the rules of evidence?
Fowler, A PsychologicalApproach to ProceduralReform (1934), 43 Yale L.J. 1254 at
1255.
. .. [evidence] is a subject that needs work, and one in which it is hard to make
changes because by incessant daily application the old rules become a part of the
daily life of the Bar and Bench; and when judges have admitted or excluded a
class of evidence 50 times a year for 5 or 10 years, they are not easily convinced
that they have always been wrong.
Letter from Charles Doe to John Henry Wigmore, quoted in Reid, A Speculative
Novelty: Judge Doe's Search for Reason in the Law of Evidence (1959), 39 Boston U.
L. Rev. 321 at 322.
344
See Sunderland, supra, note 338 at 726: ...
the lack of experience with any
other technique makes it difficult for the bar to see defects in the current system, or to
appreciate their seriousness if pointed out."
8451 trust the reader will understand what I mean by designating as "magical" the
statements of the legal thinkers I have been quoting. The statements are not based
upon actual observations. And yet they are not deliberate falsifications. These
assertions concerning the efficacy of the legal rules are reached by the wish-route;
they derive not from experience but from wishes....
. . . They want to believe that their desires are realized. Instead of saying,
'This is what I wish would happen in court," they say, "This is what usually does
happen in court." They run away from a close inspection of the actual legal
world, because such inspection would compel them to confess to themselves that
that world does not meet their desires.
J. Frank, Courts on Trial, supra, note 325 at 62.
346 Moreover, the self-interest of lawyers is almost invariably at odds with the
public interest. Indeed, while it might sound perverse, for this reason I found the response to the Code encouraging. Such an overwhelming hostile response from the bench
and bar led me to believe that the Code was on the right track.
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First, it is clear that lawyers have little personal interest in improving the
evidence rules. As one commentator rhetorically asked, "How interested will
a lawyer be, who is paid per trial day, in promoting efficiency and in exploring
questions like the added time required to try cases because of the exclusionary
rules?" -47 Further, it may be that a lawyer who successfully invokes a particular rule of evidence to have certain evidence excluded, and subsequently
wins the case, views the victory as confirmation that the rules are working
well, or at least, that the retention of that rule is in his best interests. Often
lawyers communicating with the Commission argued in favour of retaining a
particular rule by recounting the facts of a trial experience in which it had
worked to his or her advantage.348 Lawyers appeared to believe that a rule
that had worked to their advantage in a particular case must be "good law."
There is sure to be a reasonable psychological explanation for the fact that
such correspondents always recalled trials they had won because of an exclusionary rule, rather than trials they had lost because of the same rule.
What guild interests could lawyers be said to be defending in opposing
the Evidence Code? Perhaps the most likely explanation for the profession's
opposition is that the profession thought that the Code threatened their economic self-interest, which is inherent in the preservation of the status quo. A
remark attributed to Goldwin Smith makes the point colourfully: "to expect
the lawyer to reform legal procedure would be to expect the tiger to abolish
' 9 The defence of requirements
the jungle."3
for legal practice, and the enforcement of prohibitions on the unauthorized practice of law before the
courts, are much enhanced if there is, in fact, some special reason why only
legally trained persons should appear before them. To suggest that the Code
would simplify the law of evidence to the point where lawyers would be unnecessary is, of course, pure hyperbole. However, there is little doubt that the
Code does set forth a law of evidence which is more accessible and understandable than the present law. Further, it is clear that lawyers have a vested
interest in maintaining the complexity of the law.so In modern jargon, the
Graham, supra, note 201 at 289.
Individual success in practice suffers no apparent loss from the use of a defective
system, because the handicap operates equally upon all competitors. Accordingly,
immediate self-interest offers no convincing reason for leaving the familiar paths
and undertaking a struggle with new problems.
From Sunderland, supra, note 338 at 726.
348 Lawyers may have real difficulty in examining . .. [questions relating to the
reform of evidence law] objectively. It is much easier simply to favor the use
of those evidence rules which apparently help to win verdicts and/or judgments.
Thus a practicing lawyer may remember fondly a case that he had last month in
which loose interpretation of the rules of evidence aided the court in giving a
judgment-in his favor. Another lawyer may recall another case in which stricter
application of the rules of evidence was a real help-to his client.
S. H. Britt, Rules of Evidence: An Empirical Study in Psychology and the Law (1940),
25 Cornell L.Q. 556 at 557.
349 Goldwin Smith, as quoted in W. R. Riddell's Introduction to A. Esmein, A
History of Continental Criminal Procedure, trans. J. Simpson (South Hackensack, N.J.:
Rothman Reprints, 1968).
3 0
5 A commentator, as early as 1826, recognized the interest lawyers have in
ensuring the complexity of the law. Referring to the technicalities of pleading, he noted:
Not a formality is there which serves not as a pretext for charges; and scarcely
347
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complexity and consequent mystification of law results in its privatization, to
the undeniable benefit of the profession. For this reason, it is unlikely that the
impetus for simplification will come from lawyers, and it is realistic to predict
8
that common law lawyers will remain hostile to all forms of codification.as
Richard Posner, the doyen of the modem economics and law movement, has
argued:
Since . . . statutory and judge-made rules are substitutes, an exogenous decrease
in the former will lead to an increase in the demand for the latter. This helps
explain the traditional hostility of the legal profession to the displacement of
judge-made ("common law") rules by statutory codes: as noted earlier, the
demand for legal services is apt to be greater, the greater the reliance of the legal
system on precedent rather than statute.352

The self-interest protected by lawyers need not be material. A more speculative reason as to why lawyers oppose reforms in the law of evidence finds
its genesis in the theory of games that people play. In his seminal book, Games
People Play,33 Dr. Eric Berne argued that people tend to live their lives by
playing our certain "games" in their interpersonal relationships. These
"games" are played to avoid confronting reality, to deal with helplessness, to
rationalize activities, or to avoid participation in the "real" world. Is is too
far-fetched to suggest that there is some element of gamesmanship in this
sense in our current procedural system?
The trial has, of course, been analogized to the theatres5 4 or to a morality
by many commentators, and to a "battle," "fight" or "duel" by

play 355

a moment of delay which is not contrived to minister either to the ease or the
profit of lawyers, if not to both . . . Every inconsistency, every groundless distinction leads to uncertainty, and every uncertainty to law suits, accompanied
with harvests of fees for lawyers: in short there is, perhaps, not a single imperfection in the law by the existence of which lawyers are not in some way or other
benefited.
(1826) 6 Westminster Rev. 40, as quoted in Sunderland, supra, note 338, at 731.
51
3 Bentham, in explaining why members of the legal profession have such a high
regard for judge-made law, stated:
. . . wherever it exists, lawyers will be its defenders, and perhaps innocently, its
admirers. They love the source of their power, of their reputation, of their fortune: they love unwritten law for the same reason that the Egyptian priest loved
hieroglyphics, for the same reason that the priests of all religions have loved their
peculiar dogmas and mysteries.
The Works of Jeremy Bentham, supra, note 61, Vol. 3 at 206, as quoted in Alfange,
Jeremy Bentham and The Codification of Law (1969-70), 55 Cornell L. Rev. 58 at 67.
Indeed, in support of this same point-the legal profession's perceived threat to
their vocational interest in simplifying the law-it has been noted that, "James Carter,
the man who was most active in the campaign to defeat the civil code of David Dudley
Field, was commissioned to do so by the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York." P. A. Rabkin, The Origins of Law Reform: The Social Significance of the Nineteenth-Century Codification Movement and Its Contributionsto the Passage of the Early
Married Women's Property Acts (1974), 24 Buffalo L. Rev. 683 at 695, n. 73.
352 L Ehrlich and R. A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking
(1974), 3 J. Legal Studies 257 at 274.
353 E. Berne, Games People Play (New York: Grove Press, 1964).
354 See M. S. Ball, The Play's The Thing: An Unscientific Reflection on Courts
Under the Rubric of Theater (1975), 28 Stanford L. Rev. 81.
355 See J. D. Morton, The Function of Criminal Law in 1962 (Toronto: Hunter
Rose, 1962).
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others.as n The rules of evidence give form to the theatre or set limits, if not
some of the weapons, for the battle. To be sure, some of the rules serve a useful function in this regard by assisting in the resolution of the conflict and by
educating people about right conduct and fair play. One suspects, however,
that many of the rules are uncritically supported by lawyers, not because they
,contribute to the socialization function of the trial, but because they ensure
that the lawyer-as he solemnly rises to make a spectacular objection or debate, in dramatic oratory, esoteric and, to a layman, incomprehensible points
of evidence-remains the leading actor in the drama.357 The present collection
of contradictory decisions, referred to compendiously as the rules of evidence,
provides lawyers with an immense arsenal from which to either defend or advance any position. As Morgan and Maguire have observed, the rules of evidence are "clearly such fun that the initiate will not easily tolerate [their] abolition." 358 In striving to protect their role in the drama, lawyers are not unusual.
They only confirm Nietzsche's famous observation that hidden in every man
is a child who wants to play, or as the popular saying goes: "People don't
Teally grow up, they just play with bigger toys." Unfortunately, the courts
have an important social function to perform, and society can ill-afford to
permit them to be used as entertainment for lawyers.
Trial lawyers, to retain their status as members of a learned profession,
must claim to be masters of some specialized skill premised on an underlying
theory. Their trade must require intensive and systematic schooling in theory
as well as applied techniques. The rules of evidence might thus be seen as
legitimizing the trial lawyer by making an otherwise fairly ordinary task, the
presentation of proof at trial, appear to be a highly intellectual endeavour.
Without the rules of evidence, the skill required of a trial lawyer would not be
much different, and certainly not any more difficult, than the skill required of
any good police detective.
The rules of evidence undoubtedly appear, to a layman and to many
lawyers, to be a highly intellectual subject of study. Indeed, John Chipman
Gray referred lovingly to the "sustained reasoning" and the "quiet and prolonged study" necessary to master this branch of the law, of which no other
"lends itself more easily to philosophical inquiries or subtlety of distinctions." 359 Erskine discovered the source of the rules of evidence "in the charities of religion-in the philosophy of nature-in the truths of history, and in
366 See Frank,

supra, note 325.

357 Jerome Frank explained the trial lawyer's support for the jury system by
similar reasoning:
In part, trial lawyers' public praise of the jury system stems from their vested
interest in its existence. In part, too, they have come to enjoy the opportunity it
affords them to engage in histrionics. Many a trial lawyer has much of the "ham"
in him. Trial by jury is melodramatic. As Dean Green says, it is designed to make
a stage for the trial lawyer, its chief actor. It is the trial lawyer's "artistic handiwork. The courthouse is his playhouse."
Id. at 138.
#
358E. Morgan and J.Maguire, A Selection of Cases on Evidence at the Common
Lmv (Chicago: Foundation Press, 1934).
359 As quoted in Maguire, supra, note 62 at 456.
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the experience of common life. '36 0 Certainly any self-respecting members of a
profession would have an interest in retaining the vitality of such knowledge.
A number of other reasons might be put forward to explain the profession's hostility to the Code: many of the sections of the Code would compel
them to argue value choices directly, and thus force them, in effect, to admit
that the law is not autonomous; a codification of the law of evidence would
to some extent lessen the control over law-making presently exerted by lawyers and judges; and finally, the common law lawyer's deep-seated, although
misguided and uninformed, hostility to anything that smacks of the civil law.
Although this is not the forum in which to thoroughly develop these arguments, it is clear that the opposition of the bench and bar to the Code can
be explained on grounds that do not go to the merits of the Code. In contexts
such as the present, in which allegations of professional bias motivated by
narrow self-interest are easily-and often-made, it seems especially important that the profession steer a course of reasoned debate and analysis in its
assessment of proposals for change. From this perspective, the nature and
quality of the debate that was provoked by the Evidence Code could not fail
to disappoint many observers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For a lawyer the judicial trial of an issue of fact has two distinct aspects.
First, the lawyer must be concerned with proving those propositions of fact
upon which his or her cause of action rests and with persuading the trier of
fact to the requisite degree of belief in their existence. This aspect of the judicial trial is in essence no different than any other inquiry into historical fact.801
It involves collecting and evaluating relevant information and making judgments about the probable occurrence of past events. The second aspect of the
judicial trial, which distinguishes it from proof in general, is the legal aspect:
the rules of evidence. Traditionally, it is this second aspect of the judicial trial
that has consumed the attention of lawyers. Indeed, this has been true to such
an extent that the systematic study of the principles of proof has been virtually
ignored by lawyers. This emphasis is surely wrong. Unless we assume that the
rules of substantive law are perverse, "proof' is what the trial should be all
362
about.
Reforming the rules of evidence by stating them in terms of their policy
foundations, and by recognizing a discretion in the trial judge to admit evidence if its probative value outweighs the dangers of undue prejudice, the
undue consumption of time, and the possibility of misleading the jury, will
360

See Greenleaf, supra, note 58 at 584.

361L. Loevinger, supra, note 51: ". . . the problem of legal proof is nothing more

than a particular aspect of the universal problem of drawing valid inferences from
data."
3 62
The rules of evidence, generally, bear little relationship to the principles of
proof. Cf. Mason Ladd, The Relationship of The Principles of Exclusionary Rules of
Evidence To The Problem of Proof (1933-34), 18 Minn. L. Rev. 506; J. H. Wigmore,
The Science of Judicial Proof (3d ed. Boston: Little, Brown, 1937); C. T. McCormick,
Tomorrow's Law of Evidence (1938), 24 A.B.AJ. 507, 581.
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hasten the day when judicial trials will become rational fact-finding inquiries.8 63 Lawyers will have to prepare for trial by studying logic and psychology rather than the musings of nineteenth century judges .3 However, a
strong case can be made for simply abolishing the rules of evidence. The idea
that the rules of evidence should be abolished is not new. Bentham proposed
just that over one hundred and fifty years ago. 65 Since then, many commentators have taken up the cause.366 Some commentators have proposed a set of
simple principles to take the place of the rules. Lee Loevinger has suggested
that the following three principles are sufficient:
A) All evidence is to be received and considered that would influence a fairminded man in deciding the issue before the tribunal; B) The tribunal may and
should require the production of evidence and witnesses that are or may be
appropriate and useful in the investigation of the issue before the tribunal and
are within the power of the party to produce; and C) Inquiry should be forbidden
into such topics, and only such topics, as have been recognized as privileged for
reasons of social policy by the legislature or by explicit judicial decision. 67

He concluded that "Such a body of principles will serve every legitimate interest now served by the rules of evidence, will avoid many of the defects of
in making litigation a genuine
the present rules, and will permit and assist
368
search for at least some measure of truth.
Nor is the notion that the study of the principles of proof should displace
363 Operating these rules [the rules of evidence] has kept judges and lawyers and

law professors so fully occupied that they have not yet satisfactorily explored the
important questions of evidential cogency. They have been too busy deciding what
should be kept out to make, much less teach, systematic appraisal of what they
let in. So the law school work on evidence has to do with exclusion rather than
evaluation.
J. M. Maguire, Evidence: Common Sense and Common Law (Chicago: supra, note 71
at 10.
864 Eventually, perhaps, Anglo-American court procedure may find itself gradually
but increasingly freed from emphasis on jury trial with its contentious theory of
proof. With responsibility for the ascertainment of facts vested in professional
judges, the stress will be shifted from the crude technique of admitting or rejecting
evidence to the more realistic problem of appraising its credibility. Psychologists
meantime will have built upon their knowledge of the statistical reliability of
witnesses in groups a technique of testing the veracity of individual witnesses and
assessing the reliability of particular items of testimony. Judges and advocates will
then become students and practitioners of an applied science of judicial proof.
C. T. McCormick, "Evidence" in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, ed. E. R.
Seligman and A. Johnson (New York: Macmillan, 1937) at 646.
365 See supra,Part C.
366 A well-known lawyer is reputed to have said to Sir James Stephen when he was

drafting his Evidence Code: "My Evidence Bill would be a very short one; it would
consist of one rule, to this effect: All rules of Evidence are hereby abolished." Quoted
in Wigmore, supra, note 60, Vol. 1 at XIV. For a discussion which attempts to meet
some of the practical concerns that Wigmore expressed with respect to the total abolition
of the rules, see Ferrari, Political Crime and Criminal Evidence (1919), 3 Minn. L.
Rev. 365.
3
07 Loevinger, supra, note 51 at 174; for a slightly longer statement of principles
to guide the admission of evidence in jury trials, see Thayer, Present and Future of The
Law of Evidence, supra, note 86 at 94.
3
68 Loevinger, id.
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the study of the minutiae of the rules of evidence a radical idea. Bentham was
again the harbinger. Indeed, the purpose of his treatise, the Rationale of Judicial Evidence, was, in his words, "[t]o give instructions serving to assist the
mind of the judge in forming its estimate of the probability of truth, in the
instance of the evidence presented to it; in a word, in judging the weight of
evidence."369 This aspect of Bentham's treatise was all but ignored. Over one
hundred year later, Wigmore was compelled to plead: ".... [the] process of

Proof represents the objective in every judicial investigation. The procedural
rules for admissibility are merely a preliminary aid to the main activity, viz.
the persuasion of the tribunal's mind to a correct conclusion by safe materials ... the judicial rules of admissibility are destined to lessen in relative
importance during the next period of development. Proof will assume the important place; and we must, therefore, prepare ourselves for this shifting of
emphasis."37 0

Thus, my fondest hope for the Code of Evidence is not necessarily that
it will be enacted, but that it will have some influence in changing the way
in which Canadian lawyers think about evidence problems and in which students are taught them. The Code is, in large measure, a product of the long
and vibrant tradition of Anglo-American evidence scholarship, which, if it is
ultimately to achieve its objectives, will dramatically simplify the rules of evidence and hasten the day on which the profession will take up the important
task of rationalizing judicial fact-finding. 371

369

Bentham, supra,note 61, Vol. 3 at 204.
o Wigmore, supra,note 362 at 4. McCormick also perceived the trend in evidence
law from strict rules to the discretionary application of principles and, eventually, to
the abandonment of the system of exclusion and concentration on the scientific evaluation of proof. McCormick, supra, note 362. Many contemporary evidence scholars
argue that more emphasis should be placed on the rational processes of weighing evi37

dence and less on arbitrary exclusion. See A. L. Goodhard, A Changing Approach to
the Law of Evidence (1965), 51 Virg. L. Rev. 759.
371 For a bibliography of materials on judicial proof see N. Brooks, "Psychology

and The Litigation Process: Rapprochement," in L.S.U.C. Psychology and the Litigation
Process, supra, note 41 at 26.

